Revisionist History of the Norman Invasion

The population of London in 1066 is estimated to have been ten to twelve thousand. The population of the Kent was much the same. So, the men needed for an overwhelming attack on the three Hastings Peninsula access points, say 25000, would consume more food and more ale than was being produced in the entire region. A large English army of, say, 12000 men and horses, could be provisioned for a week, perhaps, by plundering Kent’s grain stores, livestock and breweries. But there was no likelihood they would break through before their supplies ran out, and it would have been costly in casualties. A smaller blockading force of, say, 6000 men with no horses, could probably have been provisioned continuously, perhaps, but there was no certainty that they could outlast the Normans. Indeed, if the Normans did not mind eating horseflesh for a few months and some supplies could be brought from Normandy, there was probably enough farmland on the Hastings Peninsula to sustain a presence indefinitely, much as the English did at Calais for 200 years.

Harold would have known the difficulty, cost and time it might take to evict the Normans by force. He would also have known that if they were not evicted, they might permanently annex the Hastings Peninsula. It contained one of England’s most important ports, one of its biggest salt production sites, and its biggest fish salting plant, making it a valuable source of tax revenue.

It was standard practice in medieval times to buy off powerful invaders, thereby avoiding the vagaries of battle. The Anglo-Saxons had been buying off the Vikings for centuries. William’s messages to Harold showed a readiness to negotiate. Harold had a compelling incentive to negotiate. We are convinced, not least because there are no credible alternatives, that Harold left London intending to meet William face-to-face, ostensibly to negotiate the renouncement of William’s claim on the English crown. ‘ostensibly’ because there is a possibility that Harold intended to ambush William at the meeting place.

William’s strategy

Even though Harold had an incentive to negotiate, he would not have ventured into the theatre of war if he had an inkling of the danger, and he was suitably cautious. While still in London, he dispatched messengers, scouts and spies to reconnoitre the enemy strength and troop disposition. While on his journey south he sent more agents into enemy territory. Yet he still placed himself within striking distance of the enemy. There is only one credible explanation: his agents hugely underestimated the strength of the Norman army. Wace says that the presence of a significant Norman cavalry was a total surprise to Harold, and this would explain his actions.

Perhaps Harold’s agents were incompetent or unlucky. We think there was more to it. According to Poitiers, one of Harold’s messengers is allowed to roam through Norman held territory until he encounters William inspecting the Norman ships. William invites him into the Norman camp. He stays overnight. William invites him to a meeting with his barons the next day, then sends him back to Harold with a messenger. According to Wace, William captured two of Harold’s scouts. He escorted them around the Norman camp before sending them back to Harold. Giving away valuable intelligence about fortifications, troop strength and disposition is unthinkable for a commander preparing for battle. Rather, it is the behaviour of a sandbagger, someone deliberately pretending their army is far weaker than it is. Five other clues suggest that William was sandbagging:

1. According to Wace, having arrived at the theatre of war to discover that the enemy was far stronger than he expected, Harold blames Baldwin, the Count of Flanders, for repeatedly telling him that William would only bring a small number of horses. Baldwin was William’s father-in-law, so it seems likely that he was acting under instruction to feed Harold with false intelligence.
2. Poitiers reports that most of William’s men were not in the Norman camp on the day that Harold arrived at the theatre of war. He suggests that they were out foraging for food. It seems unlikely. William knew Harold’s exact location. If Harold was nearing the theatre of war and William intended to defend the Hastings Peninsula, his men would be preparing for battle. It seems more likely that William deliberately distributed his cavalry in small bands over a large area to hide them from English spies. Likely, he also placed men at a hidden battle camp overlooking Sedlescombe bridge, ready to ambush Harold if he tried to cross the Brede.
3. William and his barons lived at a ‘sea camp’ on the Hastings Peninsula coast. He chose to stay there, even though he had two weeks to move elsewhere. He clearly thought it was the best place to implement his strategy. Yet, if he planned to defend the Hastings Peninsula, he and his men would be closer to the action, up near the Rochester Road bridge at Sedlescombe. In our opinion, the only credible explanation for William and his barons staying at a coastal camp is that he was pretending to be militarily impotent.
4. The Anglo-Saxon Chronicle says: “Wyllelm him com ongean on unwær, ær þis folc gefylced wære”, meaning ‘William came against him [Harold] unexpectedly, before his army was gathered’. Note the use of ‘ongean’, the Old English word for a move with hostile intent discussed above. It is saying that William attacked Harold unexpectedly. The only credible reason that Harold would not have expected William to attack once he entered the theatre of war is that he underestimated the strength of the Norman army, especially the strength of the Norman cavalry.
5. Carmen (Barlow) says: “while he [Harold] sought to deceive, he was himself deceived and destroyed”. This deceit is usually presumed to mean the feigned retreat, but Harold was not deceived by the ruse. It was his men that were gulled. Indeed, he expected tricks trying to disrupt the English line and had specifically ordered his men to stay in position. In our opinion, the deceit refers to William sandbagging.

In summary, William’s strategy was to lure Harold into the theatre of war by pretending to be venal, and to mollify Harold’s circumspection by pretending his army was toothless and too far distant to be a danger. We provide three more reasons to believe that William and his barons camped at modern Winchelsea in the Section 4 below. We provide another dozen or so reasons in ‘The Camps’ section of our book.

Harold’s strategy

We explain above why we believe that Harold went to the theatre of war, ostensibly intending to negotiate with William face-to-face. It can only mean that he thought he had nothing to lose and, even if his expectations were low, potentially much to gain.

If Harold thought he had nothing to lose by entering the theatre of war, he thought that he was completely safe. This would only make sense if he was ignorant of the Norman cavalry. In this misbelief, Harold would have reasoned that he just needed to blockade Sedlescombe bridge and the isthmus ridge to be totally safe. The blockade would prevent a swift Norman infantry sortie from the Hastings Peninsula. Their only alternative would have been to cross the estuarine Brede on boats or to cross the fluvial Brede on muddy fields. Either way they would have been delayed by hours, and vulnerable on bad terrain. The English scouts would see them coming, giving Harold plenty of time to attack them on advantageous terrain or to fall back to safety along the Rochester Roman road.

In our opinion, then, Harold’s strategy was to blockade the main Hastings Peninsula egress points to trap the Normans therein, camp north of the Brede where he thought he would be safe, then to meet William on Sedlescombe bridge. This would explain why Harold brought no archers and no cavalry, because they were unhelpful for a blockade. It would explain why he brought an understrength army, because he had enough men to implement a comprehensive blockade of Norman infantry without straining the supply chain.

If this is right, Harold presumably reasoned that he would immediately return to London if the negotiations failed or if the Normans showed any signs of aggression, leaving the blockade in place while he decided how to levy and provision enough men to evict them by force.

William’s trap

It would have been pointless to lure Harold into the theatre of war unless there was a good chance of killing him. A standard sortie attack would not suffice. It would take hours for the Norman army to assemble and advance upon the English camp – three hours according to the contemporary accounts – whereas Harold would never have been more than a 30-minute ride from safety beyond the Rother. Wace says that Harold could not ride to safety because he would have been deemed a coward and would lose the respect of his men. The opposite is more likely. If Harold left the theatre of war, William would not have attacked, and the English troops would have been safe. They would surely have been grateful. Regardless, William would not have risked the success of his invasion by second guessing Harold’s thinking. He must have been confident that he could ambush or trap Harold once he had entered the theatre of war.

William’s opportunity came from the extraordinary geography of the Hastings Peninsula. It was surrounded by sea-cliffs and marshy strands, making a seaborne attack risky and unlikely. It was a narrow-necked peninsula, crossed by a steep sided watershed, within a narrow-necked peninsula (the Hastings Peninsula, Brede basin and Rother Peninsula respectively). It gave three opportunities to trap Harold, and at least three opportunities to ambush him. The further Harold ventured south along the Rochester Roman road, the greater the danger he was in, yet there is no reason he might have realised it if he was ignorant of the Norman cavalry.

If, as we propose above, Harold’s strategy was to blockade the Normans on the Hastings Peninsula and then negotiate with William face-to-face, he would have camped on a hill near the Rochester Roman road north of the Brede. The only credible candidates are Compasses Hill near Cripps Corner (just south of C on Figure 4) and Great Sanders ridge (E). In his ignorance of the huge Norman cavalry, the latter would have seemed far preferrable, a comfortable size for an army of six thousand, within sight of bridge that was the only easy egress route for the Norman infantry and protected to the south by a string of immense iron ore pits. His subsequent actions infer that the English camped on Great Sanders ridge.

Harold was tricked. Baudri explains that William stationed men behind the English position to catch anyone trying to flee. It means that the Norman cavalry occupied the Udimore Ridge (magenta dots). Harold and his army were trapped between the Udimore Ridge and the Brede.

The corroborating evidence that the English army was trapped can be derived from Harold’s military tactics. The English fought behind a static shield wall. In a battle between a static shield wall on the one side versus cavalry and archers on the other, the shield wall cannot win. Its best outcome is to survive. Harold discovered the strength of the Norman cavalry, and therefore that he was in mortal peril, on the morning of the day before battle. It was only four miles, a sixty-minute march, from the southernmost battlefield candidate to safety beyond the River Rother. If Harold main objective was to survive, he had plenty of time to withdraw the English army to safety. Several accounts say that the battle started at the third hour, so he could have withdrawn the English army on the morning of day of battle. The only credible explanation for why he did not is that he could not. And the only credible reason he could not withdraw or flee is that the English were trapped.

The revised engagement

Harold arrived at the English camp on Thursday 12th October. At dawn on Friday 13th, according to Wace, Harold and Gyrth went out alone to reconnoitre the Norman battle camp. This is when Harold discovered to his horror that he has been hoodwinked, that the Normans had brought many hundreds of warhorses. Harold was close enough to the Norman battle camp to hear their horses and to see the Normans tents and armour. The only place in the region where they would have felt safe to be alone and this close to the Norman camp is Balcombe Green, where they would have been protected by the Brede estuary from the Normans on the other side.

According to Wace, Harold realised his danger, but he had no good options. The Brede and the main Norman army were to the south. There were streams east and west, probably guarded. The only route to safety was north, back up the Rochester Roman road, but it was guarded, perhaps with thousands of men and perhaps all the way to the Rother. Harold’s only option was to defend all or part of the Great Sanders ridge and to hope that reinforcements arrived to clear the route between Great Sanders and the Rother.

According to Wace, William spent the rest of Friday 13th reconnoitring the English camp and trying to scare Harold into flight, knowing that he had placed men on the Udimore Ridge to catch anyone trying to flee.

At dawn on Saturday 14th October, the Normans were at their battle camp along Cottage Lane (N), the English were in their camp on Great Sanders ridge (E). Harold could see the Normans amassing on the other side of the river. As soon as his scouts informed him that they were leaving their camp, he ordered the English to occupy the spur at Hurst Lane. His only alternative was to defend the English camp, but it was vulnerable with level approaches to the east and west. Hurst Lane spur was smaller, narrower, and protected on three sides with no weaknesses.

We provide three compelling reasons to believe that the Battle of Hastings was fought at Hurst Lane in Section 5 below, and another 28 reasons in ‘The Battlefield’ section of our book.

2. Some reasons to think that the Normans landed in the Brede estuary

1. Hæstingaport

The contemporary accounts agree that the Normans landed near a port. It is named ‘Hæstingaport’ in the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle. Old English ‘port’ had the modern meaning of somewhere that handled freight and/or passengers, different from harbours and havens which are Old English nouns for non-freight handling maritime refuges. The sub-Andredsweald population in Saxon times was too low to manufacture much of anything or to need significant imports, so Hæstingaport’s raison d’être was to export natural resources. In Roman times, the Brede basin had 85% of the Weald’s iron ore. Domesday lists it with the Hastings Peninsula’s only significant non-farming population, its only burgesses, and 70% of its salt production. It would have had at least that proportion of its fisheries, and it was the only estuary in the region with steep valley sides suitable for exploiting timber. Hæstingaport is therefore most likely to have been at the mouth of the Brede, and De Viis Maris, a 12th century guide for crusaders, says that Old Winchelsea at the mouth of the Brede was the only significant port in the region. It was similarly dominant in the 13th century according to ‘Ship Service’ and tax records which show that Brede’s ports were ten times bigger than any other in the region. This is consistent with the Brede basin’s proportion of natural resource production. If Hæstingaport was at Old Winchelsea, the Normans landed in the Brede estuary.

2. Logistics and bridgehead

The Normans were most vulnerable – think D-Day - as they came in to land. As it turned out, the start of the harvest and Harald Hardrada’s invasion at York had drawn the defenders away, but William was not to know. If, as he expected, the landing area was defended by an English garrison, the invaders would have needed very specific conditions to establish a bridgehead without a huge loss of men, horses and materiel. Among them: 1) An estuary with landing possibilities on both banks, to land unopposed if the defence was concentrated on one bank or to split the defence if it was not; 2) A long enough strand to land all ships simultaneously, thereby stretching the defence as thin as possible; 3) Firm ground to support mounted horses; 4) A defendable choke point to protect the bridgehead against a counterattack; 5) Level ground to assemble a kit fortress without first creating a motte. All the estuaries and inlets between Lympne and Eastbourne were naturally marshy, unsuitable for a mass landing, but Hooe Haven and the Brede estuary were being farmed for salt. Repeated flooding and top slicing of briny alluvium would have left a firm level plain on their northern estuary banks. Hooe Haven was too short to land the Norman fleet, and it lacked natural defences. The Brede basin’s salt plain was more than three times as long and it had the Sowdens pinch point to defend a bridgehead. The Brede basin therefore matches all the landing requirements and is the most likely place for the Normans to land. 

3. Rameslie manor

William would not have personal expertise about Sussex coastal geography. Someone with expert local knowledge must have told him about its estuaries, garrisons, salt plains and pinch points. Edward the Confessor’s Norman advisers and diplomats were banished from England in 1052, but monks from the Norman Abbey of Fécamps hung on to their manor of Rameslie around the Brede estuary, presumably because they alone had the financial capital, numeracy and organisational skills to manage its commercial activities, and thereby to pay tax. According to Carmen, their land was eventually expropriated, and they too were banished from England, but they would still have had the most recent and the most detailed knowledge of the potential landing sites opposite Normandy. William is known to have been in contact with Fécamps monks who had lived in England because he brought some as translators. He would have been naïve or foolish – not traits for which he is known - not to have tapped these monks for their local knowledge of the terrain, roads, fortifications, ambush opportunities, camp sites, food sources and other logistics. As Jo Kirkham proposed 25 years ago, these monks would have known the Brede basin’s unique logistical and defensive advantages – see ‘Logistics and bridgehead’ above – so they would have recommended it for the landing.

3. Harold’s traditional strategies

1. A surprise attack on the Norman camp

By tradition, Harold’s strategy was to lead a surprise attack on the Norman camp. The tradition is based on some early Norman invasion accounts that specifically say that this was Harold’s plan. Poitiers, for instance: “He [Harold] intended to surprise them and to crush them in a nocturnal or surprise attack”. There is good reason to think this is wrong:

• William and Harold had been exchanging messages before and during Harold’s advance to the theatre of war. William therefore knew Harold’s exact location, and Harold knew that the Normans could not be taken by surprise.
• The Battle of Hastings featured a passive English shield wall defending the battlefield hill. The only explanation that is consistent with a surprise attack strategy is that Harold initiated his surprise attack then suddenly realised his folly, so occupied and defended the nearest hill. But if Harold realised his folly, he would have fallen back to safety rather than risking his life, his dynasty and his people by defending a random hill.
• The only sources to claim that Harold was trying a surprise attack are early and Norman. There is no reason to believe that they were reporting facts. Everyone likely to have known Harold’s strategy died in the battle. There is no reason anyone in the Norman camp would have known his strategy, so no one could report his strategy to the authors that claim he was trying a surprise attack.
• Later accounts, Wace for instance, drop the ‘surprise attack’ claim.

It seems likely that the Norman authors of the ‘surprise attack’ accounts were trying to denigrate Harold as a hot-headed idiot. Poitiers, for example, says: “The King in his fury had hastened his march”, while Orderic claims that he was so angry about the Norman invasion that he kicked his mother. But Harold was not impetuous or simple-minded. His sister Edith described him as blessed ‘with a mildness of temper’, so willing to listen to the opinion of others that he would ‘defer action, sometimes to his own detriment’, and that ‘no one could accuse him of rashness or levity’. Doubtless she was biased but her description tallies with his actions during campaigns against Gruffydd ap Llywelyn in 1063 and Harald Hardrada in 1066.

If Harold was in his right mind, it is implausible that he would have considered any sort of attack on the Norman camp with an understrength footbound archerless army. And, anyway, if that was his plan, he would surely have delegated his brother Gyrth to command its implementation.

2. Occupy and defend the battlefield hill

Wace says that Harold marched from Westminster to: “where the abbey of the battle is now built. There he said he would defend himself”. Wace was writing over a hundred years after the battle, and he was no more likely to have known Harold’s strategy than Poitiers or Jumièges. It seems likely that Wace devised the ‘occupy and defend’ strategy to explain why it was thought that the battle was fought at Battle Abbey. It is more plausible than an aborted surprise attack and some historians support it, but that does not make it even remotely likely.

If Harold was in his right mind, and there is no reason to think otherwise, it is totally implausible that he would choose a strategy to occupy and defend a hill in the theatre of war. In a battle between a shield wall on the one side versus cavalry and archers on the other, the shield wall cannot win. Its best outcome is to survive. But if Harold’s objective was to survive, he would not have chosen to place himself in jeopardy by an occupying and defending a hill in the theatre of war. Indeed, he would not have gone to the theatre of war.

3. A blockade

Modern historians have realised that Harold could not have been trying either of the two established strategies. Instead, they increasingly propose that he intended to blockade the Normans on the Hastings Peninsula. As we explain above, this tallies with his actions, with the size and composition of his army, and with the most trustworthy contemporary account, the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle. However, we do not think it was Harold’s main strategy because he would surely have delegated Gyrth to implement a blockade. Rather, we think the idea of the blockade was to guarantee his safety and to improve his negotiating position in subsequent face-to-face meetings with William.

4. Some reasons to think that the Normans camped at modern Winchelsea

1. The Rochester Roman road

Places with ‘ceastre’ in their name were formerly Roman fortifications. Roman fortifications were linked by Roman roads. Part of the Rochester Roman road (Margary 13) is referred to as the ‘London to Winchelsea road’ in a 1294 writ, and as the ‘Winchelsea to Robertsbridge road’ in a 1300 writ. In December 2024, an excavation substantiated these writs by uncovering a stretch of metalled Roman road in Icklesham, just 2km from modern Winchelsea and aligned towards it. Thus, there was a Roman fortification at modern Winchelsea. This is corroborated by Wickham, just outside modern Winchelsea, the name almost always indicating a former Roman vicus. The Rochester Roman road was the only Roman trunk road on the Hastings Peninsula, so modern Winchelsea had the only major Roman fortification on the Hastings Peninsula. Therefore, Hæstingaceastre must have been at modern Winchelsea. If Hæstingaceastre was at modern Winchelsea, so was the main Norman camp.

2. Hæstingaport’s mercantile centre

Hæstingaport’s docks were on the shingle island of Old Winchelsea (see above). But William would not have camped on a low-lying island with no inland view and limited food (as Dauphin Louis discovered 150 years later). However, Hæstingaport, like many ports in medieval times, and many still today, probably separated its uncouth labouring activities from its refined mercantile activities. Its docks, warehouses and fisheries would have been at Old Winchelsea, while its mercantile centre was somewhere else nearby. The Tapestry depicts the main Norman camp on a hill and the Roman fortification and Hæstingaceastre burh are likely would have been on a promontory. The only nearby place which fits that description was modern Winchelsea. Hæstingaport’s mercantile centre and the main Norman camp were therefore at modern Winchelsea.