The Battle of Stamford Bridge ... at Holtby

References to ‘Stamford Bridge’ in these contemporary accounts are assumed to mean modern Stamford Bridge. There is some supporting evidence. The name appears in medieval records referring to somewhere in this vicinity. Stamford Bridge is at the Derwent’s medieval head of tide, so a good place to have a ford. The river is twice its normal width at that location and the area is known locally as ‘The Shallows’, which implies that it has been shoaled to make a ford. ‘stamford’ means ‘stony ford’ and there is a bed of Keuper sandstone north of the modern town which would have been ideal for a ford. Sandstone is a type of flagstone and there was a place in the parish named ‘Flawith’ which means ‘flag ford’ according to A H Smith, editor of ‘Place names of the East Riding and York’. This is compelling evidence that there was a medieval ford at modern Stamford Bridge, but what about the bridge?

A section of Roman road has been found at the McKechnie factory, immediately opposite Stamford Bridge on the other side of the river. It is generally assumed that it carried the Roman road from Jorvik to Bridlington via modern Stamford Bridge. If so, it might have crossed the Derwent on a bridge and there is anecdotal evidence of a medieval bridge (location shown on Figure 2) some 200m from the ford. It is almost universally assumed that this is the road and bridge that Harold used to attack the Norse army in the Battle of Stamford Bridge.

In summary, there is the bones of a conjecture that the Battle of Stamford Bridge was fought at modern Stamford Bridge. The jump from tentative conjecture to received wisdom is ‘Battle Flat’. Historians think it is implausibly unlikely to be a coincidence, so they treat it as incontrovertible evidence that the Battle of Stamford Bridge was fought at Battle Flat. In the next section, we will explain why we think they are wrong.

Debunking the Battle Flat battlefield

Figure 4 shows the LiDAR for modern Stamford Bridge. The red line shows where the medieval bridge is thought to have crossed the Derwent. The black line is the route of the A166 which is thought to follow the Roman road. The red rectangle is over some slightly elevated ground that forms the modern town centre. Battle Flat is under the magenta rectangle.

There are some inconsistencies against both the orthodox battle scenarios :

1.   Hardrada would not have defended the inside bend of a river

Henry of Huntingdon implies that the initial engagement was west of the river by saying that the English forced the Norse to retreat across the bridge at Stamford Bridge. Historians interpret this to mean that the Norse defended the inside bend of the Derwent where it was crossed by the supposed bridge at Stamford Bridge, as depicted by McLynn on Figure 2. Hardrada was a hugely experienced commander. He would not have consigned his army to almost certain defeat by defending the inside bend of a river whose only escape was across a narrow wooden bridge. After all, what would have happened if the bridge collapsed?

2.   The Norse army could not get off the island of Riccall without their ships

The orthodox Norse camp is at Riccall, an island west of the Derwent. This is inconsistent with Heimskringla which says that the Norse landing party left their ships at their camp.

3.   There was no way for the Norse army to get from a camp at Riccall to Stamford Bridge in time for the battle

Riccall is west of the Derwent, Stamford Bridge to its east. The Norse landing party needed to cross the Derwent, and the only orthodox crossings were at Stamford Bridge. There are three credible routes: 1) Rowing down the Ouse then up the Derwent; 2) Rowing to Stillingfleet, then marching east along the west bank Escrick moraine ridge, crossing the Derwent on some sort of jury-rigged pontoon bridge, then marching north along the east-bank Escrick moraine ridge; 3) Rowing upstream to Jorvik, then marching east along the Roman road to Stamford Bridge, crossing the Derwent on the bridge or ford at Stamford Bridge. It is 15 miles from Riccall to Stamford Bridge. It would have taken the Norse army five hours to make the journey without marsh or river crossing. With those obstacles, they would be lucky to arrive at the battle theatre before 14:00, far too late for Huntingdon’s early morning battle.

4.   The Norse army would not have headed east after retreating across the bridge

According to the orthodox narrative, the Norse fleet was at Riccall, south and west of modern Stamford Bridge. If, as Huntingdon says, the Norse retreated across the supposed bridge at modern Stamford Bridge, they would surely have headed south to High Catton (HC on Figure 4) and their ships rather than east to Battle Flat. Not only was High Catton in the right direction, but it was narrow, steep sided and within reach, only 2km from the supposed bridge. The English would have been delayed crossing the bridge, giving the Norse plenty of time to establish an impenetrable shield wall at High Catton or elsewhere on the ridge.

5.   The Norse would not have chosen to defend Battle Flat

Battle Flat is claggy and, well, flat. DeVries tries to make a case that it was defensible but admits that its main selling point is its name. There were two far better defensive positions nearby at Pasture Hill (PH) and High Catton (HC). If the invaders found themselves trapped in modern Stamford Bridge and unable to reach those places, they would have either defended the elevated land in the modern town centre or the Roman road with its aggers forming readymade fortifications. Moreover, and inexplicably, they would have had to cross the Roman road and the elevated ground to get to Battle Flat. In effect, the invaders are supposed to have fallen back across the two best defensive places in the area to make a stand at the least defensible place in the area, and at the only place where the higher ground would be advantageous to the English. It is incomprehensible.

Some of the more cautious historians have realised the folly of the orthodox battlefield. DeVries, for instance, despite making half-hearted excuses for the orthodox battlefield in his text, admits that its only significant selling point is the Battle Flat name. He then hedges his bets by depicting the Norse shield wall on the elevated ground (red rectangle on Figure 4). McLynn does the reverse. He depicts the Norse shield wall at Battle Flat (blue rectangle), but then explains in his text that they were actually on the elevated ground in the modern town centre. But if the battle was on the elevated ground, it was not at Battle Flat and that is the only significant evidence for the exact location of the orthodox battlefield.

Barrett and Leadman have another theory. They think that the Norse army made an initial defence of the east/south riverbank before being driven back over the elevated ground to make a stand at Battle Flat. But, if the Norse were driven over the elevated ground, they would not have stopped at the most disadvantageous location. They would have kept going to make a stand at Pasture Hill (PH on Figure 4) or High Catton (HC).

Burne acknowledges that Battle Flat is an unlikely choice of battlefield. He excuses it by saying that Viking commanders were happy to accept terrain parity because they: “considered themselves pre-eminent, and their one thought was to form this shield-wall on a fair battleground”. We have never heard this conjecture elsewhere and it seems unlikely. It seems to us that Viking commanders took pride in choosing the most advantageous battlefield terrain. It was mentioned in Harald Hardrada’s Heimskringla obituary as one of his greatest assets. We are convinced that he would have made his stand on the most advantageous terrain, whereas Battle Flat has the least advantageous terrain in the vicinity.

DeVries has another potential excuse. He reckons that the topography in modern Stamford Bridge might have changed since the 11th century. It is unfounded. The topography has not changed significantly since the advent of contour maps in the 19th century, and their predecessors lacked the manpower, tools, or incentive to move huge quantities of earth. The land might have been flattened in the town centre during the 20th century, but we think that Battle Flat is much the same today as it was then.

‘Stamford Bridge’ is an unusual name, clearly referring to somewhere that had a ford and a bridge. As far as we know, this name form is unique, albeit Cambridge had a similar etymological history, and it is difficult to explain. Why would an Ango-Saxon settlement with a perfectly good non-tidal ford need a bridge too? By tradition, modern Stamford Bridge had a Roman bridge carrying the Jorvik to Bridlington road over the Derwent. Perhaps, then, the bridge was broken when the Anglo-Saxons arrived, so they temporarily replaced it by a ford, before repairing the bridge in time for the Hardrada’s invasion. But its name is ‘Stamford bridge’ not ‘Stambridge ford’, implying that the ford came first, and the Romans are unlikely to have built a bridge where there was a perfectly good ford .

Unsurprisingly then, there is no evidence that there was a pre-18th century bridge at modern Stamford Bridge. H G Ramm reports that York Sub-Aqua Club went looking for its buttresses in 1964 but found nothing medieval. The banks adjacent to modern Stamford Bridge were excavated in 2000 for the same purpose. They too found nothing medieval. We mention above that there are medieval references to ‘Stamford Bridge’. The VCH, for instance, records references to it in 1280 and 1581. This implies that there was a medieval bridge at modern Stamford Bridge, but the original documents do not give its exact location. The bridge might be ‘near’ modern Stanford Bridge rather than ‘at’ modern Stamford Bridge.

In our opinion, this is the most likely explanation for the names. In other words, the contemporary accounts are referring to ‘Stamford bridge’, lower case ‘b’, meaning ‘the bridge near Stamford’. It is unlikely to have been upstream because the Derwent valley is flat, and the river upstream is fluvial. The Anglo-Saxon settlement of Kexby was three miles downstream. Therefore, ‘Stamford bridge’ would have been less than 1.5km from the medieval ford at Stamford Bridge and probably downstream. We will return to its exact location momentarily. We guess that there was an Anglo-Saxon settlement named Stamford which grew to absorb the location of a nearby Roman era bridge then known as ‘Stamford bridge’. The parish would have covered both, so it became known as ‘Stamford Bridge’.

If we are right, there was no Roman or medieval bridge at modern Stamford Bridge. We suspect that its first bridge was built in 1727, soon after the Derwent Navigation Act of 1702 authorised work to make the Derwent navigable to Malton. This work included a lock at Kexby. We guess that its associated weir raised the upstream river level, flooding the ancient ford at modern Stamford Bridge, so they had to replace it with a bridge.

And the point of all this is to explain that, in our opinion, the reason that modern Stamford Bridge does not match the contemporary account battlefield descriptions, and why it has no battle related archaeology, is that it had no Saxon era bridge and that the battle was not fought there.

Heimskringla's battle account

There is not enough information in the English accounts to resolve their apparent inconsistencies. We need to incorporate information from the Norse sagas. Four of them cover Hardrada’s invasion of Northumbria. They are known as Heimskringla, Fagrskinna, Morkinskinna and Orkneyinga. We focus on Heimskringla (complete account here), recorded by Snorri Sturluson around 1230, because it has the most original detail, as well a synthesis of the original details from the others. We are more positive about Norse sagas than proper historians. We are just selective about which bits to trust. Not the fantasy and magic, of course. Nor anything that glorifies Norse kings or Norse culture. Doubtless, they herald Hardrada’s successes and fudge his failures. But they had no incentive to invent incidental geographic detail or to move the location of major events. We are inclined to believe those details.

Historians have always tried to fit saga events into a Battle of Stamford Bridge narrative based on the English accounts, rejecting any saga statements that are inconvenient or inconsistent. A more coherent narrative can be built by doing the reverse, fitting the English account’s events into Heimskringla’s narrative, in which case nothing is inconsistent, and nothing needs to be rejected.

Heimskringla starts by saying that Hardrada was due to attend a meeting in Jorvik (Finlay): “An assembly was arranged for early on the Monday in the city”. This Monday was the day of battle. Hardrada was not expecting any resistance, so they left their armour and a third of their men at the camp. This is what Heimskringla says about the initial encounter (Laing):

Now as they came near the castle a great army seemed coming against them, and they saw a cloud of dust as from horses’ feet, and under it shining shields and bright armour. The king halted his people, and called to him Earl Toste, and asked him what army this could be. The Earl replied that he thought it most likely to be a hostile army, but possibly it might be some of his relations who were seeking for mercy and friendship, in order to obtain certain peace and safety from the king. Then the king said, “We must all halt, to discover what kind of a force this is.” They did so; and the nearer this force came the greater it appeared, and their shining arms were to the sight like glancing ice.

So, the Norse landing party was approaching Jorvik (Y on Figure 5) when they saw an army heading towards them. They must have been approaching Jorvik from the east because they eventually retreat across the Derwent. In case it is not obvious, if they had been approaching Jorvik from any other direction, they would have had to retreat an implausible 12km or more to cross the Derwent. The Fulford glacial moraine ridge - warm colours on Figure 5 – crossed between the Derwent and Jorvik.

The location of medieval 'Stamford bridge'

If, as we think, the Norse army approached Jorvik from Stamford Bridge and the main battle was fought west of the Derwent, they must have crossed the Derwent. They retreated west to east across the bridge, so it seems likely that they also used the bridge to cross the Derwent from east to west. We explain above why we think that Stamford Bridge’s medieval bridge was not at modern Stamford Bridge but some distance downstream. The exact location has been known for nearly fifty years.

In 1976, the Royal Commission published a B&W photo (Figure 6) showing crops marks of a Roman road junction at Low Catton, 800m south of the Derwent railway crossing. The camera is above the Derwent and facing east towards Reckondales, so the left branch is heading northeast towards the Post Office at modern Stamford Bridge. The middle branch extrapolates east to Garrowby Hill and Bridlington, west to Jorvik. It seems very probable, then, that this is the important Roman military road between Jorvik and Bridlington.

Ian G Lawton has been searching for Roman archaeology to the east of York since the early 1990s. In 1991, he found archaeological remains of a major Roman settlement traversed by a Roman road on the Derwent west bank. He reasoned, rightly we think, that this must be Roman Derventio, a settlement which was known to be in this vicinity.

The NAA confirmed and expanded Lawton’s findings in their 2005 archaeological pipeline survey. Details are recorded here and summarised in Figure 7. It shows their diagram of Roman roads in the vicinity, depicted by orange lines. Derventio is the orange hatched area traversed by a Roman road to the west of the Derwent. The section of Roman road we have highlighted in red to the east of the Derwent is that shown on the Figure 6 cropmarks. The Roman road through Derventio therefore spanned the Derwent. The river was tidal at this location, wide, muddy, and more than a metre deep in the middle at low tide. It needed a bridge and was important enough to justify having one.

Lawton reports that a 1m square sandstone block was once found at this exact location. It has subsequently been lost, so its purpose is uncertain, but he argues that it was probably “either a bridge pier or cut-water”.

Derventio was abandoned soon after the Romans left. The wooden part of the bridge probably rotted within a few hundred years. But, as long as the abutments and piers were still there, the road was probably important enough for the Anglo-Saxons to repair the bridge. Lawton concludes that this is the Saxon era bridge to which the contemporary accounts refer and from which Stamford Bridge gets its name. Derventio had disappeared by Saxon times. As we say above, we think that the bridge took its name from its nearest Saxon settlement, Stamford, and that as that settlement grew, its parish encompassed the bridge, to become known as Stamford Bridge.

Lawton realised back in 1994 that that his discoveries might have far reaching implications for the location of the battle. His very last paragraph ends: “If we enter the realms of speculation, perhaps we could envisage the Roman construction succumbing to time and decay, with a later build constructed upon the remains of the Roman stonework. Perhaps this crossing point formed the focus for that day’s activity [i.e., the battle] with the high ground of the earlier Roman settlement, and the Low Catton ridge on the opposite bank forming the arena for the event.” Brilliantly perspicacious we think, although probably incomplete.

Alas, Lawton’s Derventio no better fits the English contemporary account battlefield descriptions than modern Stamford Bridge. Hardrada would not have set up his shield wall backing onto a boggy riverbank. If he was at Derventio when he saw the English army approaching, he would clearly have crossed over the bridge and would have made his stand at the excellent defensive position of High Catton, just 1500m away on good Roman roads all the way. But this would contradict the contemporary accounts.

Roman roads east of York

The route of the A166 between Gate Hemsley and Garrowby Hill has been labelled ‘ROMAN ROAD’ since the 1912 Ordnance Survey map (Figure 8). They presumably believe it is part of the Jorvik to Bridlington Roman road. It is not based on physical evidence but on intangibles like the straightness of the road, parish boundaries, and ancient places with ‘Street’ in their name. With no physical evidence, the Ordnance Survey could be wrong.

In the 1950s and 1960s, Ivan Margary mapped Roman roads across the entire country. Figure 9 shows his 1955 diagram of the Roman roads around the Vale of York. It is not one of his more reliable. Where possible he used sections uncovered road as physical anchors, but according to his notes, the route of the 810 between the Foss and the Derwent was based entirely on parish boundaries. Again, with no physical evidence he could be wrong.

Two sections of Roman road paving were discovered in the 1950s. One was at the McKechnie factory, opposite modern Stamford Bridge on the north side of the Derwent. The other was at Apple Tree Farm, two miles northeast of Jorvik. Historians presumed that they were on the same Roman road, and that the road went between Jorvik and Bridlington. The orthodox route is from Jorvik’s north gate to Apple Tree Farm to Gate Hemsley to the McKechnie factory, across the Derwent to modern Stamford Bridge, then east to Garrowby Hill on the route of the A166, and on to Bridlington.

In recent times, information about Roman roads in Britian has been collated by the Roman Roads Research Association (RRRA). They found a new clue about the route of the 810 in a cropmark east of from Apple Tree Farm. It points directly towards Lawton’s Derventio. They have updated their route diagram accordingly (Figure 12), with the 810 going straight from Apple Tree Farm to Derventio, albeit depicted in dots to indicate it is unsubstantiated and misleadingly labelled ‘Derventio (Stamford Bridge)’.

RRRA also depict a Roman road out of the south Jorvik gate, along the Fulford ridge crest. It meets the 810 near Holtby. Unlike earlier studies, RRRA do not think that it extended to Gate Hemlsey to follow the route of the A166. That leaves the McKechnie factory Roman road hanging, so they connect it to a fork off the 810 near Derventio. 

Ian Lawton found some new stretches of Roman road between Dunnington and Derventio. He added them to those that had been found previously and to stretches of Roman road that can be assumed through crop marks. The coordinates were published in his 1994 paper ‘The Roman Roads Around Stamford Bridge’. They give a different spin on the Roman road routes between the Foss and the Derwent.

Lawton mapped his coordinates onto a diagram with his idea of the most probable Roman road routes. That diagram is not to scale, so we have superimposed his coordinates onto a heat relief map (on Figure 13), with his coordinates shown by red dots and red lines. His proposed Roman road routes are shown in faint black lines. He thinks there was a southern Roman road from Jorvik (Y) along the crest of the Fulford moraine ridge to Dunnington (D) and thence to Derventio (V) and Garrowby. He gives it the reference SBR2. He proposes another road, SBR1, connected Apple Tree Farm (A) to Gate Hemsley (G), and a Roman fortress at the McKechnie factory.

The route of the SBR2, the southern road, seems conclusive. We are less convinced by SBR1, his northern road, not least because sections of the route between Apple Tree Farm and Gate Hemsley have been excavated without finding any evidence of a road. The RRRA’s cropmark east of Apple Tree Farm was found after Lawton’s paper was published. It extrapolates east precisely to Lawton’s Derventio, and Roman engineers are famous for their straight roads, which implies this was the route of Margary’s 810.

If this is right, three Roman roads headed east from York across the Derwent. It sounds unlikely but we think there is a credible explanation. RRRA’s route for RR810 between Apple Tree Farm and Derventio is wide and straight, typical of important Roman roads. They reckon it was the earliest of the roads east of York and was therefore probably built for military use. However, it had an 8% slope as it crossed Fulford moraine ridge which would have been marginal for horse drawn carts carrying heavy freight. It also had to cross the Foss and two miles of boggy fen. It may well have been flood prone. The southern road along the Fulford moraine crest had neither of these issues. It is at least 5m above the flood plain and had no slopes greater than 2.5%. We think it was built primarily for freight between York and Brough, although it may well have been used by non-freight traffic when RR810 flooded. Historic England list the likely presence of two Roman marching camps just north of the McKechnie factory. It seems likely that the northern branch serviced these camps.

Our main interest here is in Hardrada’s location on the moraine ridge crest when he spotted the English army. The English army must have been on a paved road because they were making clouds of dust. They are likely to have been on a paved road anyway because men and horses would have risked injury and exhaustion crossing the gloopy fens between York and the Derwent. If we are right about the road routes, there are three possibilities, depending on which road the Norse army was on: northwest of Dunnington, or on the southern outskirts of Holtby (H) or midway between Holtby and Warthill (W).

We think the Norse army was at Holtby because there are issues with Dunnington and the Warthill gap. Heimskringla makes it sound like Hardrada and Tostig were looking down on the English army coming towards them, able to see its size, strength and composition while still too far distant to know whether it was friend or foe. It is unlikely that the Norse army was on the northern branch because they were heading to York from Derventio bridge. Even if the armies were heading towards each other on the northern branch, Hardrada would not have been able to see the English army in any detail because Warthill gap is only 5m above the road from York. If, on the other hand, the armies were heading towards each other on the southern road, the Norse would not be looking down on the English because the ridge crest is fairly level.

Even if Heimskringla invented the conversation between Hardrada and Tostig about their view of the English army, it seems likely that both armies were on the RR810 between Apple Tree Farm to Derventio anyway. The Norse army was heading to York from Derventio bridge. The English army was heading to Derventio bridge from York. They were not expecting to encounter each other on the road. Both, then, were likely to have chosen to use RR810 because it was the widest, shortest and best surfaced route to their destination. 

Riccall & the Norse fleet

According to Heimskringla, Hardrada made several crucial decisions - whether to fight or flee, for instance - based on the location of his fleet, so it is important to work out its location on the eve of battle. By tradition, the fleet was Riccall, but as we say above, that would not have given them enough time to get to anywhere near modern Stamford Bridge in the early morning - or indeed, before noon - making it inconsistent with the contemporary accounts. There are other reasons to doubt a camp at Riccall:

1. The Anglo-Saxon Chronicle says that Harold collects his fleet at Tadcaster. They can only have got there from the Humber estuary. But the route would have passed within 200m of Riccall. The Norse are hardly likely to let them to pass unmolested, and if they did, Hardrada would have been forewarned of the English army’s approach, yet all the contemporary accounts emphasise that he was taken by surprise.
2. The Anglo-Saxon Chronicle says that the English army marched from Tadcaster through Jorvik on the morning of the battle. They would have had to pass along a ridge crest within seven miles of Riccall, creating a dust cloud. Heimskringla explains that the weather was so warm on the day of battle that the landing party left their armour behind. The Norse fleet guard would have been able to see a dust cloud seven miles away and would have sent a warning to Hardrada, yet all the contemporary accounts emphasise that he was taken by surprise.
3. Riccall was an island in a tidal salt-marsh. Heimskringla says that the Norse army walk from their ships to the battlefield, that the Norse messengers ride from the battlefield to the ships, and that Marshall Styrkarr rides from the battlefield to the ships to deliver news of defeat. This would only be possible on a land route, which means that the camp was not on an island.
4. Riccall had less than 50 acres of pastureland and the grass quality would have been poor. It would have sustained no more than 250 sheep, barely enough to feed the Norse army for three days. They needed to move.
5. Heimskringla says that on the day before the battle the entire Norse army went to Jorvik where the townsfolk agreed to Hardrada’s conditions for surrender. He takes hostages and organises various meetings, including the fateful one in Jorvik on the following morning. Heimskringla says: “In the evening the king returned down to his ships, with this victory achieved with his own force, and he was very merry”. So, the king returned to his ships on the evening before the battle. He clearly could not have returned to his ships by water, so he must have returned by land. Therefore, the ships must have been moored somewhere with a land link to Jorvik. Hardrada returned to his ships on the eve of the battle, so they were still there the following morning. Therefore, the Norse fleet was moored somewhere with a land link to Jorvik at dawn on the day of battle. It could not have been at Riccall or any other island.
6. Heimskringla describes Marshall Styrkarr’s journey from the battlefield back to the ships. He encounters a wagon on the way, kills its driver and steals his coat. The account ends by saying (Laing): “He then took the skin-coat, sprang on his horse, and rode down to the strand”. It means ‘down’ in the sense of ‘descended’, so the ships were moored at a sandy or shingle strand beneath some sort of higher ground. Neither would apply to Riccall.
7. Auden reckons that the Ouse would have been too easy for Harold to blockade, thereby trapping the Norse fleet on the marsh. He thinks that they withdrew to open water, presumably to somewhere on the Humber estuary, on the day after the Battle of Fulford, but if they did, they did not stay there because it is too far from the battlefield.

Unsurprisingly, then, there is no evidence that the Norse fleet was at Riccall on the eve of the battle. The Norse army camped at Riccall before the Battle of Fulford and returned to their ships the same evening. No accounts say that they moved to a new camp, so historians assume they were still there on the eve of the Battle of Stamford Bridge. But they were not, for the reasons we just listed. Therefore, Hardrada moved his fleet closer to the action. We will try to deduce where.

There are not as many Norse camp candidates as it might seem. The camp could not have been upstream on the Ouse because that would not have led to a battle near the Derwent. The Humber Levels is ruled out too because the Norse could not have walked or ridden across a marsh. The only plausible camps are on the Derwent . As we conclude above, the fleet was not moored on an island, which discounts Barmby (M), Bubwith (U) and East Cottingwith (EC). They were not moored on the west bank downstream of Kexby because it is lined by stretches of marshland known locally as ‘ings’. The east bank is less marshy, but it lacks settlements. This is important because the ground water would have been brackish. If the Norse camp was on a tidal stretch of the Derwent, it must have been at a settlement with a well. The bigger the settlement the better because thousands of Vikings would have eaten prodigious amounts of livestock and grain.

Absenting Heimskringla for a moment, the obvious and most promising camp would have been at modern Stamford Bridge. Its location at the Derwent’s medieval head of tide meant that it had unlimited fresh water from the river, and it would have had grain and livestock at Buttercrambe on the other side of the ford. But a camp at modern Stamford Bridge would contradict Heimskringla is several ways: 1) There would be no point in putting the fastest riders on the fastest horses to summon the fleet guard if they were only two miles away and within sight; 2) Eystein Orre’s fleet guard were exhausted after running to the battlefield from their ships, which would not be so if they were only two miles away; 3) There would be no point sending Marshall Styrkarr to the ships with news of defeat because the fleet guard could see the battlefield; 4) Marshall Styrkarr gets so cold on his ride from the battlefield to the ships that he has to steal a coat from one of the locals, which is hardly likely on a ride of only two miles. In other words, modern Stamford Bridge was in sight and too close to the battlefield to have been where the Norse camped.  

Heimskringla’s description of Marshall Styrkarr’s journey from the battlefield to the Norse ships is enlightening. As we say above, he encounters a wagon on the way, kills its driver and steals his coat. The account ends by saying (Laing): “He then took the skin-coat, sprang on his horse, and rode down to the strand”. It means ‘down’ in the sense of ‘descended’, so the ships were moored at a sandy or shingle strand beneath some sort of higher ground. The only places in the entire region where a navigable section of the Ouse or Derwent are overlooked by higher ground adjacent to a sandy or shingle strand are at Fulford and Sutton-upon-Derwent, where they meet moraine ridges. The Norse did not moor on the Ouse, for reasons we explain above. Therefore, the only place that matches Heimskringla’s Marshall Styrkarr account is Sutton-upon-Derwent.

Sutton-upon-Derwent had other camp attractions. It was one of only two significant non-island settlements on the navigable part of the Derwent. The other, Kexby, was close to the battlefield and in sight of it, so inconsistent with Heimskringla. Sutton-upon-Derwent also had the only section of estuarine firm riverbank long enough to moor the entire fleet, and it was a farm (‘Sutton’ means ‘south farm’).

The route from Sutton-upon-Derwent to Jorvik went along the moraine ridge crest to High Catton, down the minor Roman road to the Derventio bridge, across the bridge, and then along the 810 Roman trunk road. It was 12½ miles, roughly a three-hour march. Heimskringla says that Hardrada was expected in the early morning. It sounds about right.

According to Huntingdon, the Norse fleet had roughly 350 ships. They would have needed roughly 3km of riverbank to moor. The Derwent flowed around the south of the moraine ridge in those days (it has rerouted since), and a tributary ran up east of the ridge. Each of the three sides would have had roughly 1km of mooring space, ideal for the Norse fleet (shown as magenta line on Figure 16). Indeed, it was the only 3km stretch of contiguous solid riverbank between Stamford Bridge and Brough.

Battle Timing

In this section we will try to substantiate our proposed locations for the Norse camp and battlefield by checking them against two timings described in the contemporary accounts. First, we have to work out where the English were at dawn on the day of battle.

The Anglo-Saxon Chronicle clearly says that the English were at Tadcaster at dawn on the day of battle (Whitelock): “Then in the middle of these proceedings Harold, king of the English, came on the Sunday with all his force to Tadcaster, and there marshalled his troops, and then on Monday went right on through York.” Unfortunately, it is contradicted by Heimskringla, which says that they were at Jorvik: “That same [Sunday] evening, after sunset, King Harold Godwinson came from the south to the castle with a numerous army, and rode into the city with the good-will and consent of the people of the castle. All the gates and walls were beset so that the Northmen could receive no intelligence, and the army remained all night in the town.”

In general, the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle is more reliable about English troop movements than the Norse sagas. It is surely right in this case. Secrecy was crucial to King Harold’s plan. He needed to take the enemy by surprise. Tostig was related to some of the Northumbrian barons. He would have had spies in the city and in the nearby countryside. If the English army arrived in Jorvik on the Sunday evening, those spies would have seen and heard their arrival and would have immediately sent news to Hardrada and Tostig. Heimskringla says that Harold stations guards to prevent spies getting out, but it would have been too late, and they could not stop the field spies anyway.

In our opinion, Harold probably did go to Jorvik on the eve of battle. He needed intelligence from the city elders. They knew about the Norse strength and location, and they knew of Hardrada’s plan to come to Jorvik on Monday morning. Harold also needed to press local militiamen into service and ensure that his army would be allowed through Jorvik’s gates because it was probably the only way for an army to get from the south gate to the north gate.

It is possible that Heimskringla’s statement about the English staying in Jorvik on the eve of battle is simply wrong, but we think it is just being ambiguous. Heimskringla describes the English army as ‘immense’ on the day of battle whereas Harold’s accompaniment to Jorvik is only ‘numerous’. We think Heimskringla is trying to say that Harold arrived at Jorvik after curfew with his personal guard, too few men to spook Tostig’s field spies.

We will assume henceforth that the main English army left Tadcaster soon after dawn on the day of battle. Harold might have been with them or, more probably, waited for them in Jorvik.

Forester’s translation of Henry of Huntingdon says: “the armies were engaged from daybreak until noonday”. Greenway has much the same: “They engaged at dawn, and after fearful assaults on both sides they continued steadfastly until midday”. At that point, the Norse army is forced to retreat over the river. A Norwegian giant on the bridge (Forester): “stayed the advance of the whole English army till the ninth hour”. Again, Greenway has the same. Times were calculated from sunrise in those days. Sunrise on the 25th September was just before 06:00. So, the giant is overcome around 15:00. Something is wrong.

The only way that the armies could have been engaged from daybreak is if the English army camped at Jorvik and the Norse army camped at Stamford Bridge, but neither location makes sense for the reasons we explain above. Moreover, medieval melees seldom lasted more than an hour, whereas these translations suggest this one lasted five or six hours, and it is totally implausible that the Norwegian giant blocked the entire English army for a further three hours. We think the translations are faulty.

The original Latin statement in Historia Anglorum says: “namque a summo mane usque ad meridiem”. The translations above - “from daybreak until noonday” and “from dawn until midday” - are viable, but not exclusive. We translate it to mean: “for most of the morning and afternoon”, so Huntingdon is saying: “the armies were engaged for most of the morning and afternoon”.

Most of the morning at that time of year means that the armies engaged before 09:00.  Assuming both armies left their camps soon after dawn, they would each have marched around 10 miles by 09:00. Ten miles from Tadcaster via York would take the English army to the Foss river crossing (X or Y on Figure 10). Ten miles from Sutton-upon-Derwent via Derventio would take the Norse army to the Fulford ridge. They would indeed have engaged a little before 09:00, with the proviso that Huntingdon’s ‘engaged’ referred to when the armies first sighted each other rather than when the battle started. This does not seem unreasonable.

Our Huntingdon translation and proposed camp locations also seem to fit the subsequent timed events. At the initial sighting, Tostig can see the other army but not clearly enough to identify them, so there was around two miles between them. Heimskringla says that the English closed the gap to hailing distance, then Harold makes a peace offer, withdraws, issues his battle orders, and advances. It must have taken at least 90 minutes. If the armies sighted each other around 09:00, the battle started no earlier than 10:30. Then a melee, the death of Hardrada, more negotiation and another melee before the arrival of Orre’s fleet guard. Hardrada dispatches his messengers to summon Orre’s fleet guard at 09:00. It was a ten-mile ride, around 30 minutes. The fleet guard had to dress for battle and jog 10 miles in armour. Two hours seems about right for both sets of actions, taking the timeline to 12:30. The fleet guard nearly turn the battle but run out of puff, allowing the English to regain the upper hand. It probably took 60 minutes, taking the timeline to 13:30. Huntingdon says that: “the Norwegians were forced to give way before the superior numbers of the English, but retreated in good order. Being driven across the river …” If they retreated in good order, they presumably shuffled millipede-like two miles to the river, then filtered over it in single file. This cannot have taken less than an hour, taking the timeline to 14:30. The giant is overcome around 15:00, which means that he probably only held out for a plausible 30 minutes.

Thus, the timing of all the battle events seems to be within tolerance for our proposed Norse camp, English camp and main battlefield.

Revised Battle Narrative

Soon after dawn on Monday 25th September, the main English army left Tadcaster heading for Derventio via Jorvik. Meanwhile, the Norse army left Sutton-upon-Derwent heading for Jorvik via Derventio. Well, it was not the entire Norse army. Heimskringla describes events at the Norse camp: “he {Hardrada] had the trumpets blown for going ashore, then he makes his army ready and divides the troops, which parts are to go and which are to be left behind. In every company he had two men go inland for every one left behind.” So, one third of the Norse army was left at the camp to guard the fleet.

We discuss the initial engagement above. When Hardrada realises it is the English army coming, he sends his fastest messengers to summon the fleet guard from his ships, and readies for battle. Heimskringla describes the initial troop deployments:

Then King Harald arranged his army, and made the line of battle long, but not deep. He bent both wings of it back, so that they met together; and formed a wide ring equally thick all round, shield to shield, both in the front and rear ranks. The king himself and his retinue were within the circle; and there was the banner, and a body of chosen men. Earl Toste, with his retinue, was at another place, and had a different banner. The army was arranged in this way, because the king knew that horsemen were accustomed to ride forwards with great vigour, but to turn back immediately. Now the king ordered that his own and the earl’s attendants should ride forwards where it was most required. “And our bowmen,” said he, “shall be near to us; and they who stand in the first rank shall set the spear-shaft on the ground, and the spear-point against the horseman’s breast, if he rides at them; and those who stand in the second rank shall set the spear-point against the horse’s breast.”

So, the Norse were arranged in a long thin enclosed loop. The English had a huge cavalry, the Norse had none. Enclosing infantry to defend against cavalry had been standard military practice since Roman times. King Harold approaches in person to negotiate a truce. Hardrada and Tostig reject his offer. Heimskringla picks up the story:

Now the battle began. The Englishmen made a hot assault upon the Northmen, who sustained it bravely. It was no easy matter for the English to ride against the Northmen on account of their spears; therefore, they rode in a circle around them. And the fight at first was but loose and light, as long as the Northmen kept their order of battle; for although the English rode hard against the Northmen, they gave way again immediately, as they could do nothing against them. Now when the Northmen thought they perceived that the enemy were making but weak assaults, they set after them, and would drive them into flight; but when they had broken their shield-rampart the Englishmen rode up from all sides, and threw arrows and spears on them. Now when King Harald Sigurdson saw this, he went into the fray where the greatest crash of weapons was, and there was a sharp conflict, in which many people fell on both sides. King Harald then was in a rage, and ran out in front of the array, and hewed down with both hands; so that neither helmet nor armour could withstand him, and all who were nearest gave way before him. It was then very near with the English that they had taken to flight. King Harald Sigurdson was hit by an arrow in the windpipe, and that was his death-wound. He fell, and all who had advanced with him, except those who retired with the banner.

In summary, after a long period of posturing with no combat, some Norsemen chase out of the shield wall to attack the English. The English surround them. There is fierce hand to hand combat. Hardrada joins the fray on foot. He gets too close to an English archer who shoot him fatally through the throat. Heimskringla continues:

There was afterwards the warmest conflict, and Earl Toste had taken charge of the king’s banner. They began on both sides to form their array again, and for a long time there was a pause in fighting. But before the battle began again Harald Godwinson offered his brother, Earl Toste, peace, and also quarter to the Northmen who were still alive; but the Northmen called out, all of them together, that they would rather fall, one across the other, than accept of quarter from the Englishmen. Then each side set up a war-shout, and the battle began again.

In other words, Tostig takes command of the Norse army and reforms the shield wall. Harold offers another truce. Tostig rejects it again. The English attack again. Just as they are getting the upper hand, the fleet guard arrive under the command of Eystein Orre, fiancé of Hardrada’s daughter:

Eystein Orre came up at this moment from the ships with the men who followed him, and all were clad in armour. Then Eystein got King Harald’s banner Land-ravager; and now was, for the third time, one of the sharpest of conflicts, in which many Englishmen fell, and they were near to taking flight. This conflict is called Orre’s storm. Eystein and his men had hastened so fast from the ships that they were quite exhausted, and scarcely fit to fight before they came into the battle; but afterwards they became so furious, that they did not guard themselves with their shields as long as they could stand upright. At last they threw off their coats of ringmail, and then the Englishmen could easily lay their blows at them; and many fell from weariness, and died without a wound. Thus almost all the chief men fell among the Norway people.

For a while the English buckle under the onslaught, but the fleet guard are exhausted after their jog. They discard their armour to concentrate their energy on swinging axes. It makes them vulnerable. Heimskringla says that all the ‘chief men’ were killed in this phase of the conflict. It does not mention Tostig’s fate, but one of the other sagas says that he: “fell there with glory and a good reputation”.

Heimskringla is mute about the Norse retreat, but Henry of Huntingdon takes up the story:

“… the Norwegians were forced to give way before the superior numbers of the English, but retreated in good order. Being driven across the river, the living trampling on the corpses of the slain, they resolutely made a fresh stand. Here a single Norwegian, whose name ought to have been preserved, took post on a bridge, and hewing down more than forty of the English with a battle axe, his country’s weapon, stayed the advance of the whole English army till the ninth hour.”

So, the Norse fell back to the river and crossed the bridge. A rearguard is stationed to blockade the bridge while the others flee back to their ships. The main flight route can be worked out from Marshall Styrkarr’s journey to the ships:

Then he [Strykarr] was met by a wagoner and he was in a fur-lined coat. Then spoke Styrkárr: ‘Will you sell the coat, farmer?’ ‘Not to you,’ he said. ‘You must be a Norwegian, I recognise your speech.’ Then said Styrkárr: ‘If I am a Norwegian, what do you want, then?’ The farmer answers: ‘I would like to kill you, but unfortunately I have no usable weapon.’ Then said Styrkárr: ‘If you cannot kill me, farmer, then I shall try whether I can kill you.’ He swings up his sword and brings it down on his neck so that his head flew off, after that took the fur-lined coat and leapt on his horse and went down to the shore.

He ‘went down to the shore’, so he was on a ridge of some sort. If, as we think, the Norse fleet was at Sutton-upon-Derwent, he must have travelled along the crest of the Escrick moraine ridge, and this would be the quickest and safest route.

Looking for evidence

Where then should archaeologists look for evidence of the battle? Two places stand out: Derventio and the main battlefield.

Derventio is straightforward. The entire Norse army was at Derventio on the day before the battle and the day before that, queueing to get across the bridge on the way out, then again on the way back. On the day of battle, two-thirds of the Norse army queued to cross the bridge on the way out, most of them queued to cross back, then the entire English army queued to chase them. Wherever thousands of men amassed, even if there was no fighting, there are bound to be personal items, like strap ends, brooches, buckles and pins. The bridge blockade was broken, and it sounds like the Norse rearguard was all killed. We suspect that there were only a few dozen men, but they might have left some Norse personal items and weapons.

We are not sure about the exact battlefield location. It was on the Fulford moraine ridge near its intersection with the 810 Roman road, but the road ran through a dip at Holtby while the Norse would have defended a rise (orange areas on Figure 19).

There are three candidates for the main battlefield: Mirk Hills to the northeast of Holtby (a on Figure 19 OS map), Mill Hill to the southwest (b), and Mill Field (c) to its southwest. Heimskringla is not much help. It says that the shield wall was enclosed, which implies they were on open ground. It says that the shield wall was equally deep all the way around, which implies the slope was the same all the way around. It says that there was an inner shield wall and an outer shield wall. The inner shield wall was to prevent English archers shooting over the facing shield wall to hit the rear of the opposite wall, in which case the shield wall was an eccentric ellipse or stadium (i.e. sausage) shape. English bows had draw weights of 80lbs plus. Pulled to the chest, they would have had a range of around 100m. The Norse shield wall was therefore probably no more than 75m across the short side. ‘Long but not deep?’ Heimskringla describes the deployment of three ranks. Assuming the main Norse army had 6000 men of which 1000 were archers, barons and their entourages, the shield wall would have been roughly 600m on the long side.

Mill Hill was the best defensive position between Derventio and Jorvik, higher and steeper than any other hill, but it is conical around the top whereas Heimskringla implies that the shield wall was elongated. It is also too small, with a shield wall around 400m on the longer side. Unless we have overestimated the size of the Norse army, it is not a great fit for Heimskringla’s description. Mirk Hill is lower and shallower than Mill Hill, but a better fit to Heimskringla’s battlefield description with a 75m by 600m shield wall being one of several possibilities. Mill Field is a third potential battlefield. It is 5m above the surrounding land, yet steep to the south and almost exactly the right size and shape, with a shield wall roughly 60m across and 600m long.

Each of the three battlefield candidates has a case. Mill Hill is the best defensive location but the least good fit for Heimskringla’s description. Mill Field is the worst defensive location but the best fit for Heimskringla’s description. Mill Hill is midway. We can only say that we think the battlefield was on one of these hills near Holtby, hence the name of this paper.

Revised Flight

The main battlefield was probably scavenged. Heimskringla, ASC-D and William of Malmesbury all say that the English chased and slew the Norsemen as they fled from the battlefield. They presumably dumped their weapons and armour, in order to run faster. There may be a better chance of finding isolated remnants of the Norsemen as they fled.

Henry of Huntingdon picks up the story on the main battlefield:

the Norwegians were forced to give way before the superior numbers of the English, but retreated in good order. Being driven across the river, the living trampling on the corpses of the slain, they resolutely made a fresh stand.

The Norse and Flemish survivors evidently retreated across the bridge at Derventio. We imagine this retreat was like a human millipede - a military column eight to ten abreast with shields facing outwards - crawling slowly towards the river and then across the bridge. The trampling means that the English were attacking the head of the millipede as it shuffled along.

Having made it to the bridge, the Norwegian giant is deployed. Henry of Huntingdon explains:

Here a single Norwegian, whose name ought to have been preserved, took post on a bridge, and hewing down more than forty of the English with a battle axe, his country's weapon, stayed the advance of the whole English army till the ninth hour.

The Norwegian giant was clearly posted to buy time for the other survivors to do something. He could not be expected to hold out for more than 10 minutes - regardless how long he actually held out - which would limit the possibilities. This is one reason why historians interpret Huntingdon’s statement that “they resolutely made a fresh stand”  to mean that they formed a new shield wall at Battle Flat, which was roughly 10 minutes from the traditional bridge location (20 minutes from the revised location) at Stamford Bridge.

We do not believe that the Norse would deliberately defend Battle Flat under any circumstances, for a host of reasons we list above. If they wanted to make a stand to buy time, they would obviously have done so at the bridge.

The question is whether all the Norse survivors participated in the stand or whether it was just a bridge guard posted to allow the rest to flee for their ships. From what William of Malmesbury says about what happened after the giant was skewered, it sounds like the latter:

The army immediately passing over [the bridge] without opposition, destroyed the dispersed and fleeing Norwegians.

Heimskringla does not mention a bridge guard or the giant:

This [the death of the Norse leaders at the battlefield] happened towards evening; and then it went, as one might expect, that all had not the same fate, for many fled, and were lucky enough to escape in various ways; and darkness fell before the slaughter was altogether ended.

ASC-D:

… the Norwegians that were left fled from the English, who slew them hotly behind; until some came to their ships, some were drowned, some burned to death, and thus variously destroyed; so that there was little left.

So, the Norse survivors fled towards their ships. We explain earlier why we think their ships were moored between Sutton upon Derwent and Wheldrake (SD and W on Figure 16). Some Norsemen might have fled along the riverbank. If it were us, we would have run roughly along the 10m contour, where English horses would get stuck in the mud but humans might not. The rest would have retraced their steps, fleeing along the Roman road to High Catton (H), then south down the Escrick moraine ridge.

If we are right above, Norse battle related artifacts might be found east of the Derwent. We guess that the best places to look will be near the moraine ridge crest and along the 10m contour line between the moraine ridge and the Derwent, shown as white dots on Figure 21.

Loose Ends

The battle scenario outlined above is simple, logical and militarily sensible. It ties together all the source accounts into a coherent narrative, just leaving what might seem to be an anachronism and a contradiction. In addition, there are three interesting military puzzles and English Heritage’s criticisms of Heimskringla.

The Anachronism

According to Laing’s translation, Sturluson (Heimskringla’s author) repeatedly says that the English army had a large contingent of archers and cavalry, and that they started hostilities with a cavalry attack. Historians think that cavalry and archers were only introduced to English warfare after the Norman Conquest. Freeman and others use this apparent anachronism as evidence that the sagas are untrustworthy. If the sagas are wrong, our proposed battle scenario is probably wrong too.

Battle of Hastings accounts make it clear that English horseback troops at the time were mounted infantry rather than cavalry. The difference is not just semantics. Mounted infantry used their horses to get around the battlefield and to outflank their enemy but dismounted to fight with sword or axe. Knights fought on horseback with lances. Knights and their horses were trained to give and take commands by knees and heels. Cavalry horses were bred to be strong and trained to ignore the noise of battle and the smell of blood. Historians are probably right that the English had not developed these skills at the time of the battle.

We think the sagas are not trying to say that the English had a lot of knights. The original Icelandic Heimskringla script says: “Haraldur konungur Guðinason var þar kominn með her óvígjan, bæði riddara og fótgangandi men”, which (we are told) is most likely to translate as: “King Harold Godwinson had come with a hostile army of both horsemen and infantry”. Laing’s translation is viable, but the original is ambiguous: ‘riddara’ can mean knights or horsemen. It is generally interpreted to mean knights in recent times, because it is the Icelandic name for the chess piece, but chess terms post-date Heimskringla. If it meant horsemen, it is not anachronistic. Even if Sturluson did mean knights, he might have misunderstood the meaning of the oral saga, because he transcribed it more than a hundred years after the battle, by which time horseback troops in England were likely to be knights.

As for archers, many historians assume that there were few bowmen in England at this time because none are mentioned in the contemporary accounts of the Battle of Hastings and only one is depicted on the Bayeux Tapestry.

We think the English army at Stamford Bridge probably did have a significant number of archers. Harold pressed the surviving Northumbrian militia. Many people in Northumbria were of Viking descent. They would have continued to use Viking-style bows, for hunting if nothing else. Indeed, it looks like the practice had spread to Mercia, Wales and parts of Essex because, for instance, “The Battle of Malden”, a 10th century poem, mentions English bowmen several times. Most of Harold’s army came from these bow-wielding regions. Perhaps the reason there were no English bowmen at Hastings is that the practice had not made it as far south as Wessex, Sussex, London or Kent.

The Contradiction

Forester’s translation of Historia Anglorum says:

At last someone came under the bridge in a boat, and thrust a spear into him, through the chinks of the flooring. The English having gained a passage, King Harald and Tostig were slain; and their whole army were either slaughtered, or, being taken prisoners, were burnt.

It seems to imply that Hardrada was killed after the English cross the Derwent. Heimskringla and ASC-D say that Hardrada was killed at the main battlefield. If that is what they are saying and they are all right, the main battlefield was east of the river. We think the main battlefield was west of the river. If we are right, one or other of those sources is either wrong or has been misinterpreted.

Historia Anglorum, or its translation, look culpable. It contradicts the ASC D account, which carries the same narrative only with Harald and Tostig being slain at the main battlefield before the surviving Norsemen retreated over the bridge. Huntingdon was writing 55 years after the event. It is possible that he worked from a faulty contemporary account that has subsequently been lost. We suspect that Forester’s translation is more to blame. His term ‘having’ and his semicolon make it sound like Hardrada and Tostig were killed as a consequence of the English gaining passage across the bridge, which means they died on the east side of the river. We disagree with the translation.

The Latin original says: “Transeuntes igitur Angli, Haroldum et Tostig occiderant, et totam Norwagensium aciem vel armis straverunt vel igne deprehensos combusserunt”. Forester’s translation of ‘occiderant’ to ‘were killed’ is viable but it is pluperfect, so it would normally be translated as ‘had fallen’. We translate this passage as: “The English gained passage, Harald and Tostig had fallen, and the entire Norwegian army was either slaughtered or burned.” It looks to us like a list of events to conclude the narrative, with no implication that Hardrada or Tostig died as a consequence of the English gaining passage over the bridge. If so, the main battlefield could be west of the river without contradicting any sources.

Military Puzzle 1

Huntingdon says that the Norse make a ‘fresh stand’ after being forced over the river. It is important because it is the only evidence in all the contemporary accounts that there might have been any organised fighting east of the river. It is one of the main justifications for the main battle having been fought at Battle Flat. But why then is it not mentioned in any of the other accounts?

We think the ‘fresh stand’ is being taken out of context. The whole passage reads: “Being driven across the river, the living trampling on the corpses of the slain, they resolutely made a fresh stand. Here a single Norwegian, whose name ought to have been preserved, took post on a bridge”. Once the giant had been overcome, Huntingdon explains that the English swarmed across the bridge to chase and slaughter those fleeing. It is clear to us that Huntingdon’s ‘fresh stand’ refers specifically to the Norse attempt to hold the English at the bridge and that he does not say or imply that there was any organised fighting east of the river.

Military Puzzle 2

If, as Heimskringla says, Hardrada quickly realises that he is outnumbered and outgunned, why did he reject Tostig’s advice to flee for the boats?

Heimskringla starts its obituary for Hardrada by saying: “King Harald never fled from battle …”. It sounds like he was always itching for a fight, no matter what the odds. But this is not what it means. It is trying to say that having engaged in a battle, he never fled. Reading back through Heimskringla it is clear that he assiduously avoided battle if he thought he might lose. The rest of the sentence says:

… but often tried cunning ways to escape when faced with great superiority of forces.

Hardrada was faced by superiority of forces at Stamford Bridge. His only chance of survival, apart from fleeing, came from incompetent English command or the timely arrival of his fleet guard without exhausting themselves. Neither were likely. Moreover, Hardrada had brought an entire generation of Norwegian warriors. If his army was badly defeated, Norway would be left powerless and undefended. One would have thought he would be especially circumspect considering the consequences of defeat, which makes it all the more odd that he rejected Tostig’s advice.

The obituary ends:

All the men who followed King Harald in battle or skirmish said that when he stood in great danger, or anything came suddenly upon him, he always took that course which all afterwards saw gave the best hope of a fortunate issue.

We think this was the case at Stamford Bridge. In our opinion, Hardrada worked out that he had a greater chance of surviving the battle at Holtby than of successfully fleeing, because the latter was fraught with danger too.

It is 3km from Derventio to Holtby. The English army could not have been more than 3km west of Holtby when Hardrada acknowledges what it is. The English horsemen could beat the footbound Norsemen to the bridge and blockade it. Even if the Norse could get there first, it might have taken an hour for them to stream single file over the bridge, during which time those still on the west bank would be trapped and vulnerable. Meanwhile the English horsemen could cross the Derwent upstream at Howsham and get back on the other side, to catch the fleeing Norsemen in the open. Moreover, Hardrada could not be sure that the ships were safe. Harold might have dispatched part of his army to overcome the fleet guard and hole the ships, in which case the Norse army would get trapped opposite Wheldrake on adverse terrain.

If, as we think, the Norse army was at Mill Hill or Mirk Hills, they were at the best defensive position west of the Derwent. Hardrada may well have reasoned ‘better the devil you know’. He says as much when he explains to Tostig how difficult the English will find the battle. He sends messengers to summon the fleet guard. If the English had not defeated the fleet guard, they should arrive in time to turn the battle. Otherwise, a retreat to the fleet would have been disastrous.

Hardrada’s judgement would have been influenced by his faith. He would have believed to his bones in Valhalla and Tiwaz, the magical spear that Odin wielded to control battles. If he chose to fight, he would have expected that Odin would use Tiwaz to deliver a Norse victory. Fighting valiantly, at the very least, would guarantee him a place in Valhalla. Fleeing could not be influenced by Odin or Tiwaz. If he chose to flee, his survival and his place in Valhalla would depend on factors outside of his control. If we were Hardrada, we would have chosen to summon the fleet guard and fight too.

Christian Tostig, on the other hand, would want to flee. He would not have believed in Valhalla or Tiwaz, and he had led an immoral life. His inclination would have been to fight another day on more favourable terms, then to buy salvation by building monasteries when he gained power.

Military Puzzle 3

When the Norse army retreat across the river, why did they not defend the riverbank until dusk, then flee for their ships under the cover of darkness? Considering that a single Viking warrior held the entire English army at bay, during which time he killed 40 Englishmen, even a diminished Norse army could easily have held the riverbank until dusk.

The most common explanation is that the Norse were too demoralised to fight once their champion had been defeated. Clearly ridiculous. We guess the issue was that the ships were lightly defended. The Norse survivors could not tarry by the river bank for fear that English horsemen would cross the Derwent upstream at Flawith (i.e. the traditional location of the bridge at Stamford Bridge) or further upstream at Howsham, then ride south down the Fulford moraine ridge to sabotage the ships.

It was 7½ miles from Derventio to the riverbank opposite Wheldrake, where we think the fleet was moored. The fittest Norsemen could jog cross country at roughly 6mph without armour. They could get to the fleet in perhaps 75 minutes. The English horsemen could trot at roughly 10mph. They could get to the fleet in perhaps 45 minutes. Whoever was commanding the Norse army would have calculated that the fittest of the Norse survivors could make their escape if they had at least a 30-minute head-start. Huntingdon’s account seems to say that they stationed a bridge guard, including the Viking champion, to buy time. Presumably, their orders were to block the bridge for at least 30 minutes.

The English accounts say or imply that all the invaders were killed or captured. Heimskringla says that some survivors from the battle did escape, although these might have been the lucky few that Harold allowed to return home. By the sound of it, the bridge guard did not quite hold out long enough.

English Heritage on Heimskringla

Our analysis above relies heavily on Heimskringla’s account. Historians do not trust it. Leadman says that it is too poetic to be credible. It certainly has errors. It says, for instance, that Morcar died at the Battle of Fulford. It certainly exaggerates the achievements and heroic deeds of its main protagonists, but it had no incentive to invent place names, troop composition or enemy manoeuvres. Thomas Carlyle said that the sagas were among the greatest works of history ever written. We are inclined to agree.

In our opinion, all the apparent inconsistencies between Heimskringla and the traditional narrative are caused by historians working back to front: they assume the traditional narrative is correct and list the many contradictions in Heimskringla as faults. But the traditional narrative is not fact. It is conjecture based on interpretation of enigmatic accounts. In our opinion, almost every part of the traditional narrative is wrong. What we try to show above is that there are alternative interpretations of the English contemporary accounts that match Heimskringla, thereby establishing a more credible narrative.

English Heritage (EH) go a step further than their predecessors by listing the most extreme examples of Heimskringla’s faults and inadequacies. We thought it might be useful to counter-comment. Note that EH spell Sturluson’s name as Sturlasson and that they use the A.H. Binns’s 1968 Heimskringla translation. We will switch to that for this section. This is what it says about the days before the battle:

Now King Harald began his expedition to conquer York, and the army lay at Stamford Bridge, and because the king had won such a great victory against great chieftains and superior force, everyone was afraid, and did not think there was any hope of withstanding him. The townsfolk decided to send an offer to Harald, yielding themselves and the town to him, and on the Sunday King Harald went with his troop and all the army to York, and had a meeting outside the town, and all the great men agreed to submit to King Harald and gave him hostages, rich men’s sons whom Tostig could pick out for the king, because he knew who were the worthiest men in the town. They went back in the evening to the ships with an undisputed success and were contented. It was decided that there should be a meeting in the morning in the town, when King Harald was to appoint governors of the place and give them offices and areas.

At dawn on the day of battle:

And on the Monday when King Harald Sigurdarson had eaten, and all his army had breakfasted, he ordered the signal for landing to be blown. He divided up the army who was to go or stay behind, had two men from each troop ashore whilst one remained, so he had two parts of the army. Earl Tostig got ready to go ashore with his troop with King Harald. But Olaf the king's son stayed behind to look after the ships, so did Eystein Moorcock, son of Porbrand Arnason, who was the best and dearest to King Harald of all his nobles. King Harald had promised him his daughter Maria when they got back to Norway. The weather was very hot and sunny, and they left their mailshirts behind and went ashore with shields and helmets and spears and wore their swords and many had bows and arrows.

The engagement:

They were very happy, with no thought of any attack, and when they were getting near the town they saw [a great cloud of dust and under it] bright shields and shining mail. They saw that a great army was riding towards them and King Harald straight away halted his army, had Earl Tostig called to him, and asked him what army that might be that was coming towards them. The earl answered that it was most likely enemy, but it might be, he said, some friends of ours, who may wish to join us with friendship and offer us their help and loyalty. The king spoke, 'We must await quietly this army which is coming'. They did so and the army got bigger and bigger as it got nearer and they saw it clearly, and it was like looking at an ice-field. Then said the earl, 'My lord, let us take some shrewd plan; it is not to be hidden that those are enemies, and the king himself must be with such an army'. Then said King Harald, 'What is your advice?' Earl Tostig answered, 'The first thing to do is to turn back as quickly as possible to our ships for our men and our armour and then after offer such battle as we can; but another plan would be to take to our ships, and then the cavalry cannot overcome us'. The king said, 'We shall do something else. Put our fastest horses under three bold fellows: let them ride as fast as they can and tell the Norwegians of the danger; they will come straight away to help us. The English must sooner expect more fight from us than flight, and we shall fight bitterly a good time before we acknowledge we are beaten.' The earl said, 'You must decide in this, my lord, as in everything, and I was no more eager to flee than anyone else'.

EH: “Heimskringla states that Tostig and Hardrada waited with their army at Stamford Bridge. However, due to an understandable confusion concerning local topography, Sturlasson is less precise in identifying Stamford Bridge as the actual site of the battle.”
MB: Heimskringla does not say or imply that Tostig and Hardrada waited with their army at Stamford Bridge on the day of battle. It does say that the Norse army and their commanders were at Stamford Bridge several days before the battle, preparing to sack York. It is irrelevant to the battle narrative because it also says that they went back to their ships later that day and that they slept on their boats on battle-eve. Heimskringla does not say or imply - imprecisely or otherwise - that Stamford Bridge was the actual site of the battle, not least because it implies the battlefield was elsewhere.

EH: “Sturlasson was ignorant of the topography of both the battlefield and East Yorkshire, seeming to believe that the geography of Hardrada’s campaign was condensed into a very limited area with Stamford Bridge, Fulford and Riccall all located close to the walls of York.”
MB: Fulford was close to the walls of York. Heimskringla does not say or imply that Stamford Bridge was near the walls of York. It never mentions Riccall. EH are trying to match Heimskringla to their interpretation of the English accounts. They think that Sturlasson is compressing the geography because they assume that Heimskringla’s references to the location of the fleet and the location of the battle referred to Riccall and Battle Flat. Heimskringla says nothing of the sort. Its statements that the approaching army was too far away to identify whether it was hostile, that Hardrada orders the fastest riders be put on the fastest horses to summon the fleet guard, and that the fleet guard arrives so exhausted that some die from weariness, implies to us that Sturlasson knew perfectly well how far it was between York, the fleet and the battlefield.

EH: “It is also apparent that Sturlasson could have confused events that occurred at the Battle of Hastings with those of Stamford Bridge.”
MB: The Battle of Hastings and the Battle of Stamford Bridge both featured incomplete losing armies and shield walls that were breached when troops ran out to chase retreating attackers. However, there are only two ways that a determined shield wall can be defeated: 1) By killing or barging aside everyone in a section of the wall; 2) For everyone in a section of the wall to leave their position. The fact that the English won means that they successfully employed one or other of these tactics. The latter would be quicker and less casualty prone. We guess that attackers always tried to goad parts of a shield wall out of place and that ill-discipline in shield-walls was a common problem with less experienced troops.

EH: “The Heimskringla is confused as to whether the Viking army is making its way towards York or Stamford Bridge early on the morning of Monday 25 September 1066.”
MB: Heimskringla says that on Sunday: “It was decided that there should be a meeting in the morning in the town”. Then on Monday: “They were very happy, with no thought of any attack, and when they were getting near the town they saw a great cloud of dust and under it bright shields and shining mail.” It is clearly saying that the Norse army was heading for York and getting near. Again, EH try to match Heimskringla to their interpretation of the contemporary accounts. They wrongly assume that the battle was fought at Stamford Bridge, so wrongly assume that the Norse army was heading for Stamford Bridge. Heimskringla is not confused. It says that the Norse army was heading for York and means it.

EH: “According to the Heimskringla, Hardrada and Tostig had barely reached Stamford Bridge when they became aware of Harold’s approach”.
MB: Again, Heimskringla says nothing of the sort. It does not say or imply that the Norse army was at Stamford Bridge on the day of battle. It says: “when they were getting near the town they saw a great cloud of dust and under it bright shields and shining mail.” It is implying that the Norse army was on the Fulford moraine ridge when they spot the English leaving York. Again, EH try to match Heimskringla to their faulty interpretation of the English contemporary accounts. They think that the initial engagement was on the west bank of the Derwent, so they wrongly assume the Norse army had only just got across the bridge at Stamford Bridge when they become aware of the English army.

EH: “The Heimskringla states that as the Viking army neared Stamford Bridge it became aware of Harold’s army approaching from the west along the north bank of the Derwent.”
MB: Heimskringla does not say or imply that the Norse army was nearing Stamford Bridge on the day of battle. It does not say or imply that the English army approached Stamford Bridge along the north bank of the Derwent. EH try to match Heimskringla to their faulty interpretation of the English accounts and their faulty interpretation of the contemporary geography. Heimskringla only says that Hardrada sees the English army as the Norse army approaches the town/city/castle. This is only possible if the Norse army was on the Fulford moraine ridge or west of it.

EH: “For the detail of the fighting on Battle Flats we are forced to rely upon the Heimskringla with all its anachronisms”.
MB: Heimskringla provides the only detailed account of the fighting. It is therefore true that everyone has to rely on it of this part of the narrative, but Heimskringla does not say or imply that any fighting happened at Battle Flat or Stamford Bridge. Again, EH try to match Heimskringla to their faulty interpretation of the English accounts. We presume the anachronisms to which EH refer are the presence of English ‘cavalry’ and archers, insofar as most historians think that they were not present in English armies until the 12^th century. We have mentioned these above. In short, we think the ‘cavalry’ is a mistranslation of ‘horsemen’ and that the archers were there.

Sources

Contemporary sources

Anglo-Saxon Chronicle (of which three versions covered the invasion, known as C, D and E); reasonably contemporary with events
John of Worcester; Chronicon ex Chronicis; c1125
Henry of Huntingdon; Historia Anglorum; c1125
William of Malmesbury; Gesta regum anglorum; c1135
Fagrskinna; c1200; Translation by Alison Finlay, 2004
Snorri Sturluson; Heimskringla; c1200; Translation by Samuel Laing (Vol III), 1844

Modern sources

Auden, G A; The Strategy of Harold Hardrada in the Invasion of 1066; 1927; Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research, VI
Charles R.B. Barrett; Battles and Battlefields in England; 1896; A.D. Innes & Co
F.W. Brooks; The Battle of Stamford Bridge; 1956; East Yorkshire Local History Series (No. 6)
Alfred H. Burne; The Battlefields of England; 2005, Pen and Sword Books
Kelly DeVries; The Norwegian Invasion of England in 1066; 1999; The Boydell Press
English Heritage; English Heritage Battlefield Report: Stamford Bridge 1066; 1995; English Heritage
Edward A. Freeman; The History of the Norman Conquest, Vol III; 1864; Clarendon Press
Historic England listing: https://historicengland.org.uk/listing/the-list/list-entry/1416328
I.G. Lawton; Roman Roads Around Stamford Bridge; 1997; SYO
A.D.H. Leadman; The Battle of Stamford Bridge; YAJ Volume 11 (1890)
Ivan D. Margary; Roman Roads of Britain; 1973; John Baker
Frank McLynn; 1066 The Year of the Three Battles; 1999; BCA
Northern Archaeological Associates: Stamford Bridge Water Pipeline; 2005
H.G. Ramm; A Romano-British kiln, and the Roman road at Stamford Bridge; YAJ Volume 38 (1955)
H.G. Ramm; The Derwent Crossing at Stamford Bridge, The; YAJ Volume 41 (1966)