James - The Battle of Hastings
It was my lot, while serving as an officer of the Ordnance Survey, 37 years ago, to accompany the late Mr. E. A. Freeman, I.A., the historian of the Norman Conquest, to the field of Hastings, and to have the privilege of assisting in making a plan of the battle ground. I thus gained an elementary knowledge of the incidents of the great victory won by William of Normandy on which I had previously only the limited ideas of any schoolboy.
The interest aroused in my mind was sufficient to cause me to study the battle from a military point of view; and at the earliest stage of my enquiries it became evident that gross misconceptions abound in the popular descriptions. In the following notes, in the compilation of which I have to acknowledge much kind assistance from the Hon. F. H. Baring, it is my aim to correct the prevalent errors.
A very detailed account of the Conquest of England by the Duke of Normandy is preserved in the famous Roman de Ron, written in archaic Norman-French, about a century after the events described, by Wace, a canon of the cathedral of Bayeux: English students are familiar with this work by translations, notably that by Edgar Taylor, published in 1837. A graphic representation of the same events exists in the celebrated Bayeux tapestry, the origin of which is uncertain, though it is not disputed that it dates from the 11th century: it is beautifully exhibited at Bayeux, and a traveller in Normandy should on no account fail to make an inspection of it. Although not absolutely in accord, both of these authorities may be accepted as derived from trustworthy sources, if they be not, indeed, based on information given by eye-witnesses. In endeavouring to reconcile and explain the points in which the Romance and the Tapestry differ, modern writers rely much on the records of contemporary chroniclers, among which are those of William of Poitiers, Orderic Vitalis, Guy of Amiens, William of Jumieges, the chronicles of Battle Abbey, etc. But it is unfortunate that the wlhole of these records are, more or less, biased on the Norman side, while there are very few good authorities on the part of England : this is not to be wondered at, for it was not likely that men would record their own defeat and humiliation.
The principal modern English authority is undoubtedly Freeman, whose great work was published in 1869. I assisted him, as I have said, in the topographical work of the only original large-scale plan of the battlefield which has been produced; it may be found in Volume III. of The Norman Conquest. As to my share in it, I can only vouch for the comparative topographical accuracy (the Ordnance 6-inch map did not then exist), but disclaim all responsibility for the way in which the position of Harold and the details of the battle are shown. The appearance of the book at once provoked a storm of criticism, which has not abated yet, and among the writers on the subject may be named Mr. Round, Sir James Ramsay (in The Foundations of England, 1898), Mr. C. W. Oman (in The Art of War in the Middle Ages, 1898), and, recently, the Hon. F. H. Baring. A writer preceding Freeman was Creasy (in The Fifteen Decisive Battles of the World, 1851), whose account of the battle is in the main a mere series of extracts from the Roman de Ront, with little of definite military value, and need only be referred to by saying it is full of the ordinary popular errors.
If the words of the old authorities are weighed carefully, and allowed their relative credibility, views held by those who have only studied the subject superficially must soon undergo change. We have been too ready, hitherto, to accept grossly exaggerated numbers in estimating the strength of the opposing armies. Freeman seems to have fallen into the trap like the rest; for although he guarded himself against giving an opinion as to Harold's numbers, it is plain that, in marking the defensive position on the map at so great a length, he sought to provide room for the large number popularly believed to have constituted the English army. It would not have been proper for me, in my profound ignorance in 1869, to question his accuracy; but a recent examination of the ground, made with the new 6-inch map in my hand, has convinced me (and would, I think, have the same effect on any military student) of the inaccuracy of Freeman's conception. In accepting the belief that Harold's army was so large, it was necessary, consequently, to admit a proportionate increase in William's; and as the old chroniclers, from whichever side they wrote, exaggerated the numbers on the other side, a mass of error has been perpetuated. It is easy to prove that a very large reduction in the numbers must be made.
Another controversial point, which remains unsettled still, is the nature of the line of obstacles erected by Harold-if obstacles there were at all. While some authorities maintain that the position was covered by a strong palisade and ditch, others contest that there were no obstacles of any sort beyond the shields of the defenders. After the evidence on this point has been stated, it is hoped the readers of these notes will offer opinions which will assist in settling this vexed question.
Other points for consideration are the movements of the forces on either side, and the identity of the sites at which the incidents of the battle occurred; but these need only be referred to in their place in the narrative.
Following the ancient authorities generally, but quoting from them only when it becomes necessary to compare their evidence, let us make a brief retrospect of the political events which led to the invasion of England. In a genealogical table, to be found in the translation of the Roman de Rou, it is shown that William of Normandy claimed cousinship with Edward the Confessor, and, the latter being childless, saw an opportunity of gaining the succession to the English throne. He crossed to England on a visit in 1065, and was received with great lionour by Edward. The King liad recently quarrelled with Earl Godwin, his father-in-law, who had delivered a son and a nephew to him as hostages for his future behaviour. William begged to have their custody, and sent them to Normandy, with the intention in his mind of retaining them as prisoners in order to prevent their becoming his rivals. On his return to his own dukedom lie set up the pretension that Edward had nominated him as heir to the throne of England.
At this stage of the history we are introduced to Harold, who claimed kinship with Edward through Canute, the first husband of the Queen, and is described by old Wace as a noble vassal, the most powerful chief in all England. Harold obtained the King's permission to go to Normandy and bring the captives back; with his mission the Bayeux tapestry opens. He was cast up on the coast of France by a storm, and fell into the hands of Guy, Count of Ponthieu, who gave him up to William as a prisoner. He was entertained with the highest honours, and accompanied the Duke on warlike expeditions against the Bretons, in the course of which he was knighted by William on the battlefield. He was cajoled into making a promise to deliver England to William on the death of Edward, and he was compelled to ratify the same by oath, at a council assembled at Bayeux, before lie was permitted to return to England.
In Wace's romantic verse we read that Edward, on his death bed, denied that he had promised the kingdom to any foreigner, and, in the presence of his councillors, formally nominated Harold as his successor to the throne. Another Norman authority, Benoit de Saint More, declares that this story was of Harold's invention, and that in reality he had no title but his usurpation. Whatever may be the truth, Harold seems beyond doubt to have been the King of the people's choice; and unquestionably to have been preferred to the Duke of Normandy. On becoming King he at once repudiated the oath forced from him at Bayeux under terror and false representations as to Edward's alleged promise; and William then resolved on the invasion of England to enforce his claim.
The Duke called his barons and prelates into council, and after much heated discussion induced them to promise their assistance. A summary of the names of those who were willing to help may be found in the pages of Freeman, who, quoting from various sources, states that 812 ships, with as many knights and men-at-arms as they would carry, were promised; according to Wace, however, the number seems to have been only 752. The King of France, who thought the Duke ot Normandy, his nominal subject, was too powerful already, refused his aid; while William's brother-in-law, the Count of Flanders, not satisfied with the conditions proposed by the Duke for the division of the spoil, was only persuaded to promise help faint-heartedly. By clever diplomacy William was more successful with the Pope, who sent him a standard, and consented to his conquering England to hold the land from St. Peter. While the invasion was under discussion a comet appeared in the sky, and was thought such a favourable omen that superstition brought allies from every side; from Brittany, Picardy, Maine, Provence, Flanders, and even, it is said, from Italy. Timber and materials were hastily collected in all the ports of Normandy, and one summer and autumn were spent in building ships and training men. Freeman states that the very trees had not been felled: for this there seems no warrant beyond a representation on the tapestry of a woodman cutting down a tree. But, undoubtedly, the ships were built hurriedly, and it was not possible for them to be of any considerable size; we may suppose that the largest were no bigger than the fishing boats on the north coast of France at the present day. Wace states that he heard his father say the number of ships which sailed for England was "seven hundred less four" (which allows of a reasonable discount from the 752 promised), and that small boats and skiffs carried arms and stores. He had "seen it written, but did not know how true it was, that in all there were three thousand vessels bearing masts and sails" ; and Benoit de Saint More says there were three thousand keels (nefs) at least.
These figures, doubtless, are mere guesses made to include the small skiffs which were towed, and in estimating the number of boats which actually carried men and horses we must be limited to the 696 of Wace as quite a maximum. The largest ships represented on the tapestry have only one mast and sail; on one 13 shields in a row indicate as many cross seats, and supposing 4 armed men on each seat we get 52 foot soldiers as the boat's load. In another boat 3 horses with 2 seamen are shown, and in a smaller boat, with rowers, only 5 soldiers. If we analyse the list of donors referred to before, we have another method by which we can form an estimate of the shiploads. One exceptionally large ship-that of Remigius-was for 20 knights, but those furnished by the Abbot of St. Ouen were, on an average, for 5 knights only; while, in other cases given, the ratio varies from 33 to 1 per ship. Three knights per ship, in addition to their esquires, and as many men-at-arms, seems, then, to be as high an estimate as we are warranted in making for the general average capacity of each horse-carrying ship. As regards the infantry, although a single boat may have carried 50 men, another was for 5 only, and we cannot calculate the average loads as more than 25 men. Finally, if we suppose that not more than 400 of the large boats carried horses, we complete speculative data from which an estimate of the strength of the expeditionary force may be made, as follows :-
| 400 | each with 9 men and their horses | 3,600 cavalry |
| 296 | ships, each with 25 men, the heavyarmed infantry and bowmen | 7,400 infantry |
| Total | 11,000 men |
While this result might easily be varied by using ingenuity in manipulating the speculative data, it may be noted that it agrees fairly with the opinion of Sir James Ramsay that io,ooo men was the maximum number brought across the channel. By no stretch of the figures, however, can we, by a similar method of reasoning, approach near to the 60,000 commonly believed in.
The force which assembled in Normandy is variously reported by the chroniclers; by William of Poitiers it is put at 60,000, and even more, while the Chronicle of St. Maxentius has it at 14,000. But whichever of these is nearest the truth, neither one statement nor the other is evidence of the number of men who embarked. William of Poitiers, in mentioning a messenger sent to William by Harold after the crossing had been effected, makes the Conqueror say that, if he had only ro,ooo men such as the 60,000 he had with him, he would go on. We can see plainly that this was mere bragging, and it need not make us change our opinion that the force was not much in excess of 10,000; for the messenger, on his side, had just boasted that Harold had ioo,ooo men at his back, which William knew well enough to be a gross exaggeration. The old chronicler Wace tells us Harold did not fail for lack of numbers, but that in reality there was about man for man in the opposing armies; which is probably quite true, but with the numbers on both sides diminished, as we see they must be.
For comparison's sake some facts about later invasions are worth noting. According to the best authorities, Edward III. never shipped 10,000 men across the channel; and Henry V., and also Edward IV., only just succeeded in making up such a number. Three statements in Eccleston's Antiquities are as follows :-
in 1254, one ship capable of transporting 30 men is spoken of as being of extraordinary magnitude; in I346, in the expedition to Calais, there were 783 ships, which could only carry 20 men each; and, as late as 1360, three centuries after Hastings, the art of shipbuilding had advanced so little that the largest in an order given was only for 44 men-at-arms. Do not these facts alone compel us to discredit the exaggerations about the Norman Conquest?
William's preparations were known in England, and to oppose them a fleet was assembled in the Solent, opposite Dives (near Caen) where the Norman ships were collecting. A naval expedition under a Norwegian chief, Tostig, supported by William, harried the southern coast of England, but did not achieve any substantial success. It had, however, the effect of drawing the English ships away ; some of them went northwards, some to the estuary of the Thames, and the larger part became ineffective and were disbanded; their absence from the south coast permitted the fleet of William to leave Dives. The Norman ships, driven by westerly gales, took refuge in and about St. Valery, at the mouth of the Somme ; this seemed at first to be a misfortune; but in reality it was an advantage, for the channel being almost at its narrowest point at St. Valery, the invasion of England became the more easy.
The fleet waited tediously for a fair wind, and had this not occurred auspiciously it is doubtful if success would have attended the expedition. Very fortunately for William, such a wind came at the time Harold was in the north of England. The passage across the channel was made in one night and without accident, there being just enough wind to propel the ships in a direct course.
William's army landed on the Sussex coast, early on the 28th September, if Wace be correct, rather to the west of Pevensey Bay, quite without opposition. The boats were run up on the beach, just as craft of like size may be seen at Hastings at the present day. But I think it is an error to suppose that the ships were destroyed, as some accounts state; for it seems more probable that they followed the march of the army eastward, and eventually entered the inlets of Winchelsea and Rye, which were used as a naval base later.
The Norman bowmen waded ashore as the ships grounded, and at once extended to the front to cover the disembarkation of the cavalry, meeting with very little opposition. The cavalry, without their armour, landed next; and were followed by artizans, who erected a defensive work near the shore with materials previously prepared to fit together. The infantry then landed slowly; and on the third day the entire force was ready to move to Hastings, where another defensive work was erected, the army being bivouacked, probably, along the heights north of the town. Such was the Norman position when, sixteen days after the landing, intelligence was received by William of the rapid approach of Harold from London.
The sun rose on the 14th October at 6.20 a.m.; but lunar tables show there was a two-thirds waning moon, still high in the sky at dawn, and it is recorded that the morning was unusually light for the season. The army was called hastily to arms, and was in movement at an early hour. As the advanced posts were, probably, somewhere on the main ridge between Ore and Baldslow, the distance to the front of Harold's position was not five miles; and the line of march followed the watershed line separating two distinct basins, which was then, as it is still, the main road to London. For the whole distance a narrow, nearly level, heathy ridge, from which the slopes on either hand fell quickly away, was followed. The hillsides were largely clothed with woods, and the bottoms of the valleys were marshy. In the distant prospects (which are of well-known beauty), although the trees might conceal scattered scouts and archers, a soldier's eye could search the front so easily that the presence of an enemy in force would soon be detected. The Normans were able, therefore, to march quickly with little risk of encountering resistance until the English main position should be reached.
On arriving at Telham Hill, William (according to all accounts) received the reports of his scouts, and ordered a halt on a site called ' Hecheland' in the Abbey Chronicle, where its position is so precisely described that the Hon. F. H. Baring has been able to identify it closely, at an altitude of 462 feet above sea level, on Telham Hill, at exactly two miles from the English line at Battle. The place may be traced by referring to the i-inch Ordnance map, where it will be found close to the name 'Blackhorse hill' in small print. Local tradition, for which no foundation has been found, has wrongly fixed the halting place at the site, a mile nearer Battle, on which stands a windmill.
The exact position of the halt is, however, of less importance than the information we gain on the use of armour in 1066. According to the Abbey Chronicle, William and his chief barons had ridden lightly equipped until the halt, when they donned their armour; but this is at variance with both the Romance and the Tapestry, in which they are represented as fully armed on starting from Hastings. The Chronicle may be accepted as more likely to be correct, for it is reasonable to suppose that the fatigue of wearing armour was not customarily suffered until the latest moment before a battle. The armour worn was not, however, as heavy as that of a later date, as it consisted of the hauberk, or chain-mail shirt, as the principal body covering, and not the suit of plate armour, which was not yet in general use; the head was protected by an iron cap with nasal frontals, and the legs were guarded with metal plates. In one account William Fitz-Osbern and his horse are described as wearing complete plate armour; but this is believed to be an anachronism, as there is no authority for the horses in o166 having worn any armour at all, and they are represented without it on the Tapestry. An incident during the battle leads us to thinkl that William the Conqueror wore a helmet with a close visor; that he wore a mailed shirt we have evidence in the anecdote, repeated by different authorities, that he put on his hauberk, at first, backwards, adroitly using the incident as a good augury for his success.
On learning of the position taken up by Harold, the Duke immediately ordered his force to advance in three divisions. It was probably a surprise to him that Harold had already posted his army strongly; for he had hoped to fall on the English on the march, and by the help of his cavalry and superior discipline to defeat them easily.
The road, which continued to follow the open crest until it approached the site of the modern village of Battle, fell from the height of over 400 feet above the sea until a neck of ground at an altitude of 219 feet was reached. This point is not, as most writers have said, in the valley, but only at a depression on the watershed line. It is important to note this, for the hold on the crest line gave William an important advantage in case of a counter-attack ; and, in fact, such was its actual use during the battle. (Reference to the accurately contoured plan accompanying this paper will make this clear). When William reached the neck, where he was out of archery range from the English line, which he now saw extended across his front, he at once ordered a deployment of his force to the right and left.
The dispositions made for attack and defence will be better understood if the movements of Harold, from the time the Norman fleet sailed from Dives until his own arrival on the battle ground, are first traced briefly. After his raid along the south coast had caused the dispersion of the English ships, the Norwegian chief, Tostig, proceeded to support the descent on the east coast made by Harold Hardrada, of which it is unnecessary to speak at length. The King of England hastened northwards to repel this invasion; and concerning the campaign which followed it is sufficient to say that Harold Hardrada suffered a complete and decisive defeat at the battle of Stamford Bridge, fought on the 25th September. The King, it is said, was at York on the ist October celebrating this victory, when a horseman, who had come from Sussex with all possible speed, brought the news of the landing of William at Pevensey Bay on the 28th September.
Not an hour was to be lost, and Harold returned to London as quickly as he could ride. The bulk of his fanous bodyguard had been with him in the north, and he was compelled to wait some days in London, fretting at the delay, while they, or some portion of them, were marching southwards. In the meanwhile half-trained levies were collected hastily, and the manhood of southern England flocked to the standard in Sussex. Harold himself left London on the 12th October, and reached the position on which he made his stand on the i3th. The bodyguard also arrived from York, havilg marched 250 miles in i days; if they were the very men who had fought at Stamford Bridge, it was a wonderful feat. Some writers have supposed that Harold hoped to surprise William by a night attack; but Oman's opinion that the position was deliberately selected is more likely the correct view.
There is some evidence to show that the ancient name of the site was ' Santlache '; and that ' Senlac,' the name by which the battle is known in France, is a corruption of the old Norman writers from this, possibly intended to denote a pool of blood. We speak of it in England as ' the Battle of Hastings,' and it is therefore so designated on the heading of this article.
From a range of low hills, at a general altitude of 300 feet above the sea, mainly covered with forest at the time of the Conquest, the road from London descended upon, and followed the crest of, a narrow ridge, dividing valleys on either side, which is now marked by the main street of Battle. At its southern end the ridge broadens out in the form of a tongue of ground, running east and west and nearly square to the direction of William's line of march ; this was the fine position chosen by Harold. It seems to have been almost bare of trees, as the chroniclers only note one ;-a " hoar apple tree." The probable line occupied has been the subject of the most careful consideration on the actual ground by Mr. Baring and myself, and the opinion we have formed is that the defensive position was (as shown on the plan) about 700 yards long and nearly level. On Freeman's plan (Vol. III. of The Norlmanl Conlquest) it is given a length of 1,650 yards, Harold's left being made to run down the hill in a dangerous manner, this extension being evidently adopted to provide room for the number of men,-20,ooo to 25,000-usually stated to have been placed along the ridge. The men are stated to have been in ten, or more, ranks, crowded together (' conglobati' being the word used to express their formation); and if the length of the line be limited, as we say it must have been, the total number of men who could be packed on the ridge would be 9,900. To this number we may reasonably add i,ooo on the isthmus in rear, and thus we get an aggregate of 10,900. Possibly, also, there was a horde of peasants in the woods at the back; but these were a useless encumbrance, and doubtless vanished like a summer cloud when the English defeat became evident.
The slopes from the position fell quickly away towards the front. The gradients are as follows :-along the centre, 1 in 5 ; on the left flank, 1 in 22; and on the right, 1 in 33; the slopes at the extremities of the line bend quickly backwards, and become 1 in 8 on the right rear, and 1 in 4 on the left rear. On both sides of the narrow isthmus the slopes continue steep, and it is evident that the position could only be attacked in front. Flank attacks were but little practised in io66, and Harold did not think of one as possible. He appears, rather, to have looked on the position as an impregnable redoubt, believing firmly in the ability of his housekarls to withstand any possible attack which could be made. Retreat did not enter his mind; if it had done so, he could have prepared an excellent position for a second stand on the hill at the back; but we shall see that, when defeat came, the retreat was a disorderly rout.
Let us pause to consider how far the number we have arrived at is in accord with what is known of the military power of England in the 11th century. The statement of Benoit de St. More that Harold had 0oo,ooo men at his back may be dismissed as a Norman fiction, or, if he quoted from an English source, as mere boasting. The entire population of the country, exclusive of the unsettled areas, did not exceed one million; and the maximum number of male adults of suitable age for public service amounted at most to 48,770, the number said to have been the constituted military force of the kingdom under the Anglo-Saxon rulers (Hume, Vol. I.). This total may be understood as a paper estimate of a mere militia force, which in ordinary times would have to be divided by four, at least, to reach the number likely to be called out at once. The duty to be done included the preservation of order, the repair of roads and bridges, and (not the least in importance) the protection of game. A large deduction must be made in calculating the number it would be possible to assemble in an emergency, at one place, for actual military operations. Considering these points carefully, the estimate of 10,900 men present on Harold's position seems as large an one as we .can reasonably make.
Some, if not all, of the housekarls who had been with Harold in Yorkshire had joined the main body of them at Battle, and we have seen how great was the King's impatience while he awaited the arrival of this splendid contingent. The whole of them present did not number more than 3,000, or about one-third of the force on the position; and apparently they were the only thoroughly trained and disciplined body in the English army. They were entrusted with the defence of the Standard, which at first was planted on the highest ground almost in the centre of the line, a hundred yards or so to the north-west of the site of the ruins of the Abbey Church (subsequently founded by William), to which site it was probably moved before the final stage of the battle.
The housekarls are described as having been equipped with short, closely-fitting leather jerkins, on which iron rings were sewn; they wore the hair long, and their heads were covered by steel caps with nasal pieces, long leather flaps falling over the shoulders; they were shod with sandals, and their legs were bound with thongs. They carried long leather shields, so made as to rest on the ground and lock together, forming a sort of wall strong enough to stop arrows in flight. Among their offensive weapons the chief was the long two-handed axe, with which a horse and his rider could be cut down at a stroke, but which had the double disadvantage that it was necessary to open the shield wall to use it, and that its recovery after the blow was struck was so difficult that its holder, for the moment, was completely exposed. It was necessary, consequently, for a proportion of the men to have other arms-javelins to throw, short swords, and keen-edged bills-for use until the shields were relocked. The house-- karls were noted for their perfect drill in using their offensive and defensive weapons together to advantage. The light-armed auxiliaries, who were posted along the front and on the flanks, wore, for the greater part, plain leather jerkins, but many were in the ordinary costume of the peasantry. Their arms were various-spears, short axes, bills, scythes, javelins to throw, slings to hurl stones, and even stone hammers. Only a few wore chain-covered shirts, or had the long axe, but very generally they carried some sort of small shield. They had long hair, and their heads were covered with leather caps. They were not well-trained or disciplined, but their bravery is indisputable.
The English liad no cavalry and very few bowmen. The few horses which belonged to the leaders were sent to the rear, and, from the King downwards, all fought on foot. The King and his two brothers took up their position near the Standard, on which was Harold's device of a fighting man.
I come now to the point upon which there is the greatest difference of opinion,-the nature of the obstacles, if any existed, which covered the front of the position. In the Roman de Ron, written by Wace, a canon of Bayeux, a century after the battle, there is an elaborate description of a palisade and fosse ; but no indication of an artificial obstacle appears on the Tapestry, nor does William of Poitiers, a contemporary authority, mention the existence of one. In spite of its minutia, the negative evidence of the Tapestry may be set aside, if we regard its design as merely decorative and as one in which, for simplicity's sake, much detail was evidently suppressed. It is noteworthy that although the Tapestry is thought to have been founded on sketches by Odo, Bishop of Bayeux, who was personally distiuguished as a combatant at the battle, no allusion should be made to it in the Romance; from which it might be argued that Wace, who possibly worked from manuscript notes left by Odo, purposely ignored the work of women as being, at the best, derived from the same information. On the other hand, although William of Poitiers is said to have been a priest in the suite of the Conqueror, there is no proof that he was on the battlefield himself, and he may have compiled his account from the reports of others. The question of the obstacle thus resolves itself, in great measure, into a consideration of the relative credibility of Wace and William of Poitiers; and it is difficult to conceive that the former absolutely invented his circumstantial statement.
According to the Roman de Rou, the position was guarded in three parts, with openings between them. In front of the defenders were raised barricades of ash and other trees, closely joined together. This view is adopted by Freeman (The Norman Conquest, Vol. III.), as well as by Oman (Art of War in the Middle Ages, p. 153), but is not accepted by most other writers. Oman points out that a hurdle fence with a ditch in front was a Danish device used in England 200 years before, and thinks that the hurdles at Hastings were not more than four feet high. If he is right, we might go a step further, :and suggest that, as the materials were close at hand and plentiful, the words which are translated "trunks of ashes and other trees" refer possibly to something of the nature of an abattis in front of the hurdle revetment. As the attacks were spread over eight or nine hours, something more than the shield-wall would seem to be required to maintain such a desperate resistance. The question for consideration, then, is what the obstacle really was.
Wace declares the English spent the night before the battle in carousing, and gives some picturesque information about the toasts drunk ; he also states that the Normans were engaged in religious exercises. But this must be taken as mere rhetoric, if we accept the fact that the Normans were suddenly called to arms, on the morning of the battle, seven miles away, and that the English had hastily occupied the position and were hard at work. Another statement, also unconfirmed, is that Harold and Gurth rode to the Norman camp to parley; it seems more probable, as the King was accused of treachery and perjury, that he would not dare to run the risk of being detained as a prisoner. The truth would seem to be that the march from London was so hasty that the King only reached the position late on the r3th, and at once ordered such defensive measures as were possible ·of execution in the short time available.
Soon after it was fully light the English perceived the enemy pouring down the slopes of Telham in orderly formation. At this point we may revert to William, whom in a previous page we have brought to the neck, at 219 feet altitude, at which he deployed. He was not yet aware of Harold's weakness in bowmen; but as the central portion of the English line was rather more than 200 yards from the neck, he was able to keep out of arrow range until the movement was completed. The ground lent itself admirably to its accomplishment, for he had not to cross either of the ravines to east or west, but was able to deploy along a contour line, which was about 50 feet below the line to be attacked. The Norman army was in three divisions; and in the arrangement of the line were placed in geographical order. On the right the men of eastern France, Picardy, and Flanders, many of whom were mercenaries, extended from the neck towards the point at which the slopes began to bend round the English position; the Normans, under the Duke's personal leading, covered the centre of the position, their right resting on the neck; and the men from Brittany, Maine, Anjou, and western France were on the left, extended to the top of the steep slope which fell towards the rivulets in that direction. It seems probable that the men of each contingent furnished by a baron or knight were massed separately in some wedge-like formation under their own chief; the infantry being in front in the intervals between the horsemen, and the bowmen extended in advance of the former. We have no precise evidence to show the exact arrangement, and it would be incorrect to endeavour to indicate it by the usual rectangles ; a simple line has therefore been adopted to mark on the plan the general extension of the Norman army at 9 a.m., the bowmen being shown conventionally. The word "Bowmen " is used in preference to " Archers," because the bow used was a very small one, with a considerably shorter range than the famous English long-bow of Cressy, which was not introduced until two centuries later. But although the precise formation of the units of the Norman army is uncertain, a speculation may be made on the numbers it was possible to deploy along a line generally following the 2oo-feet contour between the limits east and west at which the slopes turn sharply northwards. The length of the alignment was about seveneighths of a mile ; and as we suppose the infantry were placed between the horsemen, the latter cannot have been at smaller intervals than two-and-a-half yards. Allowing some break between the divisions, and supposing there were four mounted ranks, a calculation gives us 2,464 as the cavalry strength, exclusive of reserves. If we take the infantry in the proportion of two men for each horseman, and the bowmen at one for two horsemen, we can obtain the following result ;-
| Cavalry (in four ranks) | 2,464 |
| Infantry | 4,928 |
| Bowmen | 1,232 |
| Total | 8,624 |
As the Normans were stronger than the two other divisions combined, and the Bretons rather stronger than the French, we may suppose the force to have been divided, approximately, as follows:-
| Bretons | Normans | French | |
| Cavalry | 650 | 1,300 | 514 |
| Infantry | 1,300 | 2,600 | 1,028 |
| Bowmen | 325 | 650 | 257 |
| Totals | 2,275 | 4,550 | 1,700 |
| Approx frontage (yards) | 405 | 815 | 320 |
The results obtained by these methods of reasoning are wholly different from the popularly accepted numbers on the opposing sides. Against 20,000 to 25,000 on the English side, we have, on reasonable grounds, been able to account for 10,900 only; and on the Norman side, against 60,000, only 8,624. In the previous calculation we came to the conclusion that 1,ooo men may have been transported across the channel; and when due allowance is made for reserves, casualties, men left on the communications, and sick, the total 8,624 is as high an estimate as can be made of the numbers likely to have been in line on the battlefield.
The juggling feats of Taillefer, and the dramatic episode (mentioned by Wace) in which he sacrificed his life, may be passed over as without military interest; and we now reach the point at which the actual fighting commenced. Soon after 9 o'clock the preparations were complete, and William ordered a general advance along the front. In the armies of the IIth century, previous to this battle, the majority of the fighting men had usually been cavalry, while the infantry had been a much despised arm. But at Hastings footmen were employed in larger proportions, for two reasons-the difficulty of transporting horses over the sea, and the reputation recently gained by the English infantry. William's tactics were, after preparing the attack with his bowmen, to assault with infantry, not caring how many of the despised arm he sacrificed, and to charge with cavalry when the defence was shaken. The infantry, whose hair was worn short, were in most respects very similarly clad to the English; some had chain shirts and iron caps, but the greater number wore leather jerkins and caps, while many had the simple blouse of the French peasantry; their legs were bound with thongs, and they were shod with sandals; their arms were short axes, spears, daggers, and broadswords. In discipline and courage they were not inferior to the English bodyguard, and in all respects were better than the English light-armed levies. But their opponents had the great advantage of being posted on the top of a steep slope, and it was the first experience of the Normans against the famous housekarls, with their shield-wall and two-handed axes. If there were any engineering obstacles, these also had to be surmounted; but even if there were not, the task before William's army was a most difficult one. We cannot wonder, then, that the first assaults failed at every point. A desperate resistance was encountered, and the storm of missiles of every description showered on the assailants is described as quite unprecedented.
On the left, as may be seen from the plan, the Bretons advanced up a comparatively easy slope, and doubtless reached the English line more quickly than the Normans in the centre; being unsupported, at first, on their right, the full opposition was concentrated against their attack ; they were thrown into confusion, and fell back in disorder. It had been strongly impressed on the English that the only hope of gaining the day depended on their remaining steady on their own ground of vantage; but the ill-disciplined levies on the west of the ridge, seeing the Bretons retiring, could not restrain their excitement, and rushed down the hill in pursuit, crying "Victory." Their triumph was short-lived, for William's highlytrained cavalry on the slope in the centre lost not a moment in attacking the pursuers in flank; and it is reported that very few of the brave Englishmen were left alive to return to their lines, though some of them may have escaped through the wood on the west. In the repulse and retreat of the Bretons occurred the greatest loss sustained by the Norman army during the whole day. The baggage guard even was in danger, and indeed for a short while there seems to have been an absolute crisis. William of Poitiers states that the issue of the battle was in doubt and hung in the balance until 3 o'clock. The valiant conduct of Bishop Odo in rallying the flying Bretons is specially noticed by William of Poitiers; he is shown on the Tapestry clad in coat-of-mail, striking into the melee with a mace (being an ecclesiastic he was not allowed to use a sword). Duke William himself also assisted in arresting the flight; a rumour had spread that he had fallen, and he is reported as having lifted his visor to show his face in order to re-assure the army that he was alive.
The Norman army fell back along the whole line to re-form. Many times during the day the attack was vigorously renewed, and as often failed. The stand made by the English has been compared to that at Waterloo, but there was an essential difference between the cases, arising from the unsteadiness of the light-armed men; had they stood doggedly on their ground like Wellington's squares, the issue of the battle might have been quite other than it was. William was personally foremost in the fray, but still his cavalry could not penetrate the English line.
Towards the afternoon, remembering how the light-armed men had left the line in pursuit of the Bretons in the morning, lie conceived the idea of feigning defeat in order to tempt them to do the same again. But this time his retreat was made in the direction of the Hastings road, where he knew the advantage of higher ground would soon be on his side; and at the critical moment the French on the east fell on the disorderly crowd of pursuers on their flank, and effected immense slaughter. This manoeuvre seems to have been repeated more than once, with the result that the English strength was so materially weakened that it became necessary to concentrate for the defence of the Standard, thus leaving their right insufficiently guarded. The Normans on the west, who were only waiting for this to happen before renewing their attack, succeeded, about 3 o'clock in the afternoon, in getting to the top of the hill behind the line on the English right. The cavalry were now able to move rapidly along the ridge, on fairly level ground, in the direction of the Standard, round which the housekarls maintained the shield-wall unbroken, the low-aimed arrows of the Norman bowmen being caught in the shields. This being observed, the bowmen were ordered to give greater elevation in order that their shafts should fall at a high angle on the English rear ranks. The arrows "flew thicker than rain," and before long one pierced the eye of Harold. From this moment the issue of the battle was no longer in doubt. William, however, continued to engage the housekarls hand to hand in a prolonged struggle; his men suffered much from the terrible two-handed axes, but gradually gained a footing on the high ground. King Harold'and his two brothers fell fighting to the last in defence of the Standard; and it is stated that the crowd round it was so dense that the wounded were trampled under the horses and the living marched over heaps of the dead.
William, from the top of the hill, noticed that the English left was gradually becoming weaker, and sent an urgent order to the French division, which was engaged down the outer slope in completing the defeat of the last sortie, to detach a body to assist the main attack at the east end of the ridge. From the Carmen de Bello Hastingensi, we learn that Eustace of Boulogne, with two Norman knights and a body of stragglers hastily collected, came up in obedience to the order, and got inside the line on the extreme English left. I cannot, myself, consider this as the first time the English line had been penetrated, as I believe Mr. Baring does, but I think Eustace's attack very possibly hastened the English flight, the day having been virtually lost long before.
It was dusk, and nearly 6 o'clock ; all the leaders had fallen, and the housekarls lay dead to the very last man round the captured Standard; the few survivors, mainly the light-armed militiamen, broke at last, and fled in complete confusion in all directions.
I have frequently discussed the incidents of the battle with Mr. Baring, and in company with him and Sir Augustus Webster, the owner of Battle Abbey, have examined the ground. In nearly every particular I am in full agreement with him, but in one respect we differ in opinion. He attributes a larger share in the battle to the French than I do, and does not accept my view that the first penetration of Harold's line was by the Normans at the west end of the ridge. According to my reading of the chronicles, the repeated mention of the Normans and Bretons in the description of the late stages of the battle shows that the principal scene of the fighting at that time was the Norman left-centre and left; while, on the other hand, little is said until the final phase of the action of the French division, beyond the mention of the assistance given by it in repulsing the sorties on the Hastings road. It seems to me that the penetration of the line by the French at the east end was, as I have stated in other words, nothing more than a final movement in support of the men already fighting on the hill; and that the victory would have been equally assured if it had not taken place.
The horses of William's army had been saddled twelve hours or more, and were thoroughly tired out; and I imagine the final pursuit must have been made by the French, whose mounts were the only comparatively fresh animals. Most of the fugitives ran towards the north-west, in which direction for half a mile the ground was fairly level and open; the pursuing cavalry, in their fury, appear to have lost all discipline, cutting down the helpless English mercilessly. It was by this time almost dark, and the reckless riders failed to notice that the ground was intersected by the head of a ravine about half a mile from the position on which the Standard had stood. Its steep bank was concealed among bushes, and became a death trap into which a large number of horses and their riders fell. The retreating English turned a moment in their flight, and took a last revenge by killing every fallen Frenchman; their further pursuit by the Norman army was abandoned.
The site of this disaster, which the chroniclers refer to as "the Malfosse," is erroneously marked on Freeman's map on the east side and at the left-rear of the battle ridge. Sir James Ramsay perceived it was on the west side, but marked it much too near the Standard. The site now indicated was suggested by Sir Augustus Webster, and Mr. Baring has proved that he is correct. It would take too much space to give the documentary evidence quoted by him in support of his arguments, which I accept as most convincing.
The present state of the battle ground is difficult to compare with what it must have been in 1066. There can be no reasonable doubt that the ruins of the Abbey Church founded by William the Conqueror mark the exact position on which stood the English Standard at the end of the battle and where Harold was killed; and on this spot a monument to Harold has recently been erected by a French society. The ground which was then quite open is now covered with trees and gardens, and the even slopes up which the Normans advanced have been completely altered in character by walls, retaining terraces upon which the fine abbey buildings stand. To the east of the position of Harold, and on the line of the Norman approach from Telham hill, the site is covered by the houses of the village and the railway. Although there are many trees on the south-west angle of the battle site, it is the only part of the ground which to some extent is the same in contour as it was in 1066. On the plan an endeavour is made to show the ground as it was at the date of the battle.
The romance of the finding of Harold's body and its supposititious interment on the seashore is too well known a story to be repeated. The English army had ceased to exist. William's loss cannot be stated, but was so heavy that he was too crippled to advance at once. Falling back to Hastings, he obtained reinforcements there before marching along the coast to Romney and Dover; and he was not able to commence his march from Canterbury to London until after December ist. His exact movements need not be traced further.