The Battle of Hastings, Executive Summary
Are you interested in the Battle of Hastings but too busy to investigate? You have come to the right place. Well, as long as you do not want to hear the traditional fairy-tale about Harold riding through the night to defend the hill around Battle Abbey. This, in effect, is a concise version of our book 'The Battle of Hastings at Sedlescombe'.
One significant difference is that we state most of this narrative as if it were fact, whereas the book makes clear it is 'confident supposition'. This version is more comfortable to read, purged of ugly sentences beginning 'we think', 'it seems likely', 'in our opinion', etc, but it is not fact. Another is that we provide no evidence or reasoning. Something has to be redacted. If you want evidence or reasoning (entirely circumstantial), read the book.
The backstory
Edward the Confessor died childless on 5th January, 1066. Harold Godwinson was crowned King the following day. William of Normandy immediately resolved to invade England and wrest the English throne from him.
By tradition, William's motivation was fourfold: 1) He thought he was Edward's rightful blood heir; 2) He thought that Edward had promised him the succession; 3) He thought that Harold had reneged on an oath to support his claim to the English throne; 4) He was acting on behalf of the Pope to rid England of church corruption.
William had grounds for these beliefs. 1) He was Edward's nearest male relative bar Edgar Ætheling - first cousin three times removed and great nephew respectively - but Edgar was too young to take the crown at 13. Harold had no blood relationship. 2) William is said to have come to England to see Edward in 1051, which might have been to discuss his support for William's succession. 3) Harold went to see William in Normandy in 1064 at Edward's behest, quite possibly carrying a message about the succession and he might have made an oath to support William's claim on the English throne. 4) The Pope was peeved that simony had become rife in the English church and that England had stopped paying "Peter's pence", a tax sent to Rome, and he was supporting William's campaign.
He had a skewed view. Anglo-Saxon England did not practice agnatic primogeniture. English Kings were elected by a council of wise men known as a 'witengemot', albeit taking into consideration factors like bloodlines and the wishes of the previous King. They duly elected Harold Godwinson. The debate took less than a day because Harold was overwhelmingly the best candidate. He was the most powerful baron in England and Edward is said to have chosen him as his preferred successor while on his deathbed (as depicted on Tapestry Panel 26). He was the only candidate with a good chance of repelling an almost inevitable series of foreign invasions. He was the best candidate to fulfil the witengemot's core long term purpose, to protect and enrich Anglo-Saxon culture and the Anglo-Saxon people.
Moreover, it is difficult to believe that Edward or Harold willingly gave their support to his claim on the English throne. Edward was half-Norman and was doubtless grateful to William's father for protecting him while he was in exile, but that does not mean that he wanted to see his country asset-stripped or his people cast into slavery. Rather, Edward seems to have privately hinted at supporting each of the powerful candidates. Perhaps he kept changing his mind. More likely, he was practicing chicanery to buy peace during his reign. Harold was Edward's de facto heir. If he made an oath to support William, he must have been tricked or coerced or, most likely, hoped it would prevent William preparing an invasion before Edward's death, thereby giving him time to fortify the English coast after his accession.
In reality, these are all side issues. England was the richest country in Europe. William's underlying motivation was clearly to subjugate England and use it as a cash cow to fund his empire building ambitions. All this other stuff was just a bunch of excuses to legitimise warmongering in the eyes of his followers, the Pope, and himself.
The traditional battlefield at Battle Abbey
By tradition, Harold was so incensed by William's invasion that he led a makeshift army to the Hastings Peninsula while as many men again were still on their way. His incredibly unlikely plan is supposed to have been a red-mist inspired immediate or nocturnal attack on the heavily fortified Norman camp. Then, having arrived at the battle theatre, he is supposed to have volte-faced, switching from an implausibly aggressive strategy to implausibly passive, placing his army on a defensively weak hill to wait for the Normans to attack. Less plausible still, he is supposed to have positioned his men in a line across the hill, gambling that William was so inept that he would not ride around the open ends of the line (black lines on diagram above) to attack him from behind and kill him in the first few minutes of the battle. Just as implausibly, William is supposed to have been that inept, eschewing a quick and easy victory, instead choosing the only strategy that might allow the English to hold out all day: to attack a short section of the English shield wall that was on the steepest part of the hill.
The absurd tradition is based solely on seven contemporary accounts which say or imply that Battle Abbey was built on the battlefield. Seven is an awful lot if they are unequivocal, independent and trustworthy. In our opinion, three of them are not unequivocal, trying to say that Battle Abbey was built in the vicinity of the battlefield rather than on the battlefield. Two of the others are not trustworthy, having been written by monks at Battle Abbey, who had a vested interest to pretend that the Abbey was built on the battlefield. The other two are not independent. The author of one reports it as hearsay originating from monks of Battle Abbey, suggesting that he did not believe them. The other was written nearly 100 years after the battle, and was therefore almost certainly based on some of these others.
Shorn of 'Abbey on the battlefield' support from the contemporary accounts, Battle becomes an incredibly unlikely battlefield. It fails to match more than 30 geographic and military clues from the contemporary accounts. It only matches a couple of the most general geographic and military clues, and then only if William attacks from one of the two least favourable directions. William is supposed to have done exactly that, when he would obviously have looped behind the English line, or at least attacked on the shallow approaches to the east, west and northwest. Harold would have had to pass a far superior defensive position at Cottage Lane to get to Battle. William would have had to be implausibly stupid or naive to allow the English army to venture that far onto the Hastings Peninsula, when he could have ambushed them wherever they crossed onto the Hastings Peninsula. He would have had to be even more stupid or naive for the battle to have lasted more than a few minutes.
Furthermore, Harold was not the hot-headed dolt that he is usually made out to be. His sister described him as: "endowed with mildness of temper and a ready understanding" and "the fault of rashness or levity is not one that anybody could charge against him". This is clearly not a man likely to jeopardise his life, his brothers' lives, his dynasty and his race in a premature advance with an understrength army followed by a suicidal defensive deployment just because he is having a hissy fit.
The preliminaries
Under normal circumstances, William would have had virtually no chance of taking England by force. Normandy had less than a quarter of England's population and the English were almost united behind Harold. Dissenters, such as they were, mostly supported Hardrada. William did not have time to prosecute a long siege or a long campaign, because Normandy would be left virtually undefended during the invasion. His supply lines would be long and precarious. If Harold left the Normans to stew or if he adopted a Fabian defence or if he chose to hide or if he stayed within the walls of London or Winchester, William would eventually have had to return home.
After returning to London from Stamford Bridge, Harold had to choose a strategy to get rid of William. All the non-military tactics listed above were possible, as were a siege or a battle with overwhelming force or a siege followed by a battle with overwhelming force. Then there was the issue of whether he should lead the campaign himself or delegate command to his brother Gyrth. On the one hand, it was crucial for him to stay alive. He could not risk being exposed to snipers or ambushes, and he could not risk a battle in which the enemy stood any chance of victory. On the other hand, as a medieval warrior King, he would want to lead his men to glorious victory in battle. His barons and subjects would expect their King to plan and lead the defence of his realm. And he was by far the best man for the job: England's most experienced military commander, the only English nobleman who knew William's fighting style, and the only one with expert local knowledge thanks to his nearby manor at Crowhurst.
Making any sort of strategic decisions from London was difficult because of the long delay receiving intelligence. Harold reasoned that he needed to get closer to the action, while staying far enough away from the Normans to be completely safe. To work out where would be completely safe, he dispatched messengers and spies to scout the enemy position, strength, troop dispositions and fortifications.
William was also a medieval warrior 'King', albeit of a Dukedom. Perhaps he faced a similar decision when Henry and Odo invaded Normandy in 1054. Regardless, he could have predicted Harold's concerns, probably before crossing the Channel. It gave him a sniff of an opportunity. His biggest hurdle was luring Harold to the battle theatre. If William fed him with false intelligence about the size and strength of the Norman army, making it seem feeble and toothless, Harold would probably come in person and might venture within striking distance. William just needed to sandbag, concealing any threat.
It is said that nearly all the Norman knights were out foraging when Harold arrived at the battle theatre. Deliberate or by chance, this was how William achieved the illusion. The entire Norman cavalry and perhaps a third of his infantry was spread thinly over the Udimore and Hastings Peninsulas. English scouts would focus on the enemy camp. They might come across small pockets of Norman knights out foraging for food. It would seem only natural. As long as the Norman knights did not clump together for a chat, the English scouts had close to zero chance of realising that William had brought any cavalry, let alone catch on to its enormous scale.
Meanwhile, William placed himself, his barons and the balance of his infantry as bait in a siege-prone camp. He needed to appear as unthreatening as possible, which he achieved by placing the camp at the remotest part of the Hastings Peninsula, and at a place that was visible across the Brede estuary.
English messengers and scouts would have reported what they thought was most pertinent: a heavily fortified Norman camp in a good defensive location, occupied by some 3000 men, mostly footbound. The Norman camp was some eight miles downstream of the lowest Brede crossing point, at Sedlescombe. It would take the Normans at least three hours to march there. English scouts on the north bank of the Brede would see them leave. As long as Harold did not cross the Brede, safety at the Rother was no more than a 20 minute ride or a 60 minute fast march. Mollified, he made the fateful decision to relocate himself to the outskirts of the battle theatre.
Next, he had to decide whether to move immediately with his makeshift army of perhaps 6000 men, or wait a week for half as many again to arrive from the furthest reaches of Wessex, Essex and Mercia. There was a big benefit in an early relocation to the battle theatre in that he could devise a plan ready to be executed as soon as his reserves arrived. It would minimise the time that his troops needed to be fed and not give them time to fret about their fate. But he could only relocate if he was safe.
Harold's intelligence was that William had no more than 3000 men, mainly footbound. He would have had twice that number with the makeshift army, plus a fortified camp on higher ground, an early warning of potential danger, and the ability to blockade the egress points from the Hastings Peninsula. He reasoned that his makeshift army would be easily strong enough to keep him secure for what he needed to do, which was, after all, only to gather intelligence, pick a strategy and decide whether to delegate command of its execution to Gyrth.
Luring Harold perilously close to the Hastings Peninsula was one thing. Killing him was another. He would be naturally cautious and surrounded by enough men to deter snipers and guerrillas. A siege was out of the question with Harold's reinforcements due within a few days. William's only realistic chance of killing Harold was to defeat the English army in battle. But, at any normal place, as soon as William coalesced enough men to be a potent threat, English scouts would have realised the strength of the Norman cavalry and Harold might have fled or retreated to safety. At any normal place, William would have had hardly any chance of killing him. But medieval East Sussex was no normal place.
The geography of the medieval English coast opposite Normandy was extraordinary. It had a narrow-necked peninsula within a narrow-necked peninsula, mostly within a steep ridged basin, all within a narrow-necked peninsula - these were the Cape of Winchelsea, where William established his camp, the Hastings Peninsula, the Brede basin and the Rother Peninsula respectively. In effect, it offered four concentric rings of natural entrapment.
William would have known all this because the Norman abbey of Fécamps had an outpost at Rameslie manor in the Brede basin. Monks that once lived in this outpost would have known because Fécamps was also Tenant-in-Chief or feudal Lord of Steyning, Laleham and Bury. They would have routinely used the peninsula crossing points and isthmuses to visit these outliers, as well as when they attended major events in London and Winchester. Indeed, it seems likely to us that Jo Kirkham was right when she proposed 25 years ago that the Abbey of Fécamps planned the entire invasion.
Harold arrived at the battle theatre on the Roman road from Rochester, having crossed the Rother by ferry near Bodiam. As soon as he disembarked on the southern bank, even though he was 12 miles from the Norman camp, he was already in peril because Norman cavalry on the Udimore Peninsula could block the Roman road and the isthmus, to prevent him getting back to the mainland. The further south Harold ventured, the greater the danger he was in. Cripps Corner, where the Rochester Roman road crossed the Brede basin watershed, was the Rubicon. As soon as the English army passed into the Brede basin, the Norman cavalry on the Udimore Peninsula could spread out along the watershed ridgeway to close the door behind. The English army was trapped in a four square mile area between the Brede estuary and its northern watershed. Battle was inevitable.
Unlike the traditional narrative, this engagement scenario does not need Harold to have an uncharacteristic fit of impetuous lunacy, or to make a suicidal attack with an understrength army on a heavily fortified Norman camp, or to defend a defensively pathetic hill when two far better hills were easier to reach, or to deploy his troops so ineffectually that they might as well have not been there. Nor does this scenario need William to jeopardise the success of his invasion by spending the entire day battling the only part of the English shield wall that could have held out all day, when he could easily have ridden around the open ends of the shield wall to lop off Harold's head in the first 15 minutes. It just needs the English messengers and spies to be hoodwinked by a clever and well executed Norman trick. A foretaste of what happened during the battle, then. No one could claim that such a trick was out of character.
The real invasion narrative
The Norman fleet arrived near 'pefenes ea', often contracted to 'Pefenesea'. It was known to the Normans as 'Peuenesel'. The Tapestry refers to it as 'PEVENESÆ'. It was an island harbour some 2km south of modern Pevensey. Nothing remains. It was washed away by storms in the 13th century, forcing its former occupants to relocate to modern Pevensey, taking the name of their settlement with them. The Normans did not land at 'pefenes ea' but moored nearby on shallow offshore sandbanks to wait for dawn and the tide.
The Norman fleet sailed to Hæstinga port at the mouth of the River Brede. Its docks and warehouses were at Old Winchelsea on a shingle spit that was also washed away by 13th century storms. Its mint and administration were at Iham, which became modern Winchelsea. The Norman fleet did not stop at Hæstinga port but sailed up the Brede, landing on the north bank between Pickdick Farm and Float Farm (Panel 39). It was near a place known to Normans as 'Peneuesellum', which means 'fortress in the wash'.
The Norman knights (Panel 40) crossed the Brede at Sedlescombe bridge/ford to seize food at 'Hestinga', the Tapestry's name for the Hastings Peninsula.
William established a bridgehead on the strand between Pickdick Farm and Float Farm. It was unusually flat and dry because it included a plain of dried out salt evaporation ponds. He expected a counterattack from the English garrisons at Lympne and Pevensey. As it happened, those garrisons had been emptied several weeks previously, but William was not to know. He assembled a kit fortress to protect the strand and blockaded the Udimore Peninsula ridgeway at the Sowdens pinch point to protect the heights. Meanwhile, the Norman horses, weapons, armour, fortifications and supplies were unloaded.
In the afternoon of the day they landed, the Normans raided a nearby fortress and settlement. The most likely candidate is the fortress known to the Normans as 'Peneuesellum', which was probably at modern Cadborough. Tapestry Panel 42 depicts the Normans eating dinner at their first camp. The twin towered building is often assumed to be the kit fortress they had brought from Normandy. It is not. It might be a fishing net store or a salt warehouse or, most likely, the fortress at 'Peneuesellum', depicted in the far distance.
William thought that the Udimore Peninsula's long flat strand and its narrow ridgeway were ideal for the landing and bridgehead, but he did not like its tactical possibilities. It was probably too small and too easy to besiege. He stayed just one day before moving most of his troops to a new camp at Hæstinga port on the Hastings Peninsula.
The new camp's strand was too short to hold the entire Norman fleet. William did not want to leave seaworthy ships behind in case they were useful to Harold. He had no intention of reloading his horses or supplies back into ships, so he ordered that all the cargo ships and horse carriers should be burned. The remaining ships moored in Hæstinga port harbour, below modern Winchelsea.
The second Norman camp was at Winchelsea. William ordered his men to dig a motte for a second kit fortress, as depicted in Tapestry Panel 45. It shows his men still digging, so the second kit fortress had not yet been assembled. There is already a fortress on top of the hill. It must have been there when the Normans arrived. It was probably Hæstinga ceastre, a former Roman fortress that had been adapted into one of Alfred's burhs. It was on the summit of Winchelsea where St Thomas's now stands. The kit fortress guarded the narrow neck entrance to the Winchelsea peninsula, at the junction of modern Wickham Rock Lane and Monk's Walk. The tower to the right of Panel 45 was at the same location as the surviving Greyfriars Monastery tower.
News of the Norman invasion was carried to Harold, still in York basking in the glory of victory over Harold Hardrada at Stamford Bridge. He immediately returned to London. As we explain above, he decided to lead a makeshift army of some 6000 men into the battle theatre. They took the Roman road from Rochester, crossing the Rother by ferry near Bodiam. They camped on the last rising ground before the Brede estuary, on a ridge adjacent to modern Great Sanders.
Great Sanders ridge had unusual geography. The ground fell away precipitously to the west, steeply to the north and it was bounded to the south by two immense ditches, each 30m wide and 10m deep. Together they were some 450m long, from the spring above Hurst House to half way across Killingan Wood. There were two bridging points across the ditch, one where Hurst Lane now runs through, the other where Churchlands Lane runs through. Harold ordered them to be heavily guarded. The only vulnerabilities were a shallow slope to the east and a level approach from the Roman road to the northwest.
Not realising that the Normans had brought a significant number of knights and warhorses, Harold would have been pleased with his camp. It was a naturally fortified dry ridge, dotted with rainwater filled Roman iron ore mining pits for drinking and adjacent to two streams for latrines. It was close to the Rochester Roman road, from where his reinforcements would arrive and, if necessary, which could be used as an express highway for a safe retreat. It covered the main Brede crossing point at Sedlescombe, as well as minor fords at Brede village and Whatlington.
Harold presumably planned to blockade the only land egress from the Hastings Peninsula, along the isthmus ridgeway at High Wood. The only other ways off the Hastings Peninsula had to cross the Brede or the Ash Bourne. The English camp overlooked the only easy egress point, where the Rochester Roman road crossed the Brede at Sedlescombe. If the Normans tried to cross there on foot, Harold would have assumed his men could swoop down from their camp to trap them on the riverbank against a bottleneck crossing. If footbound, they would not have been much better off elsewhere, because both armies would be similarly mobile. Harold's simple plan would have been to mirror the Norman troop disposition across the Brede or Ash Bourne. Wherever they tried to cross, his men could trap them on muddy river bank or push them back into the river.
The following day, Friday October 13th, Harold discovered to his horror that William had brought a significant number of knights and warhorses. It was a multiple setback. The English could no longer guard the Brede or Ash Bourne crossing points, because the Norman cavalry could cross upstream and loop behind the river guard, trapping them on the muddy river bank. Worse, some of the Norman cavalry would be guarding the Brede watershed ridgeway, able to cut off a retreat or personal flight back to the Rother. In effect, the English were trapped with nowhere to escape. William coalesced most of his army in a battle camp on the ridge now occupied by Cottage Lane, above Pestalozzi village. Harold's only hope was to hold out until the rest of his army arrived.
William's problem was that the English camp would be a tough nut to crack. Precipitous slopes made it virtually impregnable south and west. The slope to the north was a dangerous 10%. William would have been forced to concentrate his attack to the northwest and east, where the slopes were relatively shallow, but the former was only 125m long, the latter 225m long. Harold could have fortified them with barricades and defended them with 8 ranks of men, still leaving enough men to be 4 ranks deep elsewhere.
William's scouts reported that relatively few reserves would arrive in the following two days, which gave him a day to search for weaknesses in the English camp and to prepare a detailed plan of attack. He also send messengers trying to intimidate Harold into flight, having hidden knights along his escape path to cut him off. It didn't work.
At dawn on Saturday October 14th, the day of battle, William and his barons were at Winchelsea (W on map above), the Norman army was at its battle camp along Cottage Lane (N), some of the cavalry were at Cripps Corner (G) to prevent a retreat, the English army was at Great Sanders ridge (E). The Brede was in between the two armies. William and his barons rode to Cottage Lane while his men had breakfast. He dressed for battle and gave his pep talk. The Normans filed out of their camp on the Roman road, using its narrow Brede crossing. William went to pray in the Fécamps monastery which was beside the Rochester Roman road near Sedlescombe, probably at the place now occupied by Sedlescombe Church.
As soon as the English scouts reported the Normans leaving camp, Harold moved his army some 400m south onto Hurst spur, either side of modern Hurst Lane below Churchlands Lane. It was a smart move. The English camp had two weak points whereas Hurst spur did not have any. Parts of the English camp were woody, which would hinder Harold's ability to monitor events and to send commands, whereas Hurst spur was almost treeless. Hurst spur was only 400m wide between two muddy streams, leaving no more that 150m between the English shield wall and the muddy stream banks. This narrowed to nothing at the top of the battlefield. The further the Normans ventured up the sides of the English shield wall, the greater the risk they would get shield charged to death in the stream or the muddy stream banks.
The English crossed the immense ditch between their camp and the battlefield on the causeway bridge. It was so narrow that it appeared to the Normans that they occupied the battlefield in a military column. They fanned out into a wedge shape following the spur contours. Those at the top of the shield wall lined the south side of the immense ditch. The weakest point was the relatively shallow slope to the south, which Harold fortified with a 200m long barricade and water filled ditch, probably hastily made by running horses to and fro.
The Normans had been heading north up the Rochester Roman road, preparing to attack the English camp. They redirected to attack Hurst spur, leaving the Roman road at Sedlescombe Church, probably then the location of the Fécamps monastery. They followed the modern public footpath east. The English saw them appear on the crest of the adjacent spur to their west. The Norman army headed down the crest of that spur to Balcombe Green, then crossed the stream their east, forming up in three divisions along modern Brede Lane at Brede Barn Farm. The camp followers stayed on the crest of the spur where they could watch events unfold. The rest of the Norman army slowly climbed the slope towards the English shield wall.
The battle started with a Norman crossbow attack, killing a dozen or more Englishmen at the tip of the shield wall. It is said that the English shield wall was so tightly packed that the dead were unable to fall. Harold had no crossbowmen to return ammunition so the Norman crossbowmen soon ran out of ammunition, retiring from the battle. Next a Norman archer attack, ineffective because arrows could not penetrate the English shields. Again, the English had no archers to return ammunition, so most of the Norman archers ran out of ammunition and had to retire from the battle. Next a Norman infantry attack, ineffective because of the steep slope. Perilous too because the Norman armour could not withstand being hit by English axemen in the second rank.
Next a Norman cavalry attack of junior knights, ineffective because their horses would not charge the shield wall and perilous because the horses were liable to trip on the barricade or slip in the ditch.
Some Norman infantrymen ventured up the sides of the shield wall, hoping to pull the English out of position, thereby creating holes in the shield wall for the Norman cavalry to get directly at Harold. They were shield charged into the muddy stream banks. Those Normans at the back slipped in the mud and fell, bringing down those backing onto them. The Normans at the bottom were drowned or crushed. Those on top got chopped up by English axemen. It is said that more Normans died in this event than in the rest of the battle combined.
At least once during the early fighting, the Normans fled in terror from the shield wall. At least once, some men ran out of the shield wall to chase them. Harold's brothers Gyrth and Leofwine tried to get the chasers to return. Everyone that left the shield wall, including Gyrth and Leofwine, was surrounded by Norman knights and killed. This is depicted in Tapestry Panel 48. Presumably, seeing their colleagues getting slaughtered encouraged those still in the shield wall to hold their position.
That was pretty much the end of the real fighting, all over in less than an hour. The terrain, fortifications and enclosed shield wall made it impossible for the Normans to inflict any meaningful damage. This is depicted in Panel 54. Conversely, venturing anywhere within axe distance of the shield wall was suicidal. The slope and narrowness of the battlefield made it just as dangerous to venture up the sides of the shield wall. The immense ditch made it impossible to attack from above.
William realised it would be pointless and dispiriting to sacrifice more men in forlorn attacks. After a discussion with his senior barons, the Normans switched strategy, trying to goad the shield wall out of position. It is said that an unusual type of battle ensued, with one side standing like statues stuck to the ground, while the other tried all sorts of strategies to get them to move.
William ordered his archers to shoot their remaining ammunition over the shield wall, hoping to hit the English commanders beyond. One lucky arrow struck Harold in the eye, incapacitating him. As the day wore on, William tried repeated feigned retreats, trying to draw men out of the shield wall. Perhaps the loss of English commanders caused the English troops to lose discipline. Eventually, late in the afternoon, William tried a feigned retreat in which enough men chased out of the shield wall to leave a big enough gap for the Norman knights to get through. They quickly swept aside Harold's personal guard and killed him.
The English reformed the shield wall higher up the spur and continued to resist. Late in the afternoon, they fell back into and over the immense ditch. It is said that many Norman knights tried to chase. The ditch was deeper and the sides more precipitous than they looked, causing dozens of them to fall to their death. Accordingly, the Normans named the ditch 'Malfosse'. It is still there, to be seen either side of Hurst Lane about 200m north of Hurst House.
The English fled east along the base of the Malfosse and along the far side, some Normans chase in the ditch. This is depicted in the double decker Panel 58, right at the end of the Tapestry. It is said that the English fled into a 'labyrinth of ditches'. Again, it is still there, with the Malfosse crossing Churchlands Lane and continuing into Killingan Wood. The western end of the immense ditch in the middle of Killingan Wood formed a bottleneck. The English made a fresh stand, but many were slaughtered, giving the wood its name.
The number of casualties was far lower than traditionally assumed, especially at the shield wall. No Norman barons died during the entire battle. A few dozen Englishmen died in the initial crossbow attack. A few dozen Normans died in the initial assault on the shield wall, then a few dozen more in the flanking stream ditch. The Norman crossbowmen and most of the archers quickly ran out of ammunition. Nearly all the subsequent fatalities at the battlefield were due to men running out of the shield wall, then getting surrounded and killed by Norman knights. Some more Normans died in the Malfosse during the English retreat. More again the the 'labyrinth of ditches' as the Norman knights chased the fleeing English. Many Englishmen were cut down as they fled, probably leaving hundreds dead in Killingan Wood.