Alternative Battlefield Theories

The traditional battlefield surrounding Battle Abbey is a poor geographic, topographic and military fit for the battlefield descriptions in the contemporary accounts. It is not supported by any archaeological or physical evidence. It makes no sense. We list 20 specific reasons to doubt the orthodox battlefield location here. These inadequacies have led some people to suggest that the battle was fought elsewhere.

We are among the sceptics. We believe that the battle was fought at Hurst Lane near Sedlescombe. We explain our thinking here. Credible arguments have been made for other battlefields. The oldest is Caldbec Hill, refined by John Grehan from an original idea by Jim Bradbury. The most popular is Telham Hill, devised by Nick Austin. Old Heathfield was  devised by Dr Rebecca Welshman and Simon Coleman. The most recent is Blackhorse Hill devised by David Barnby. We analyse these theories in some detail below.

• Crowhurst (Telham Hill)
• Caldbec Hill
• Old Heathfield
• Blackhorse Hill

We also include notes on two more alternative battlefields that have been proposed at one time or anoher. The best known, simply through the power of television, is Time Team’s theory that the battle was fought on east slope of Battle Hill. We do not analyse this in detail because it has all the drawbacks of the orthodox battlefield, and then some. The other is Beech Farm (Wadhurst Lane) devised by Simon Coleman. We do not analyse it in detail because he has subsequently abandoned this theory in favour of Old Heathfield.

• Battle Hill east slope (Time Team)
• Beech Farm (Wadhurst Lane)

Battlefield location clues and the alternative battlefield candidates

We validated our Sedlescombe battlefield hypothesis against 33 battlefield location clues - listed in the table below. It aligns with 30 of them, including both of the 'fingerprint' clues. The orthodox battlefield, excluding its unreliable intimacy with Battle Abbey, is only consistent with seven of the most general of these clues. Each of the alternative battlefields is only consistent with five or six.

We divide the clues into six sections. The first, 'Orthodox battlefield clues', are the four clues that support the orthodox Battle Abbey battlefield. The most cogent of these are the first two, that Battle Abbey was built on the battlefield (1) and its less specific equivalent, that the English defended the place where Battle Abbey was later built (2). They uniquely match the orthodox battlefield and form the only significant evidence that supports the orthodox invasion narrative. We think both clues are unreliable, for reasons we explain in our paper about the orthodox battlefield, here. Indeed, we think they are inside out: they are evidence that the battle was not fought at Battle Abbey rather than that it was. The second section, 'Battlefield fingerprint clues' are the two other specific battlefield location clues in the contemporary accounts. They uniquely match Hurst Lane in Sedlescombe. The other four sections are relatively self-explanatory. Full descriptions of the clues can be found in our main Sedlescombe battlefield paper, here.

✓✓✓ = Unique match;  ✓✓ = Match;  ✓ = Consistent ✖ = Inconsistent; ✖✖ = Contradictory	T.H.	C.H.	O.H.	B.H.
Orthodox battlefield clues
1. Battle Abbey was built on the battlefield?	✖✖	✖✖	✖✖	✖✖
2. The battlefield was in the vicinity of Battle Abbey?	✖	✖	✖✖	✖✖
3. The Normans advanced up a steep slope	✓✓	✓✓	✓✓	✓✓
4. The battlefield was at or near the top of a hill	✓✓	✓✓	✓✓	✓✓
Battlefield fingerprint clues
5. Non-fluvial ditches near the battlefield	✖	✖✖	✖✖	✖
6. Wace’s description of the Norman advance	✖✖	✖✖	✖✖	✖✖
Battle enigmas
7. Explanation for why Harold went to Sussex	✖✖	✖✖	✖✖	✖✖
8. Consistent with logistics & Harold’s route to the battle theatre	✖✖	✖✖	✖✖	✖✖
9. The shield wall was wedge-shaped	✖✖	✖✖	✓	✖
10. The shield wall was enclosed	✖✖	✖✖	✓	✓
11. Consistent with William’s military tactics	✖✖	✖✖	✖	✖✖
12. Consistent with Harold's military tactics	✖✖	✖✖	✖✖	✖✖
13. Contemporary Archaeology	✖✖	✖✖	✖✖	✖✖
Proximity to English and Norman camps
14. The battlefield was roughly an hour’s march from the Norman battle camp	✖	✓	✖✖	✖
15. The battlefield was nine Roman miles from ‘Heastinga’	✖✖	✓	✖✖	✖✖
16. The battlefield was visible from the Norman battle camp and close enough that the English troop deployment and English Standards could be seen	✖✖	✖✖	✖✖	✖✖
17. The battlefield was adjacent to the English camp	✓✓	✖	✖	✖
Placename clues
18. The battlefield was at or near ‘Senlac’	✖✖	✖✖	✖✖	✖✖
19. The battlefield was at or near ‘Herste’	✖✖	✖✖	✖✖	✖✖
20. The battlefield was near a ‘spinam’	✖	✖✖	✖✖	✖✖
21. The battlefield was at or near ‘haran apuldran’	✖	✓	✓	✖
22. The battlefield was on ‘planis Hastinges’	✖✖	✖✖	✖✖	✖✖
Geographic clues
23. A lateral fluvial ditch adjoined the battlefield	✓	✖✖	✖	✓
24. There was a plain below the contact zone	✖✖	✖✖	✖✖	✖✖
25. The battlefield was overlooked by another hill	✓	✖	✖	✓
26. The battlefield was a small hill	✖✖	✖✖	✖✖	✖✖
27. The battlefield was narrow	✖	✖✖	✖✖	✓
28. The fighting was more intense in the middle	✖✖	✖✖	✖✖	✖✖
29. The battlefield was steeper than the approach	✖	✖	✖	✖
30. The battlefield was on a north-south ridge/spur	✖✖	✖✖	✖✖	✖✖
31. The English army was difficult to encircle tightly	✖✖	✖✖	✖✖	✖✖
32. The battlefield was adjacent to a metalled road, woodland, untrodden wastes, and land too rough to be tilled	✖	✖✖	✖✖	✖
33. The battlefield was not on the Hastings Peninsula	✖✖	✖✖	✓	✖✖

 

Some statements in the contemporary accounts use unqualified adjectives like big, narrow, close, near, steep, long, etc, that can have a wide range of meanings. Some of the clues are our interpretation of original statements that are equivocal or enigmatic. Some clues are ambiguous in their original language or in translation. Some of the locational clues are relative to the Norman or English camps, for which there are no confirmed locations. None of the place names survive and most of them have more than one interpretation.

Nevertheless, we are confident that all the clues except 1, 2 and 22 are correct because they align perfectly with Hurst Lane, Sedlescombe. This has led some to accuse us of rigging the data. It is not that anyone has found errors in our interpretations but rather that, when there are multiple interpretations, we have chosen those that match Hurst Lane. We make two points in response. One is that we have tried to be as flexible and positive about the alternative battlefield candidates as we can. Secondly, proponents of the orthodox and alternative battlefield candidates arbitrarily reject at least twenty of our battlefield location clues because their favoured battlefield candidate is inconsistent with all interpretations of them. Which is more credible: to select a valid interpretation that supports your argument or to not have an interpretation that supports your argument?

Each of the alternative battlefield proponents accepts that their theory has inconsistencies and conflicts with many of the battlefield location clues. Each thinks that they have specific supporting evidence that outweighs those inconsistencies. We will analyse the special supporting evidence in the relevant sections below. There are so many inconsistencies between the alternative battlefield candidates and the contemporary account battlefield descriptions that it would be unhelpful to address them all. Instead, we will focus on the major inconsistencies.

One important factor applies to all the alternative battlefield candidates, so we will address it here: They all rely on impenetrable woodland to force the Normans to attack from the most disadvantageous direction. However, Dr Helen Reed, an expert in medieval woodlands, confirmed to us that unworked mature deciduous woodland - the only type of woodland there would have been in the theatre of war - is never impenetrable because the wide tree canopies of mature deciduous trees blocks light which stunts the growth of saplings and scrub. On the contrary, the understory in mature deciduous woodland is open and spacious, with tree trunks typically separated by 8m or more. This can be easily confirmed by visiting any deciduous woodland that has not been worked or managed for a hundred years or more. One example near us is Burnham Beeches (above).

Woodland played another significant role in the battle. William’s horses, lances, archers, and armour would all have been less effective in mature woodland. Woodland was so ubiquitous in medieval Sussex that Harold would never have been more than a few hundred meters away from one. Why, then, would he even consider fighting behind a shield wall? In a battle pitting a static shield wall against cavalry, infantry, and archers, the shield wall cannot achieve victory; it can only survive. If Harold’s objective to survive, his best chance would have been to melt away into nearby woodland and escape via the Andredsweald.

It is usually claimed that a retreat would be deemed too cowardly for Harold to countenance. It is true that Saxons and Vikings took pride in shield wall fights. If the English were fighting Vikings or other Saxons, they may well have thought it dishonourable to duck a shield wall fight. But, despite their common ancestry, the Normans were neither Saxon nor Viking. They fought on equine tanks. They attacked with impunity using bows and crossbows. We think that the English would have judged that this underhand and cowardly fighting style would justify any response that might lead to ultimate victory.

In summary, all the alternative battlefield candidates rely on implausible impenetrable woodland at the battlefield and on Harold's implausible decision to fight a battle that he would very likely lose and that he could not possibly win. These two factors alone make all the alternative battlefield candidates unlikely. We will temporarily forbear about this to give each of them a hearing.

Telham Hill and Caldbec Hill feature open English shield walls. We list eleven clues in the contemporary accounts that suggest the English shield wall was enclosed. We originally assessed an alternative 'enclosed loop' troop deployment scenario for each of them. This  addressed some inconsistencies but created just as many new ones. We have therefore removed those analyses from this latest update. If anyone is interested, please contact us.

Crowhurst / Telham Hill

Nick Austin’s Crowhurst battlefield theory has more adherents than all the other alternative battlefields combined. We saw him present his theory back in the 1990s when he was promoting his book “Secrets of the Norman Invasion” (SOTNI). His approach was a revelation that we quickly copied. His theory sounded credible and coherent too, but the more we investigated, the more flaws we found in his evidence, and the more we realised that it is based on some spurious assumptions. 

Before any explanation, we should make a note about the name. While Austin refers to his battlefield being at Crowhurst, it is located on Telham Hill and is closer to Telham on the Ridge. We will refer to it as Telham Hill to avoid any confusion.

Austin's landing and engagement scenario

Austin's core premise is that the Normans landed in Combe Haven, at Redgeland Wood, labelled R on Figure 62. He rightly reasons that the the Normans could not possibly have landed at modern Hastings, so they must have landed in Combe Haven or the Brede estuary. He then discounts a Brede estuary landing and camp for one specific reason: Rameslie manor, which surrounded the Brede estuary, is not flagged as 'wasted' in Domesday. He argues it is implausible that the Normans would not have laid waste to the land around their camp, so they could not have landed and camped in the Brede estuary. The logical reasoning then is that the Normans could only have landed in Combe Haven or the Brede estuary and they did not land in the Brede estuary, so they must have landed in Combe Haven.

All the contemporary accounts agree that the Normans landed and camped at Hæstingaport, or a cognate of it. There are twenty or so reasons - listed in 'The Landing' section of our book - to believe that Hæstingaport was at Old Winchelsea at the mouth of the Brede estuary. Austin uses his 'Rameslie was not wasted' argument to reallocate those reasons to Combe Haven, making Redgeland Wood look like a compelling Hæstingaport location candidate, and therefore a compelling landing site. This argument percolates through Austin's entire Norman camp and battlefield theory. However, the core premise, and therefore his entire camp and battlefield argument, is flawed.

Rameslie manor was gifted to the Norman Abbey of Fécamps by Cnut. William was Fécamps Abbey's patron. He would clearly not have plundered himself or his most important supporters, the Church and the Pope. Austin provides some other evidence that Hæstingaport was in Combe Haven. It is all flawed, as we explain here. We will forbear to consider his engagement and battle scenarios in isolation. 

Several contemporary accounts say or suggest that the Normans camped near where they landed. Austin thinks they landed at Redgeland Wood (R on Figure 62), so they would have camped there and in the adjacent Monkham Wood (1). Those accounts that record an initial camp go on to say that the Normans moved to a permanent camp which Carmen refers to as their 'sea camp'. Austin thinks this was at Upper Wilting (2), 700m northwest of the initial camp.

Austin's engagement scenario is as follows. The English army approached the theatre of war on the 'old London road' (small 'o' and small 'r') which he claims to have run between modern Hastings and Battle, passing through Crowhurst (C) and Telham Hill (T). The English camped on Telham Hill from where they could see the Norman camp at Upper Wilting. On the day of battle, the Normans headed north on this same road. Harold's scouts saw them pass through Crowhurst. Harold deployed his shield wall roughly 100m from the crest of Telham Hill at what is now Pye's Farm on the steepest part of the south slope. The Normans attacked up Telham Hill, broke through the shield wall using a feigned retreat, and killed Harold and his brothers to secure victory.

Yeakell and Gardner (Figure 63) shows the geography in the 1770s. It is probably a good indication of land use in 1066. Austin’s proposed battlefield was either side of Fore Lane which snakes up Telham Hill, passing the parsonage which is labelled on Figure 63. If Y&G is a guide, Austin's battlefield would have been virtually treeless at the time, with the English shield wall lining the top of the shaded area that indicates the steepest part of the slope. Fore Wood was tight against the western side of Austin’s battlefield in those days. Note that Y&G does not depict woodland on the eastern side of the battlefield, apart from along the base of the gill. The gill's banks are unlikely to have been cleared during the intervening 700 years, but it is possible that they were.

Figure 62 sets the scene at 09:00 on the day of battle with the English at Pye’s Farm (T) and the Normans at Crowhurst (C). Figure 64 shows Austin's proposed troop deployments with the English shield wall (magenta line) stretching between Fore Wood to the west and Hunters Gill to the east. Austin says that Fore Wood and Hunters Gill were impenetrable woodland, forcing the Normans to attack up the steep slope from Crowhurst (shown by cyan arrows). The shield wall would have been roughly 650m long, perhaps 20% shorter (and therefore 20% deeper) than the traditional shield wall at Battle Abbey. If the surrounding woodland was as impenetrable as Austin suggests, this scenario may well have led to a battle that lasted all day and that only ended thanks to a ruse.

Crowhurst battlefield supporting evidence

Austin's main supporting evidence is that the Battle of Hastings could not have been fought at the orthodox Battle Abbey location. This is assuredly correct for the many reasons we list in our paper 'The Traditional battlefield', here. His other supporting evidence aligns with some our battlefield clues (listed in the table above):

1. Telham Hill is steep, far steeper than the orthodox battlefield (Clue 3).
2. The contact zone is near the top of the hill (Clue 4).
3. The English army approached the theatre of war on the 'old London road' (Clue 8)
4. The Normans were forced to attack up the steep south slope of Telham Hill because it was surrounded in all other directions by impenetrable woodland (Clue 11)
5. Harold was unable to withdraw to safety from the English camp on Teham Hill because all routes other than the 'old London road' were blocked by impenetrable woodland. The English army was therefore trapped on the 'old London road' and the best place to defend it was 100m below the crest of Telham Hill (Clue 12).
6. The main Norman camp was at Upper Wilting, which is roughly an hour's march to the battlefield (Clue 14).
7. The English standards at their camp on Telham Hill were visible from the Norman camp at Upper Wilting (Clue 16).
8. The battlefield has a nearby lateral ditch which might have been the Malfosse (claimed to match Clue 5, but which might match Clue 23).
9. The battlefield was overlooked from the hill at Crowhurst Park (Clue 25).
10. There is a low stone wall - a ‘spinam’ - under a 2000-year-old yew tree in Crowhurst cemetery (Clue 20).

Austin's other supporting evidence applies uniquely to Telham Hill:

11. Some ruins adjacent to the Crowhurst church were a first attempt to build William’s abbey which the Chronicle of Battle Abbey describes as “not far” from the battlefield and "somewhat lower down".
12. The 'Malfosse' referred to Hunters Gill, immediately east of the battlefield

Analysis of Crowhurst supporting evidence

We spent a month checking and verifying Austin's evidence in the summer of 2016. The numbers at the beginning of each section refer to the evidence numbers in the preceding section.

Evidence 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6

The south slope of Telham Hill is steep (1), especially at Pye's Farm where Austin proposes the English shield wall was deployed (2). However, there is no plausible reason the Normans would have attacked up a horribly difficult slope if there was a way to flank or loop the English shield wall, thereby enabling them to attack from behind and above, and there seem to have been no less than four such flanking opportunities.

William's flanking opportunities are depicted on Figure 65: Through Fore Wood (1), through Hunters Gill (2), up the mining track to Crowhurst Park and then across Hunters Gill (3), or up to and along the Hastings Ridge then out along Telham Hill spur (4).

Austin reckons that the Normans were unable to use any of these flanking routes because Fore Wood, Hunters Gill and the Hastings Ridge were covered with impenetrable woodland. His evidence is threefold: 1) Some photographs of dense thicket in Hunters Gill; 2) A passage in Dawson’s History of Hastings Castle that he interprets to mean that the Hastings ridge was blocked; and 3) The alleged route of a coaching road through Crowhurst and Telham Hill.

We explain in the introduction that unworked mature deciduous woodland is never impenetrable, so there is a conflict. We found that Austin's photographs were taken beside open paths that allow the sun to penetrate. Indeed, the sky is visible on one of them. Dense thicket will develop wherever the sun can penetrate. It is not typical of Fore Wood or Hunters Gill. Even today, when Fore Wood and Hunters Gill are far less mature than they would have been in the 11th century, both are open inside. It took us less than an hour to traverse them south to north, and that included delays in Fore Wood caused by the need to circumvent a railway line and rhododendron groves which would not have been there to bother the Normans.

There is a lot of confusion about the Hastings Ridge ridgeway. Dawson's passage says: “there are no evidences of any such thing as a main road to London from Hastings at this early period, or indeed for many years afterwards”. Austin interprets this to mean that impenetrable woodland prevented the maintenance of a byway on the Hastings Ridge in medieval times. He goes on to argue that the Hastings to Flimwell turnpike did not follow the ridge thereby indicating that the Hastings Ridge remained obstructed by dense woodland into the 18th century. Instead, he claims that the turnpike passed through Crowhurst and Pye's Farm to join the Hastings Ridge at the Esso garage in Battle. This is the road that he refers to as the 'old London road'.

Dawson is being misinterpreted. He was just stating the obvious fact that before the construction of the Hastings to Flimwell turnpike, the main road from Hastings to London would have passed through Ore and dropped down to the Rochester Roman road, probably along the route of the modern A259. This does not mean - and he does not imply - that the ridgeway along the Hastings Ridge was blocked by impenetrable woodland. It is clear from the very next paragraph that Dawson thought that there was an ancient byway on the Hastings Ridge: “The artificial highways lay along the crests of the hill-ranges … one of the principal of these tracks, in the neighbourhood of Hastings, ran along the crest of the range between Fairlight and Battle”. There is no evidence that the Hastings Ridge byway extended to Fairlight, but there were Saxon settlements at Telham and Baldslow, and the Chronicle of Battle Abbey describes a byway road between Battle Abbey and Telham on the ridge, so there was an unpaved open ridgeway past Austin's proposed battlefield.

Austin's only evidence that the Hastings Ridge ridgeway has ever been blocked by impenetrable woodland is Martin White's discovery of a coaching inn at Crowhurst. Austin argues that this coaching inn proves that the Hastings to Flimwell turnpike went through Hollington, Crowhurst and Telham Hill. He contends that they would only have chosen this severely undulating route - crossing a gorge at Hollington, a marsh at Little Bog, a steep ridge at Telham Hill, and four gloopy tributaries of the Powdermill Stream - if the Hastings Ridge was impassable.

However, turnpike experts George Kiloh and E J Upton told us that it is totally implausible that the coach road would have taken such a challenging route. Furthermore, no Acts of Parliament were passed to authorise it. On the contrary, the Flimwell to Hastings Turnpike Act (1753) specifically sanctioned the route between Hastings and Battle to pass through Ore and along Hastings Ridge. This is the origin of the Old London Road (big 'o' and big 'r') between Hastings and Ore. Martin White later clarified to us in correspondence that his Crowhurst coaching inn was on a spur that joined the Hastings to Flimwell Turnpike near Crowhurst Park on the ridgeway. It sounds like he did not divulge this extra information to Austin, thereby innocently becoming the source of the confusion.

To summarise, Austin's engagement scenario relies on the presence of a medieval byway on the route that he refers to as the 'old London road'. This name gives the impression that it was a well-known coaching road, but it is nothing more than Austin's personal nickname for a route with no evidence of existence other than a mistaken belief that the Hastings Ridge was blocked by impenetrable woodland. In reality then, there is no evidence that the Hastings Ridge ridgeway was ever blocked, there is no evidence that there was ever a byway on the route of Austin's 'old London road' and if there was, it would have been entirely unsuitable for wheeled traffic.

Harold could not have brought his wagon train along an unpaved road, let alone taken it through five miles severely undulating muddy fields, so Austin's engagement scenario contradicts Harold's route to the theatre of war (Clue 8). There is no reason to think that Fore Wood, Hunters Gill or the Hastings Ridge were impenetrable at the time of the Conquest, or at any time since the iron age. If any of them were normal mature deciduous woodland, the Normans would have used one or more of the flanking route shown on Figure 66 to get behind the English line and kill Harold within the first fifteen minutes. Austin's engagement scenario therefore contradicts William's military tactics (Clue 11). Harold would not have deployed a shield wall at a location that could easily be outflanked, so it contradicts Harold's military tactics too (Clue 12). Although it is only two miles between Austin's proposed Norman camp at Upper Wilting and English camp at Telham Hill, the route would have been horribly difficult and slow. In our opinion, it would have taken the Normans at least two hours to get to the battlefield, contradicting Clue 13.

Evidence 7

Carmen says that the English standards are visible from the Norman battle camp. Baudri, Draco Normannicus and others say that the English troop deployment is visible from the Norman battle camp. SOTNI has a photograph showing the view north from Upper Wilting. Austin claims that it shows that standards at the English camp on Telham Hill would have been clearly visible from the Norman camp at Upper Wilting.

Figure 66 shows the view north from Upper Wilting in July 2020. It looks different from Austin’s photo of the same view in SOTNI. This is partly explained by the removal of the foreground trees in his photo during the construction of the Bexhill Link Road. There is also a 20-year gap and it was taken in a different season. Even so, the middle ground and distance should look similar. He claims that the horizon is Telham Hill and Hastings Ridge, picking out a white house that he claims to be on the Hastings side of Telham Lane. In reality, the treeline is Rackwell Wood and the white building is at Green Street.

The tiny grey haze in the red circle on Figure 66 is the top of a 27m high L7 electricity pylon on the exact location Austin proposes for the English camp. Only the top 5m of the pylon is visible, and only in perfect weather. Even if Rackwell Wood was treeless in 1066 - which seems unlikely considering that this was a heavily wooded region – William’s chance of seeing a typical 6m by 1m Royal Standard from Upper Wilting in the middle of October would have been close to zero. After all, Austin's photo was taken at roughly the same time of year as the battle, and the pylon is not even visible.

Evidence 8 and 9

Wace describes how the Normans were shield charged into a ditch where more Normans died than in the rest of the battle combined (Clue 23). He also describes how the youths and clerics watched the battle from a hill adjacent to the battlefield (Clue 25). Wace explains that the shield charge ditch went unnoticed during the Norman advance, so it must have been lateral, to one side of the battlefield. Hunters Gill matches that description. The Normans could not have been shield charged through woodland as dense as Hunters Gill is today, but Y&G only depicts trees at the bottom of the gill. Those trees would not have been tall enough to obscure the view across the gill. The youths and clerics might therefore have watched the battle from Crowhurst Park, looking over Hunters Gill. We therefore give Austin's battlefield a qualified 'consistency' with Clue 23 and Clue 25. However, this is a generously positive spin. If Hunters Gill was lightly wooded in 1066 to make it consistent with Clues 23 and 25, the battlefield was not protected by impenetrable woodland to the east and the entire engagement and battle scenario fails.

Evidence 10 and 11

The Chronicle of Battle Abbey says that William's monks tried to build a commemorative monastery near the battlefield, but "lower down" and on the "western side of the slope". It then explains that William commanded them to abandon that location and to build his monastery on the battlefield at the exact location where Harold died. The monks left a 'spinam' at the site where they started the aborted monastery. 'Spinam' is usually translated to its normal meaning, 'thorn bush'. Eleanor Searle, rightly we are sure, translates to its niche meaning 'low stone wall', referring originally to the low wall between the turning posts at a Roman circus. Therefore, there might be a low stone wall and, perhaps, an aborted monastery somewhere lower down and on the western side of the battlefield hill. Austin identifies these features as the wall under the yew tree in Crowhurst church graveyard (Figure 67, left), and the ruins behind the house next door (Figure 67, right).

The ruins have a gothic arch window, which can be no earlier than 12th century. Perhaps it is a later amendment because Austin points out that it has some 11th century features. He also contacted us about some new research showing that it is made of Caen stone. This indicates it was high status, but not that it is pre-12th century or that it might have been the aborted abbey. Battle Abbey took twenty years to build. The aborted monastery was being worked on for no more than two years. Yet the ruins are the remains of a complete building that was roughly the same size as Battle Abbey's church. It is possible that the surviving building was constructed on the low stone wall, but there is no evidence this was so. The land was held by the devout Robert, Count of Eu, one of William's most trusted barons and one of the richest people in post-Conquest England. In our opinion, the ruins are from a Norman parish church commissioned by Robert in the 11th century, perhaps as a penance for his acts of violence in the battle, and completed by his descendants in the 12th century.

The wall under the yew tree looks Victorian with modern mortar. Martin White, who owned the property at the time, told us that the medieval wall is thought to be underneath the visible wall but that it had never been excavated to check. It is not really evidence.

Anyway, the ruins and wall are not that 'near' Austin's proposed battlefield - 1500m away - and they are in the wrong place, at the bottom of the southern slope rather than lower down its western slope. Indeed, Austin's proposed Telham Hill battlefield is on an east-west spur, so it does not have a western slope.  

Evidence 12

The Chronicle of Battle Abbey describes many Norman horses and riders falling to their death into a huge pit as they chased the English from the battlefield. CBA gave this pit the name 'Malfosse' in recognition of this calamity. Austin proposes it referred to Hunters Gill. His evidence is a dilapidated wooden bridge depicted in SOTNI, which he claims to have been on a medieval path from Pye's Farm to Crowhurst Park along which the English fled. There are several reasons to think this is not correct.

• CBA describes the Malfosse as an immense hollowed out pit with precipitous sides. In this region, it is clearly describing an opencast iron ore mine, whereas Hunters Gill is a fluvial stream valley.
• Hunters Gill is deep and steep towards the caravan park, but the English cannot have fled anywhere south of their shield wall. If they fled east or northeast from Pye's Farm, Hunters Gill is not deep enough or steep enough to be fatal. If they fled in any other direction away from the enemy, they would not have encountered any valleys or pits.
• If the English fled along a path through Hunters Gill, it would have been barely wide enough to ride more than one abreast. Perhaps two leading horses might have slipped and fallen, but the others would have had plenty of time to stop.
• Austin's engagement scenario depends upon Hunters Gill being impenetrable woodland. But if the English fled through it, it was not impenetrable. If they fled along a path, whether or not the woodland was impenetrable, the Normans could have used that path to outflank the English line.

In practice, Hunters Gill is evidence that the battlefield was not at Telham Hill rather than that it was.

Crowhurst battlefield summary

Nick Austin's Telham Hill battlefield candidate relies on a Norman landing in Combe Haven for which all his evidence is flawed. It seems unlikely compared to a landing in the Brede estuary. His battle narrative relies on the battlefield being surrounded on three sides by impenetrable woodland, but there is no such thing as impenetrable mature deciduous woodland. His engagement and battle scenarios seem to match a handful of our 33 battlefield location clues, but two of them depend upon Hunters Gill not being impenetrable, contradicting his engagement scenario, while another is a mistake. In practice, Telham Hill is only compatible with Clues 3 and 4, that the battlefield was near the top of a steep slope, but that would apply to any random hill in the region. And, indeed, Telham Hill is not a more likely battlefield candidate than any random hill in the region.

We feel that Nick has been desperately unlucky. He did the difficult part, which was to work out that the Normans cannot have landed at modern Hastings so they must have landed in Combe Haven or the Brede estuary. But he then ruled out the Brede estuary because its surrounding manor of Rameslie was not flagged as 'wasted' in Domesday. It was a clever deduction but flawed because Rameslie had been gifted by Cnut to the Norman abbey of Fécamps. William was their patron and monks from that abbey were crucial invasion advisers thanks to their knowledge of Old English and the local geography. William would have avoided any harm becoming Rameslie, lest he be seen plundering his main supporter, the Pope, his most important advisers, the monks of Fécamps, and himself.

Caldbec Hill

John Grehan explains the origin of his Caldbec Hill battlefield theory in the introduction to his book 'The Battle of Hastings 1066: The Uncomfortable Truth'. He explains that it dates to his attendance at a Battle of Hastings re-enactment with Martin Mace. They were struck by how easily the Norman infantry and cavalry were able to climb the slope south of Battle Abbey. Later that day, they walked to the traditional English camp at Caldbec Hill (C on Figure 69) and realised that there is no plausible reason why Harold would abandon it for the much inferior position at Battle. They reasoned that if the English camped at Telham Hill and never left, the battlefield must have been at Caldbec Hill. Jim Bradbury had speculated this might be so some years previously.

Caldbec Hill is a public park now. English Heritage have a plaque at the entrance to remind visitors that it is widely believed to have been the location of the English camp on the eve of battle. The photo above shows us investigating its trig point.

It might help to place Caldbec Hill in the topographic landscape. It is labelled C on Figure 69. Battle Abbey is labelled B, Sedlescombe bridge S. The proven metalled Rochester Roman road is shown as a black line, probable unpaved byways are shown in white lines, possible byways shown in dotted white lines. Harold brought the English army down the Rochester Roman road from the north. By tradition, the Norman camp was at modern Hastings (H) at the opposite end of the Hastings Ridge (HR) from Caldbec Hill.

Caldbec Hill engagement and evidence that it was the English camp

Grehan’s engagement theory, mostly culled from Colonel Lemmon and William Seymour, is as follows:

1. Harold brought the English army south on the Rochester Roman road (black line on Figure 69).
2. The Rochester Roman road crossed the Brede by ferry because the river was estuarine and 200m wide at Sedlescombe (S). Harold therefore took an ancient byway that crossed the fluvial Brede at Whatlington ford.
3. Harold led the English army onto the isthmus ridge at Caldbec Hill (C) where he chose to camp.
4. William attacked the English camp.

Grehan's engagement scenario depends on the English having camped at their traditional Caldbec Hill location. The evidence for this is based on the orthodox battlefield location at Battle Abbey. Poitiers says that the English camo was on a hill, Carmen says that the English left their camp to occupy the battlefield, giving the impression that the battlefield and camp were close. The English camp must have been on a hill on the opposite side of the battlefield to the Norman battle camp but not far from it. Caldbec Hill is the only English camp candidate in the right vicinity that fits this description.

However, this orthodox English camp location argument is invalid if, as Grehan believes, the battle was not fought at the orthodox Battle Abbey location. He offers five other reasons to think that the English army camped at Caldbec Hill. 

1. It was at the junction of the Hastings Ridge and the southern border of the immense Andredsweald forest, so it matches Poitier’s statement that the English: “were camped on a hill near to the forest through which they had come”.
2. It was a good defensive position that would be difficult to attack.
3. It was the location of a marker apple tree which was the English mustering point according to some translations of the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle.
4. It was at the junction of three ancient trackways whence Harold’s men would arrive from different parts of the country.
5. It blocked the only way that the invaders could leave the Hastings Peninsula thereby trapping them on the Hastings Peninsula.

Argument 1 is faulty. Caldbec Hill was not on the southern border of the Andredsweald. Mountfield, Netherfield, Drigsell and others are mixed farming manors several miles north of Caldbec Hill. The Andredsweald's southern border was north of them. Grehan takes Chibnall's translation of Poitiers' ‘montem silvæ’ to 'forest' too literally anyway. The term can mean any sort of hilly woodland. Wherever the English camped, they would have been near hilly woodland through which they had come. Indeed, if Yeakell & Gardner (Figure 72) is anything to go by - and there is no reason to think the land usage had changed significantly since the 11th century - Caldbec Hill is the furthest from hilly woodland among the battlefield candidates.

Argument 2 derives from 1, that Caldbec Hill was on the southern border of the Andredsweald. Grehan thinks that the forest protected the northern and eastern sides of Caldbec Hill (see Grehan's troop deployment diagram below), thereby forcing any attacker to fight up the steep east slope. However, the Andresweald did not extended as far south as Caldbec Hill. Woodland would not have provided any useful protection anyway because, as we explain above, there is no such thing as impenetrable woodland. Stripped of other defences, Caldbec Hill is defensively vulnerable with level approaches from the southwest and north. And, as Time Team pointed out in 2013, it is too big to have been easily defended by the number of men that Harold had available.

Argument 3 is based on a passage in the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle's Norman invasion account: “he gaderade þa mycelne here, com him togenes æt þære haran apuldran”, meaning: ‘he [Harold] assembled a large army and came to meet him [William] at haran apuldran’.  Thorpe, Whitelock and Swanton translate 'haran apuldran' as ‘hoary apple tree’, Garmonsway as ‘grey apple tree’. Grehan thinks that this apple tree was a hundred junction marker at Caldbec Hill. It seems implausible to us. An unspecific apple tree seems too vague for such a crucial mustering point. Grehan says that there are 14 other known apple trees that were used as local hundred markers, which means that there were probably hundreds of them. Harold had a nearby manor. He might have known the location of a local apple tree marker, but how would his barons know where to go? And what was the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle's author trying to tell his audience? How would they know about some unspecific apple tree's location, especially as medieval apple trees only had a life expectancy of forty years and it was already supposed to have been hoary. It would likely have died by the time they read the passage. In our opinion, this apuldran was a proper noun referring to Appledore. We are not the first to think so. Ingram, for example, translates haran apuldran as the 'estuary of Appledore'. We discuss some alternative translations - here - where we conclude that haran apuldran meant ‘boundary of Appledore’, ‘estuary of Appledore’ or ‘anchorage of Appledore’, all of which would be referring to where the Rochester Roman road crossed the Rother estuary, near Bodiam.

Argument 4 is based on the common misperception that medieval armies sometimes moved on so-called 'herepaths', but these byways were for small warbands of less than 100 men. Armies needed wagon trains and these could only move on metalled Roman roads, apart from during the height of summer perhaps. Hence, all of Harold's men would have arrived on Margary 13, the Rochester Roman road, and it did not pass within two miles of Cadbec Hill.

Argument 5 is based on Grehan's misunderstanding of 11th century geography in the theatre of war. He states that the Brede was 200m wide at Sedlescombe and only passable by ferry. Therefore, he deduces that Harold was diverted off the Rochester Roman road at Cripps Corner to cross the Brede on Whatlington ford. The only route south from there was to climb onto the Hastings Ridge at Caldbec Hill. But the Brede was not 200m wide at Sedlescombe. Sections of metalled Roman road have been found on both banks. Like all Roman roads that cross rivers near the sea, the Rochester Roman road would have crossed the Brede near its head of tide. The fluvial Brede would have been much as it is now, roughly 2m wide and easily bridged with timber planks. Harold therefore had no reason to go to Caldbec Hill. 

In our opinion, all Grehan's evidence that the English camped at Caldbec Hill is faulty. Nor can he rely on the orthodox argument that the English probably camped at Caldbec Hill because it is the only credible camp location inland from the orthodox battlefield. That argument does not work if he is also arguing that the battle was not fought at the orthodox location. Therefore, if the battle was not fought at Battle Abbey, there is no evidence that the English camped at Caldbec Hill. On the contrary, there is significant evidence they did not.

1. Wace says that the English camp was protected by a deep ditch that had three well-guarded entrances. The English were only at their camp for a day. It would have been impossible to dig a useful protective ditch at Caldbec Hill in one day.
2. Carmen says that the English left their camp to occupy the battlefield. Brevis Relatio and Wace say that Harold took the English army to Battle where he made camp and resolved to defend. These accounts seem to be inconsistent with each other, but they are both inconsistent with Grehan's Caldbec Hill engagement theory.
3. Carmen says that the English camp is visible from the Norman battle camp. Baudri and Draco Normannicus say that the English troop deployment is visible from the Norman battle camp. Neither would be true of Caldbec Hill which is not visible from the orthodox Norman battle camp at Telham.
4. The climb from Whatlington to Caldbec Hill would have been implausibly risky. Whatlington ford would have been no more than two wagons wide. It would have taken hours for Harold's wagon train to cross, or days if it got rutted. The climb from Whatlington to Caldbec Hill was at or beyond the upper steepness limit for heavily laden ox drawn carts. The climb would have been slow at best, again taking hours. During this entire time, the English would have been horribly vulnerable, unarmed, unarmoured, and disorganised on a steep upslope with nowhere to defend and trapped against a narrow river crossing. In our opinion, Harold would not have countenanced crossing the Brede at Whatlington before he had had the other side scouted and cleared, but the English were not at the theatre of war for long enough for this to happen.
5. Caldbec Hill is inconsistent with Harold's strategy. The Rochester Roman road crossed the Brede at Sedlescombe and terminated at modern Winchelsea, as we show on Figure 69 and explain in our paper here. The only plausible routes from the Rochester Roman road onto the Hastings Ridge arrived at the Ridge on the Hastings side of Caldbec Hill. By tradition, Harold's strategy was a surprise attack on the Norman camp at modern Hastings or to blockade the invaders on the Hastings Peninsula. But if either of these was his intention, he would not have led his men away from the Norman camp and away from their egress route.

In our opinion, all Grehan's supporting evidence for an English camp on Caldbec Hill is faulty, and the contrary evidence strongly suggests that the English camped elsewhere.

Analysis of Caldbec Hill supporting evidence

Grehan's main argument in favour of a Caldbec Hill battlefield is that it is a better defensive location than the orthodox battlefield, so the English are unlikely to have left their camp to defend the orthodox battlefield. We explain above why the English are unlikely to have camped at Caldbec Hill, so this argument is invalid. But, perhaps, for some unknown reason, the English ended up defending Caldbec Hill, even though it was not their camp. We will look at Grehan's Caldbec Hill battlefield evidence.

Grehan depicts his engagement scenario in his book, but it is difficult to see what is going on because the labels are on top of the contours. We have transposed it to an OS map with the contours on top (Figure 71). The English line is shown in bright green, byways in yellow, the Norman attack in cyan arrows, the supposed Andredsweald southern border in bottle green. In reality, the Andredsweald was miles away, so the English line would need to have been 40% longer and 40% thinner to fill the gap.

Grehan's non-camp supporting evidence for a Caldbec Hill battlefield is meagre:

1. There are several small water courses at the base of Caldbec Hill, one of which might be that depicted on Tapestry Panel 53.
2. Caldbec Hill is adjacent to Oakwood Ghyll which is the traditional location of the Malfosse, and CBA says it is “where the fighting was going on” so it was adjacent ot the battlefield.
3. The summit of Caldbec Hill is known as Mountjoy, the English translation of Mont-joie, a name associated with some French combat victories.
4. Caldbec Hill is roughly an hour's march from the orthodox Norman battle camp at Telham on the Ridge (Clue 14). 
5. Caldbec Hill is roughly nine Roman miles from the orthodox location of 'Hastingas' at modern Hastings (Clue 15).

There are some streams at the bottom of Caldbec Hill. One of them could have been the stream depicted on Tapestry Panel 53, but the same would apply to any of the hundreds of streams that blanket the theatre of war.

Grehan is right that CBA implies that the Malfosse is immediately adjacent to the battlefield, and Caldbec Hill is immediately adjacent to Oakwood Ghyll, the traditional Malfosse. If the Malfosse did refer to Oakwood Ghyll, the battlefield could only have been at Caldbec Hill.  But the tradition is wrong. The Chronicle of Battle Abbey describes the Malfosse as an immense precipitous sided pit. In this region, it is clearly referring an iron ore mine whereas Oakwood Ghyll is a stream valley.

The only battlefield fluvial ditch described in the contemporary accounts, as we explain here, is the one into which the Normans are shield charged. Wace explains that the Normans passed it without noticing during their advance. It was, therefore, a lateral valley, parallel to the battlefield. This description might apply to Oakwood Ghyll but it is in the wrong place, behind Grehan’s shield wall in the opposite direction to anywhere that the Normans could have been shield charged.

The summit of Caldbec Hill is, indeed, known as Mountjoy and some places in France are named 'Montjoie' to commemorate battle victories. However, 'montjoie' was a Frankish battle cry not Norman, places named Montjoie tend to commemorate Frankish victories rather than Norman victories, and the 'mont' part of 'montjoie' derives from Frankish 'mund' meaning 'protect' rather than French 'mont' meaning 'mountain'. In other words, there is no reason to believe that Mountjoy derives from 'montjoie', and even if it does, there is no reason to believe that it commemorated the Norman victory at the Battle of Hastings, and even if it did, there is no reason to think that it was on the battlefield.

In summary, there is little or no evidence that the Battle of Hastings was fought on Caldbec Hill. On the contrary, it contradicts nearly all the battlefield clues.

1. One major issue with Grehan’s theory, shown in Figure 70 and 71, is that he follows the standard practice of assuming that William would attack whatever shield wall was presented to him, no matter how preferable his alternatives. Caldbec Hill is at the junction of the Hastings Ridge and the Isthmus Ridge. Like all ridges on the Hastings Peninsula, it would have had shallow dry slopes on its ridge crests (Figure 71). Those crests probably carried ancient ridgeways. If the English were deployed as in Figure 71, there is no plausible reason why William would attack up the steep southeast slope of Caldbec Hill. He would clearly have attacked along the shallow dry ridge crests to the northeast, south and southwest, thereby contradicting Clue 3 and Clue 11.
2. There are no non-fluvial pits near Caldbec Hill, contradicting Clue 5.
3. The Norman approach bears no relation to that described by Wace, contradicting Clue 6.
4. There is no plausible reason why Harold would have taken his army to Caldbec Hill contradicting Clues 7 and 8 and 12.
5. Grehan's proposed shield wall is half-kidney shaped and open, contradicting Clues 9 and 10.
6. No contemporary archaeology has been found at Caldbec Hill despite extensive metal detecting, thereby contradicting Clue 13.
7. Caldbec Hill has no association with any of the place names in Clues 18 through 22. Grehan claims that it has an association with haran apuldran (Clue 21), but we explain above why we think this is unlikely.
8. Caldbec Hill contradicts nearly all the geographic clues 23 through 33. It is possible that spectators might have been able to see some action from a vantage point behind Battle church, even though they would have been 20m below Grehan's battlefield  (Clue 25).  Grehan's battlefield is steeper than the approach, but there is no reason the Normans would have advanced on the least favourable terrain (Clue 29).

Caldbec Hill has no supporting evidence as the battlefield. only aligns with a handful of the most general battlefield location clues. There are twenty or more reasons to think it is not the battlefield.

Caldbec Hill summary

Caldbec Hill matches only a handful of the most general battlefield location clues while being contradicted by all the most specific clues. John Grehan's Caldbec Hill battlefield theory is based on some misassumptions. Most crucially, by wrongly assumes that the Brede was 200m wide at Sedlescombe. In reality, the Brede was 2m wide at Sedlescombe and would have been bridged by wooden planks. It means that there is no plausible reason that Harold would have taken the English army across the Brede at Whatlington, so there is no plausible reason the English might have camped at Caldbec Hill, refuting the Caldbec Hill battlefield theory. 

Grehan's demeanour suggests that he knows his theory is flawed. When Time Team presented him with their alternative theory (next section but one), he made no attempt to defend his own. He meekly accepted theirs, even though it was clearly invented at the last moment to compensate viewers for having not seen an iota of proper evidence. If Grehan had more confidence in Time Team’s joke theory than his own, it is fairly certain that he knew his own to have been unsound.

Old Heathfield

The Old Heathfield battlefield theory was devised by Rebecca Welshman and Simon Coleman. They published an original outline in 2019, then refined it for their 2024 paper 'THE CASE FOR THE BATTLEFIELD OF HASTINGS AT A SITE NEAR HEATHFIELD'. They say: "We base our claim on two pieces of place-name evidence, a logical reconstruction of the military situation in the lead-up to the battle, and various topographical evidence". It makes their theory relatively easy to assess.

Old Heathfield engagement

Welshman and Coleman propose that Harold brought the English army south on Margary 14, the London to Lewes Roman road, heading for the main Norman camp. They agree with the orthodox narrative that the main Norman camp was at Hæstingaceastre, but suggest that it was probably located at Bulverhythe in Combe Haven, or perhaps at modern Pevensey, rather than at its orthodox location at modern Hastings. According to their theory, Harold branched off Margary 14 onto LIN-129, a forest byway that crossed the Andredsweald east-west. He established a camp near Old Heathfield, at what he believed to have been a safe distance from the enemy, intending to await the balance of his forces. Unbeknownst to him, the Normans had moved to a forward base at Ninfield or Catfield, placing them within striking distance, just seven miles away. The Normans launched an attack the following morning, taking Harold by surprise. Harold repositioned the men he had available, less than half of his expected army, to defend the high ground west of Punnett's Town. Figure 74 shows Welshman & Coleman's proposed inital troop deployment in a chevron pointing southeast.

Old Heathfield supporting evidence

As promised, Welshman's theory is based on two major place-name clues - the first two below - plus some anciliary supporting evidence:

1. There are many 18th century references that state the Battle of Hastings was fought at ‘Heathfield’. At that time, Heathfield was a mile from modern Heathfield, on the other side of Heathfield Park. It is now known as 'Old Heathfield'. The proposed the battlefield is 1km to its northeast, at 50.96465, 0.29663, covering part of Sky Farm and Hugletts Farm.
2. There are two references to a place named ‘Horeapeltre Common’ near Heathfield. ASC-D says that Harold: “assembles a large army and goes to meet him at haran apuldran”. This 'haran apuldran' is variously translated as ‘hoary apple tree’ and 'grey apple tree', as well as a bunch of non-arborial alternatives. Horeapeltre sounds like a Middle English version of ‘hoary apple tree’. In other words, Welshman speculates that Harold went to meet William at ‘Horeapeltre Common’, so the battlefield must be nearby. She is not sure about Horeapeltre Common's exact location, but its charters suggest it was near Old Heathfield.
3. One of the Horeapeltre Common charters says that it is bounded by 'the Kings Highway'. Welshman claims that the name implies it was a busy and high status road used by kings, perhaps by King Harold on his way to the Battle of Hastings.
4. A 19th century tithe map names a field covering the western side of Sky Farm 'Slaughter Rough'. Welshman speculates that the name might be an indication of a violent history.
5. Harold is unlikely to have brought the English army down Margary 13, the Rochester to Winchelsea Roman road, because it had to cross the Rother by ferry. Therefore, he probably brought them down Margary 14, the London to Lewes Roman road, which would pass through Heathfield.

Welshman and Coleman also try to address three concerns we had about their original Old Heathfield proposal:

6. The battle's name and lots of the contemporary accounts say or imply that the battle was fought at or near 'Hastinges', 'Hastingas' or somewhere that sounds like it. This place is assumed by most experts to have been a settlement on the coast, and therefore not within fifteen miles of Old Heathfield. Their explanation is that the accounts might have been referring to an Anglo-Saxon equivalent of the Rape of Hastings which would cover Old Heathfield at its western border.
7. John of Worcester says that the battlefield was nine Roman miles - roughly eight imperial miles - from the Norman camp whereas Old Heathfield is at least fifteen miles from anywhere that Norman camp might have been. Their explanation is that John of Worcester was simply reporting the received wisdom that the battlefield was at Battle Abbey, roughly nine Roman miles from the Norman camp on the coast.
8. Lots of contemporary accounts imply that the Battle of Hastings was fought on or near the Hastings Peninsula whereas Heathfield is seven miles away. Welshman and Coleman have devised a plausible scenario involving a forward battle camp to explain these apparent discrepancies.

Analysis of Old Heathfield supporting evidence

1. Heathfield in the 18th century accounts

Welshman's 2019 paper 'The Heathfield name attached to the Battle of Hastings: a chronological study' lists thirty-six references to the Battle of Hastings having been fought at Heathfield. They start in the second quarter of the 18th century, become increasingly frequent for the next fifty years, then tail off during the 19th century before petering out in the early 20th century. We are convinced they are due to a misunderstanding that took a hundred years to address, and that it continued to cause confusion for another hundred years.

The contemporary Battle of Hastings accounts were written in Latin, Old English and Old French. There were no narrative analyses of the battle or vernacular translations of the contemporary accounrts until the first quarter of the 19th century. Some general histories of England had mentioned the battlefield location in passing. Holinshed, for example, says that the battlefield was: "whereas the abbeie of Battell was afterward builded". This means that the first narrative style publications to express an opinion about the battlefield location - the three below - say that it was at Heathfield.

• A footnote by Nicolas Tindall in his 1726 translation of Paul de Rapin-Thoyras's book 'Histoire d'Angleterre' says: "The battle was fought near Heathfield in Sussex, in the place where the town of Battel now stands".
• Aubry de La Mottraye explains in his 1732 book ‘Voyages en Anglois et en François’ that he was delayed for a week at Rye - "The vessel where with I agreed for my passage to Diepp being not to sail but within 6 or 7 Days" - giving him time to investigate Rye, Winchelsea, Hastings and Battle. He says of the battle: “They generally call that the Battle of Hastings, in which he [William] gained the Crown, though it was fought some 6 or 7 miles distant to the NE, upon a plain called Heathfield.”
• The 1738 second edition of Daniel Defoe's book 'A tour thro the whole island of Great Britain' says much the same as La Mottraye: "The decisive battle which he fought Anno 1066, with King Harold, was upon a plain call’d Heathfield, about seven miles from Hastings".

The thirty-three Heathfield battlefield references that followed have much in common with these three. Many of them say that Heathfield is a plain. Many of them say that Heathfield was 'where the town of Battle now stands' or similar. Some say that Heathfield it was '6 or 7 miles from Hastings'. None them add any additional information and they all use similar language to these three. It seems that these three have all the original information about the theory. The Heathfield battlecfield claims have more in common. None of them were written by academics, other than in heavily abridged histories of England. Many of them are in travelogues. Many of them were published in France. We believe this is a clue to the theory's origin.

In our opinion, the explanation for academic disinterest in a Heathfield battlefield is that academics could read the contemporary accounts in their original language, so they knew that those manuscripts contained no supporting evidence for a Heathfield battlefield. Thus, all the Heathfield battlefield claims are in narrative style vernacular books and magazines. They were read by normal people, like travel writers, who did not learn ancient languages. They simply repeated what they had read.

The French link with Heathfield is interesting. Paul de Rapin's book Histoire d'Angleterre was the only academic history of England available in France for most of the 18th century and it remained popular well into the 19th century. It became the standard reference for anyone in France that wrote about the Battle of Hastings, so they stated that the battle was fought at Heathfield.

In effect, much the same happened in England. Daniel Defoe was the most popular author of his time. His British travelogue was his second most popular work after Robinson Crusoe. Pretty much every literate person in Britain would have read it. In our opinion, all the post-1738 references to the Battle of Hastings having been fought at Heathfield were copied, directly or indirectly, from Defoe's book. Of course, he died in 1731. The first edition of his book does not mention Heathfield. It was added by the editor for the second and subsequent editions. In our opinion, he copied the Heathfield battlefield information from 'Voyages en Anglois et en François' or Tindall.

Who originated the Heathfield battlefield thory? Tindall's footnote is enigmatic. Why mention that the battle was fought 'near Heathfield', when the very next phrase gives a specific location? Tindall published first but, as a respected translator, we suspect that he was given a draft version of 'Voyages en Anglois et en François' from which he copied the Heathfield phrase without understanding its implications. This seems likely to us because Tindall is not known to have visited Battle Abbey whereas de La Mottraye says that he did.

But where did the Heathfield battlefield notion come from in the first place? In our opinion, it derives from the Chronicle of Battle Abbey which says that the Normans established a Battle Camp at 'Hechelande'. Hechelande is old English for 'heathland'. 'lande' is uncommon in Anglo-Saxon proper nouns. We guess that de La Mottraye, or perhaps Tindall, knew that there was somewhere named Heathfield in Sussex but did not know its exact location, so they assumed it was the modern name for 'Hechelande'.

Support for a Heathfield battlefield started to dwindle in the second quarter of the 19th century. We believe the catalyst was twofold: 1) It was when the great French historian Augustin Thierry created the othodox Battle of Hastings narrative - with a Battle Abbey battlefield - that still holds sway; 2) Vernacular translations of the contemporary accounts appeared, so everyone could see that there is no supporting evidence in the contemporary accounts for a Heathfield battlefield.

In summary, all the Heathfield battlefield references were copied - directly or indirectly - from 'Voyages en Anglois et en François’, but it is based on a misinterpretation of one enigmatic comtemporary account that cannot be trusted.

2. Horeapeltre Common

Welshman says: "Horeappletree is certainly derived from an Old English haran apuldran". It looks like a dubious transition to us. Place names tend to evolve phonetically. Middle English 'hoar' probably does derive from Old English 'har' but they do not sound that similar. It seems more likely to us that Middle English 'Horeappletree' would derive from the phonetically identical Old English name, 'Horeapeltre', meaning 'dirty' or 'muddy' apple tree.

More fundamentally, it seems implausible to us that the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle was trying to say that Harold commanded the English army to muster at a tree, especially not at an apple tree. How would his commanders know where to find an unspecific tree in a forest of 7000 square miles? How would the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle's readers know where the action was taking place? What would happen if someone had cut it down for firewood? Moreover, the Anglo-Saxons lost the ability to graft fruit trees, so Roman eating apples mixed with wild crab apples to make hybrid apple trees that only had a life expectancy of a few decades. The ASC tree is supposed to have been 'hoary', which means it was already old. It would have died by the time anyone came to read about it in the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle.

Welshman realises that medieval apple trees' short life expectancy make them an unlikely mustering point, so she proposes that the ASC's 'apuldran' referred to a longer lived oak tree. Oak trees do not go 'hoary' as they age, so she also proposes that 'haran' meant 'pollard'. Neither seem unlikely to us. As far as we kniow, there are no other examples of Old English 'haran' meaning 'pollard'. Old English 'apuldre' (and its conjugation 'apuldran') refers to a fruit tree, nearly always an apple tree. It seems implausible to us that the ASC's monk author would not know the right Old English word for an oak tree. After all, it has come down to us unchanged.

On the contrary, as we explain in our book, we are convinced that 'apuldran' referred to Appledore, a settlement on the River Rother whose Old English name was 'apuldre', the unconjugated root of 'apuldran'. 'haran', in its non-arborial translation, means 'boundary', 'estuary' or 'anchorage', all implying that the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle's 'haran apuldran' referred the place where the Rochester Roman road intersected with the River Rother. It is an obvious mustering place, just south of the Margary 13 junction with Margary 130, along which troops from Kent would arrive, and at the Rother along which Harold's huscarls would arrive. It would have been familiar to all Harold's commanders and to Anglo-Saxon Chronicle readers because it is where the Great Heathen Army stationed themselves in 893.

3. via regia

Via Regia - proper noun - crossed the Holy Roman Empire in the 13th century. A quick search of archive.org gave 113,000 hits on 'via regia', hardly any of which referred to the actual Via Regia. The enormous number of others is because it was the generic name for medieval public highways in England and elsewhere. Some of these were metalled Roman roads, the vast majority were unmetalled byways between important settlements. They are referred to as 'via regia' because the King used them for the movement of his court, his messengers and his troops, so it was illegal to block, destroy or rob construction material from via regia.  They had no maintenance program but the King would command a nearby vassel or church to fix bad ruts. If a byway became unusable through rutting, the general public was allowed to use a fresh route parallel to the original.

Welshman refers to the 'via regia' near Heathfield as the King's Highway - definite article and proper noun upper case letters - as if it is unique and important. In our opinion, there was nothing special about it. The original references are to a bog standard public highway, like hundreds of others in the country. It did not have military garrisons at either end. It did not link or pass through any sigificant settlement. It does not appear in any royal charters. It does not appear in any royal or clerical itineraries before the Andredsweald was cleared in Norman times. It was probably not even in regular use because long distance land travel was rare in Anglo-Saxon times and the Andredsweald's population was minuscule. It was probably used no more than a couple of times a month by a few dozen drovers that lived in the forest.

In our opinion, Heathfield was not the communications hub that Welshman suggests, and not somewhere that Harold is likely to have commanded his troops to muster.

4 Slaughter Rough

Welshman and Coleman propose that the name Slaughter Rough, a field in the southeast of their proposed battlefield, might be a memorial to those slain in the battle. We think it unlikely. The word 'slaughter' was not coined as a noun until the 15th century, or until the 16th century as a verb. It seems implausible to us that local memory of the battle would be lost for four hundred years, then suddenly get re-discovered and only be used to name a field.

Where then did the name come from? The modern word 'slaughter' derives from Norse 'slatr' but it seems implausible that a field would take that name in a part of southern England that was never in the Danelaw. Perhaps, it was a makeshift abatoir at one time. In our opinion, the field's name derived from Old English 'slohtre', meaning 'sloe tree' or 'muddy hollow tree', with no violent history association.

5. Harold's route to the theatre of war

Welshman and Coleman propose that Harold brought the English army south on Margary 14 to Uckfield where they branched east on the LIN-129 forest byway before camping at Horeapeltre Common near Old Heathfield. It looks like a relatively long and arduous journey compared to the Margary 13 route via Rochester. Welshman and Coleman suggest one group of reasons (1 to 4) why Harold might have liked to use Margary 14, and one group why he might have rejected Margary 13 (5 to 7).

1. LIN-129 was on high ground allowing Harold to "seize any of a number of hills or spurs if he should be attacked".
2. LIN-129 has "a number of superb observation points"
3. The Andredsweald southern border ran along LIN-129, protecting the English rear if they needed to fight.
4. Following high ridgeways was the fastest way to move troops around.
5. Margary 14 crossed the Rother at Bodiam where there might not have been a ford.
6. The undulating route of Margary 13 south to Cripps Corner did not afford the consistent high ground and commanding views of the Heathfield-Netherfield ridgeway.
7. Margary 13 does not provide significant woodland cover to conceal Harold’s approach.

Argument 4 is simply wrong. The fastest way to move troops with a wagon train was on a Roman road. This is self-evidently true because the Roman army would not have gone to such lengths to build Roman roads if it was easier to move troops on ridgeways. Waterways would be next best, if they were available. Ridgeways would have been a much inferior third choice when Roman roads and waterways were unavailable.

Argument 7 concerns Harold's ability to conceal his location, perhaps because he wanted to take the Normans by surprise. It is irrelevant because Harold and William had been exchanging messages, so each knew exactly where the other was located. There is no possibilty that Harold thought he might take William by surprise.

Perhaps the most important of these arguments is 3, that LIN-129 ran along the Andredsweald's southern border. If it ran through the forest, there would be no useful observation points (argument 2) and few defensive hills suitable for a shield wall (argument 1). We note that the five manors covering thirty square miles to the south of Heathfield - Wardon, Warbleton, Chiddingley, Hawkridge and Hendon - had no meadowland between them and a combined population of just 17 households. Moreover, the only routes through the Andredsweald that are mentioned in royal or clerical itineraries through to the 14th century are the two Roman roads, which implies that the forest byways were too difficult for wagon trains. In our opinion, Heathfield was at least five miles from the southern border of the Andredsweald. This would have brought a lot of additional problems.

Horse collars were yet to invented in the 11th century, so Harold's wagon train would have been drawn by yoked oxen. Pivoting front axles were also yet to be invented. Fixed axle ox drawn wagins would have been horribly unwieldy with a 15m turning circle, hopeless for steering around trees and getting out of ruts. Daniel Defoe reports that it took six oxen to pull an old lady's carriage to church along Wealden forest byways. Harold's wagon train would have been far more weighty, and the slower they progressed, the more food, ale and fodder they would have needed, compounding the difficulties. It might have taken a month for Harold to get his wagons from Uckfield to Netherfield, and his troops could not precede their supplies.

We discuss Harold's route in detail in our book. For our purposes here, we would just make four points.

• We find it implausible that William would have attacked Harold in or near the Andredsweald, for fear that Harold or his brothers melted away into the woodland and escaped.
• We find it implausible that Harold would have risked a long journey through dense forest for fear there might be snipers in the trees - as William Rufus discovered to his cost a few decades later.
• Medieval armies did not take food, ale (no one drank water in medieval times) and fodder with them. Whenever possible, they moved from settlement to settlement plundering whatever was available at each and on the way. That would have been easy if Harold came down Margary 13 but impossible if he came down Margary 14 and branched onto the LIN-129. Indeed, for this very reason, if he did come down Margary 14, he would have camped at Uckfield.
• The Romans were brilliant engineers who built hundreds of roads that crossed rivers. It seems implausible to us that they would not have directed the road to cross a fluvial part of the Rother, or if that was too out of the way, to cross the estuary on a low tide ford.

We remain convinced that Harold brought the English army down Margary 13.

6. The meaning of Hastinges

Most of the contemporary accounts say that the battle was fought at or near a place named 'Hastinges', or somewhere that sounds like it. Welshman proposes that it referred to a proto Rape of Hastings, thereby incorporating Old Heathfield. In our opinion, this would not match the Norman, or some Anglo-Norman, contemporary accounts:

1. Poitiers, Jumièges, Huntingdon and Benoît say that the Normans built a fortress at Hastingas, as if Hastingas was a settlement.
2. CBA says that the Normans constructed a fortress at “a port named Hastinges”.
3. Brevis Relatio says that William: “arrived with his whole army at another port nearby named Hastingas”.
4. Malmesbury says that William: “built another monastery near Hastingis, dedicated to St. Martin”. That monastery was Battle Abbey, so it only makes sense if Hastingis was a settlement.
5. Benoît says that after the battle: “William placed his best knights to guard the fortress at Hastinges”, which only makes sense if Hastinges was a settlement.
6. John of Worcester says that Harold: “… gave them battle at a place nine miles from Heastingam”, which can only refer to a settlement.

They all say or suggest that Hastingas was a settlement or port, which means that it was probably a settlement at a port. Conversely, they all contradict 'Hastinges' being an area, especially not one as large as a Rape, thereby contradicting an Old Heathfield battlefield. 

7. The Norman camp was nine Roman miles from the battlefield

Welshman proposes that Malmesbury was referring to the distance between the Norman camp and the orthodox battlefield at Battle Abbey. Very clever. There is no evidence that this was his intention, but it might have been. Even so, as the crow flies, Battle Abbey is six miles from the orthodox Norman camp at modern Hastings or four Roman miles from their proposed Norman camp at Bulverhythe. The crow flying distances do not match what Malmesdbury says, and it would make no sense if he was referring to marching miles from Bulverhythe because it was an island in those days.

8. A foreward battle camp

The Normans could not have marched fifteen miles from their main camp on the coast to Heathfield and arrive by the third hour of the day, when some accounts say that the battle started. Welshman and Coleman therefore propose that the Normans moved to a battle camp within striking distance of Heathfield on the day before the battle.

We are convinced they are right about the battle camp. It is consistent with Brevis Relatio and the Chronicle of Battle Abbey, both of which specifically say or imply that the Normans had a battle camp near the enemy. It is the only way that the English standards and the English troop deployment might have been visible from a Norman camp, as half a dozen accounts describe. But we think they have fingered the wrong place.

Welshman and Coleman propose that the Norman battle camp was at Netherfield, some seven miles from Heathfield. It could be just about within marching distance, if the Normans took breakfast and Mass in the dark. But there is no possibility that the English standards or the English troop deployment might have been visible through seven miles of woodland.

9. Initial troop deployment

Welshman and Coleman explain that the the battle events are currently beyond the scope of their theory, They only go as far as to propose a cheron shaped initial English troop deployment around Hugletts Farm. It is enough to compare Old Heathfield to many of our battlefield clues - see table at the start of this blog. So, the proposed Hugglets Farm battlefield is not narrow, not on a small hill, not on a north-south ridge, not on a spur, not overlooked by another hill, and has no adjacent ditch into which the Normans might have been shield-charged.

Our bigger problem with the proposed Old Heathfield initial troop deployment is that it is too long - over 2km - and not steep enough in places. Indeed, the 250m section north of the nursery is on level ground. If Harold stacked that vulnerable section ten deep, the rest of the line would have been just two deep. If, on the other hand, he deployed all his troops on rising ground (cyan line), the line would have been over 2.5km long and less than three deep. Worse, the battlefield is too big for Harold to have commanded his flanks from the middle, and the line is too long to have been manned by huscarls. Indeed, most of the line would have manned by unarmoured farmers armed with billhooks. Moreover, this troop deployment makes a nonsense of William's tactics, and of Wace's description of William leading the middle division 'where the fighting would be most intense'.

Old Heathfield summary

In our opinion, the core place name evidence supporting an Old Heathfield battlefield location is faulty, and the other supporting evidence is weak or faulty. We do not believe the central premise that the English army headed south on Margary 14. Even if we accept for a moment that they did use Margary 14, there is no justification for Harold to have moved from Uckfield to Old Heathfield - thereby compounding his logistical challenge, exposing himself to snipers  and risking his country's future - for no benefit. In our opinion, if William had been faced by the proposed initial troop deployment at Hugglets Farm, he would have used his cavalry to probe weaknesses all along the paper thin line, and it is implausible that they would not have made a breakthrough in less than an hour. While Welshman and Coleman's theory is not impossible, we think it is implausibly unlikely.

Blackhorse Hill

David Barnby's theory is recorded in his 2023 book '1066 The Lost Hastings Battlefield'. He subscribes to Nick Austin's Combe Haven landing theory, and therefore proposes that the Normans camped at Upper Wilting. As we mention above, Austin's landing theory is fundamentally flawed, so the same issues blight Blackhorse Hill. Nevertheless, as with Telham Hill above, we will forbear about the landing and camp to consider Barnby's engagement and battle theories in isolation. 

Blackhorse Hill engagement and battle scenario

First a note about the names. Barnby refers to his proposed battlefield as Blackhorse Hill, but that is the name of the north slope. His battlefield is on the south slope, at what is now the Crowhurst Park Holiday Village. We will refer to it as Crowhurst Park to avoid confusion.

Barnby proposes that the Normans were camped at Upper Wilting at dawn on the day of battle, a theory previously proposed by Nick Austin twenty-five years ago. Meanwhile, he argues that the English were camped on his proposed battlefield at Crowhurst Park. He speculates that the Rochester Roman road extended from Sedlescombe to Blackhorse Hill, then crossed the Hastings Ridge and descended the other side, passing through Crowhurst Park and Upper Wilting before terminating at a minor Roman port in what is now Redgeland Wood. According to Barnby the Normans advanced north along this road to engage the enemy. There is a steep slope to the west of Crowhurst Park. Barnby suggests that the English lined the ridge above this slope, and looped their shield wall in a chicken drumstick shape. William then chose to attack uphill from the south. At the battle's end, the English therefore fled north on the Roman road through the Roman iron working site in Beauport Park.

Barnby's supporting evidence

Crowhurst Park is on the south slope of the highest hill on the Hastings Ridge. Barnby's proposed battlefield has a 5% slope to the south, the direction from which he believes that the Normans attacked. It is very steep to the west where it drops down to a tiny stream. He proposes that this valley is the Chronicle of Battle Abbey's Malfosse ditch. 

John of Worcester says that the English were drawn up in a narrow place. The southern side of Barnby's proposed battlefield is just 350m across. If the Normans attacked up the slope from the south, their view of the shield wall would match this description.  Several contemporary sources report that the Normans made little impact on the shield wall despite attacking throughout the day. Barnby argues that this would make sense if they were continuously assaulting a well-defended position from the south.

Barnby's unique and specific evidence is a mound which he accurately reports to have been known as 'The Mount' in Victorian times. Located adjacent to the A2100, it is just 200m from the upper section of his proposed shield wall. He speculates that it might have been constructed as a monument to the Norman victory or perhaps for the mass burial of battle victims. His supporting evidence is in 'An etymological dictionary of family and Christian names' by Willam Arthur (1857). He quotes the end of the 'Mountjoy' entry to be saying: "This name [Mountjoy] is still retained in a division of the hundred of Battel, not far from the remains of a majestic pile reared by William the Conqueror. Boyer defines 'Mont-joie' as a heap of stones made by a French army, as a monument of victory." Barnby speculates that Arthur's 'majestic pile' referred to 'The Mount' and that it was a Mont-joie monument.

Barnby's other evidence is helpfully listed after the appendices in his book:

1. That events on the western side of the battlefield could have been observed by youths and clerics from the adjacent Telham Place spur, as described by Wace.
2. That Harold placed his banner at the "highest point of the summit" of the battlefield hill, which aligns with Carmen.
3. That the English fled through deep gulleys around the Beauport Park iron workings, which aligns with the Chronicle of Battle Abbey, Orderic, Poitiers and others.
4. That several place names on the northern side of the Hastings Ridge might preserve references to the battle. Blackhorse Hill could refer to the black horses reportedly ridden by William and Odo, while Duke’s Wood and Bishop’s Wood might reference the two leaders. Additionally, Red River, Red River Wood, and Red River Pond could recall a tradition that the water ran red with blood after the battle.

Analysis of supporting evidence

Maps by Yeakell & Gardner and Thomas Gream show Crowhurst Park and the western stream valley to have been heavily wooded in the 18th century. This makes it unlikely that they were the open battlefield and valley described in the contemporary accounts, though it remains a possibility. If they were open ground at the time, the western and southern sections of  Barnby's proposed battlefield are a reasonable match for those descriptions. The Chronicle of Battle Abbey describes the Malfosse is a pit rather than a fluvial valley, so it is not the west valley that Barnby proposes. However, its proximity to the proposed battlefield along with its steep sides and orientation mean that if it was unwooded at the time, it could correspond with Wace's shield charge ditch.

Barnby's proposed shield wall has some creditable features that are otherwise only consistent with Hurst Lane. For instance, he is correct to propose that it was enclosed. Seven contemporary accounts say or imply that the shield wall was enclosed, reflecting a common defensive tactic against cavalry since Roman times. It is a shame that proponents of the orthodox battlefield and the other alternative battlefields have not taken heed. Barnby is also correct to propose that the shield wall is narrow, just 350m wide when viewed from the south, with the English fighting back-to-back. John of Worcester specifically says that 'the English were drawn up in a narrow place', Wace specifically says that they were deployed to fight back-to-back, and this is how they are depicted on the Bayeux Tapestry.

However, some aspects of Barnby’s proposed battlefield cast doubts about its feasibility. Most pertinently, it is huge compared to most of the other battlefield candidates, more than eight times the size of Hurst Lane (380000m² versus 47000m²), for example. The relatively level crown at Crowhurst Park is far too big for an army of 7000 to defend, so Barnby proposes that the English only defended the western side. This would leave the entire eastern side of the English shield wall exposed on level or downward-sloping ground. Moreover, while Barnby says that his shield wall is 5000ft (1524m) long, it is really about 1750m, spreading the line even thinner. It cannot be reduced in length without pulling the southern side of the shield all onto such gently sloping ground that it may as well be level too. 

Barnby calculates that the shield wall could be manned one rank deep to the west and three ranks deep elsewhere, leaving 2500 men in reserve. However, shield walls relied on mulitple ranks to be effective: the men in the front rank held shields and spears to keep attackers at arms length, while men in the second rank hacked them to pieces with axes wielded between the heads of those in front. A one rank shield wall would allow the attackers to grab the defenders' spears and break their formation. In other words, the shield wall had to be at least two ranks to operate effectively. A more accurate calculation would be that the shield wall was two ranks deep to the west and three ranks deep elsewhere, leaving the third rank to fill gaps if men in front of them fell.

The Normans would have struggled to make any impact on Barnby's shield wall if they attacked from the south or west, but they would not have done. If the Normans had camped at Upper Wilting, they would have marched up the Baldslow spur ridgeway onto the Hastings Ridge. Baldslow was an Anglo-Saxon settlement, so it would probably have been on a ridgeway along the Hastings Ridge towards Battle and beyond. William would have used the Hastings Ridge ridgeway to attack Barnby's shield wall from the north and east.  While Barnby describes the eastern terrain as level, the Normans could have angled their approach to gain a downhill advantage. We think it implausible that a three-rank shield wall could have withstood sustained downhill oblique-order attacks for more than an hour, let alone the entire day. It would also contradict Poitiers’ claim that the fiercest fighting occurred in the center.

The Mount also looks dubious. We investigated. It looks like a slag heap and responds to metal detectors as if there is something magnetic underneath. We suspect it is left over slag from the stock that was used to surface the Hastings to Flimwell turnpike. Anyway, Barnby misquotes William Arthur's statement. Arthur actually says 'the majestic pile' rather than 'a majestic pile', a minor distinction that changes the meaning. He was clearly referring to Battle Abbey not The Mount. Barnby argues that Arthur could not have meant Battle Abbey because it was largely destroyed during the Dissolution of the Monasteries. However, Arthur was referring to the original Battle Abbey, not its 13th-century replacement. Finally, while it is true that some French soliders did raise stone piles on hilltops and refer to them as Mont-joie, the Normans were not French and the practice did not start until at least two hundred years after the Conquest.

Some of Barnby's key arguments are baseless. He claims, for example, that the Anglo-Saxon 'port of Hastings' was located in Combe Haven to export products from iron ore mines in Beauport Park: "That the [Beauport Park] bloomery was still being worked until the early days of the industrial revolution, when purer ores were being discovered elewhere in the country, means iron was almost certainly being extracted at Beauport Wood (and surrounding sites) through the centuries and without doubt at the time of the Conquest." He provides no evidence that the Beauport Park mines were active in Anglo-Saxon or Georgian times - despite claiming they 'without doubt' and 'almost certainly' were - and this contradict WIRG who report that there is no evidence of post-Roman iron working anywere in the Brede basin or Combe Haven basin. On the contrary, the Romans mined out the Hastings Peninsula's iron ore in the mid-3rd century and abandoned it, so Anglo-Saxons almost certainly did not work the iron ore mines at Beauport Park. 

Barnby proposes a route for a Roman road from Combe Haven to Sedlescombe via Crowhurst Park, Blackhorse Hill and the Beauport Park iron ore mines. It is important because this is the road that he proposes to have been used by Harold to bring the English army to the Crowhurst Park battlefield. The only evidence he provides is a photograph of General Murray's drive. He says that it 'looks Roman', but does not explain how. It does not look Roman to us because it passes straight over a 15% slope whereas Roman roads would be oblique or zig-zag to reduce the steepness below 9%.

Turning to the minor evidence:

1. Barnby is right that the western side of his proposed battlefield would have been visible from Telham Place spur, assuming the intervening valley was treeless at the time. 
2. Blackhorse Hill is the highest point on the Hasting Ridge, as Barnby states, but Carmen does not say that Harold planted his banner at the highest point in the vicinity. Instead, it says that he 'planted his banner at the highest point of the summit' of the battlefield hill. It is a very odd tautology. We interpret it to mean that he 'planted his banner at the highest point of the crest of the battlefield hill', implying it was a spur. Barnby's battlefield is on a spur, but his shield wall does not encompass the water tower which marks the crest's summit, making it inconsistent with Carmen's description.
3. The deep gulleys through Beauport Park are oriented north-south. The English would be have fled north along the ridges between the deep gulleys rather than across the gulleys. The Normans would therefore have chased them along the ridges between the gulleys. It seems unlikely that a significant number of them would fall into the gulleys, and they are unlikely to have suffered any injury if they did because the gulleys have soft bases.  Furthermore, most contemporary accounts describe the deadly ditches where the Normans fell as 'pits' rather than fluvial valleys. In this region, this suggests that they were open-cast iron ore mines, whereas Beauport Park contained stream valley mines.
4. Blackhorse Hill is believed to have been named after the Black Horse public house in Telham. It was only established in the 18th century and is therefore implausibly unlikely to have taken its name from the horses ridden by William and Odo. Duke's Wood and Bishop's Wood were not woods in the 18th century, according to Yeakell & Gardner and Gream. Their names were given sometime in the 19th century, so they too are implausibly unlikely to have taken their names from William or Odo. The 'Red' names are probably because those streams run through siderite (iron stone) bands which stain the water red.  They are still red today.

Summary

Barnby's engagement scenario is based on Nick Austin's proposed Norman camp at Upper Wilting, for which there is no valid evidence and no likelihood. His proposed Blackhorse Hill battlefield is a better match for the contemporary account battlefield descriptions than the orthodox battlefield and most of the other alternative battlefield candidates, but only because he proposes an enclosed narrow shield wall, which could apply anywhere. Otherwise, Crowhurst Park only matches a handful of the most general battlefield descriptions. Conversely, it contradicts the most specific battlefield clues, namely Wace's description of the Norman advance and the many descriptions of deadly pits along the route that the English fled. Crowhurst Park also contradicts both Harold's proposed strategy and William's documented tactics: Harold would not have chosen to defend a battlefield where he could only deploy a wafer thin shield wall or where more than half was on level ground or a downslope; William would not have chosen to attack uphill on a narrow front if it was just as easy to attack downill on a wide front. Barnby's only other significant supporting evidence is The Mount, which we believe to have been misinterpreted.

Time Team & English Heritage

Thanks to the power of television, the best-known alternative battlefield theory is Time Team's, from their 2013 special '1066: The Lost Battlefield'. Tony Robinson (sitting on the bench at Upper Lake, Figure 77) concludes that the battle probably did happen on Battle Hill, only with the Normans attacking along the ridge crest from the east rather than up soggy fields from the south.

We are reliably informed by one of the producers that Time Team did not take their theory seriously, but thought they needed to say something positive because the entire dig made no finds, no advances and no useful discoveries. We were therefore surprised to read an interview conducted by Roy Porter, English Heritage's Head of Property, with The Guardian: “The one place we know the armies weren't is the low ground below the abbey, where most visitors understandably think the battle must have been fought." Then, the Guardian reporter is not contradicted when he says that the view from the gatehouse roof shows the: "high ground towards Hastings from which William’s army marched". It sounds like sme important people in English Heritage have accepted Time Team's theory. A former East Sussex County Archaeologist told us in private that this is his personal view too.

Figure 78 is our interpretation of the traditional English battlefield deployment, only with the Normans attacking from the east insteasd of from the south. Tony Robinson’s bench is under the head of the middle arrow. The Norman attack would be coming along modern Marley Lane from the east.

Exactly as Time Team suggest, a ridge crest attack makes more military sense than the traditional attack. The Normans would be on better ground and would not be fighting up a significant hill. Harold would be forced to concentrate his elite huscarls at the east end of the line, making the other flank even more susceptible to an oblique order attack. Everything else is the same. The English shield wall would still have to stretch between the two stream heads. There would still need to be an implausible natural barrier that prevented the Norman cavalry riding around the open ends of the English line. Therefore, just as with the orthodox engagement scenario, the battle would have been over in 30 minutes whereas the contemporary accounts say that the battle lasted most of the day.

The orthodox battlefield was already a poor match for the contemporary account battlefield and engagement descriptions. A Norman attack along the ridge crest would contradict those few clues it did match. It would no longer be overlooked by Telham Hill, the English would no longer first see the Normans cresting a hill and crossing a valley, there would no longer be a plain below either of the Norman flanks, the battlefield would no longer be on a steepish slope. We list 36 clues about the battlefield and deployments from the contemporary accounts. Time Team’s theory does not match a single one.

Time Team’s theory would mean that the battle’s killing zone was under the modern town. As the Guardian says: “To add to the confusion, the annual recreation of the battle by costumed re-enactors, which will be fought with increased fervour in October, is held in the wrong place, since the town and the abbey ruins occupy the true site.”  We have a suspicion that English Heritage might endorse Time Team’s theory because it absolves them of any responsibility to find archaeological evidence of the battle on the traditional battlefield.

Wadhurst Lane / Beech Farm

Through to the late 1990s, we still accepted the traditional view that the English army camped on Caldbec Hill. Wace says that the Norman fleet steered towards a port. He implies that they passed through the port to land upstream of it. We speculated that they steered towards pefenes ea, then passed it to land in the Ash Bourne estuary. If they landed there, they would have camped on Standard Hill, a mile south of the western end of the Isthmus Ridge. Caldbec Hill is at the eastern end of the Isthmus Ridge.

If the Normans camped at Standard Hill and the English camped at Caldbec Hill, we speculated that the battle might have played out as tradition suggests, only rotated 90 degrees clockwise onto the Isthmus Ridge instead of the Hastings Ridge. In other words, the English were heading west along the Isthmus Ridge to attack the Norman camp on Standard Hill, when they ran into the Normans heading the other way. As in the traditional scenario, and as Carmen specifically says, we thought the English might then have occupied a nearby hill where they set up their shield wall.

The two candidates are High Wood hill on the B2096 and Wadhurst Lane, both of which are roughly a mile north of the Isthmus Ridge. High Wood hill is higher and steeper but, as its name suggests, it is ancient dense woodland. The battle described in the primary sources could not have happened in woodland, let alone such dense woodland as High Wood. We concentrated on Wadhurst Lane.

Wadhurst Lane follows the north-south leg of a chevron shaped ridge (Figure 79). He east-west leg crosses Beech Farm. We investigated several places along the ridge where the battle might plausibly have happened, before abandoning the location when we realised that the Normans almost certainly did not land in the Pevensey lagoon. Simon Coleman took up the baton, proposing that the Normans attacked a shield wall across modern Beech Farm (Figure 80).

One major issue we had with Coleman’s theory is that Yeakell & Gardner (Figure 81) show that Beech Farm was covered by woodland in the 18th century. If it was covered by woodland in the 18th century, it was almost certainly covered by woodland in the 11th century, which makes it implausible as a battlefield

In the first editions of this book, we dedicate a section to other reasons we believe Coleman’s Beech Farm theory is implausible. We note that he has now abandoned the theory, so we have redacted our comments. He is instead backing Dr Welshman’s Old Heathfield battlefield theory.